Center for Strategic and International Studies

August 27, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung achieved his top goal: a productive and cordial meeting with President Trump. He did so and more, hitting all the right notes. From his speech at CSIS to his interactions with Trump, Lee consistently emphasized the importance of the alliance, underscored the need for continued cooperation with the United States against China, and highlighted the shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea. His use of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) slogan, “We go together,” resonated with Washington’s South Korea watchers, who were looking for signs that Lee would seek to weaken the alliance in favor of “balancing” the relationship with a more conciliatory China policy.

Some liberal South Korean (ROK) presidents have sought a new path with the United States—because of such attempts, both Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in had challenging starts to their relationship with Presidents Bush and Trump as they channeled the desire of some of their core liberal supporters to stand up to “big brother” and shed any sense of dependency on the United States. Despite this, by the end of their respective terms, on alliance issues, China policy, economic cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, the two presidents had the U.S. relationship on stable ground and at the nexus of South Korea’s foreign policy and, arguably, the U.S.-ROK relationship at the center point of their presidencies.

While many critics expected Lee to stumble out of the gate on the world stage after a career laser-focused on domestic ROK policy and politics, he clearly learned two important lessons before arriving in Washington and did not miss a step. First, the relationship with the U.S. president and the United States is pivotal; therefore, he should seek to get off on the right foot with Trump and with the U.S. government. Second, he realized that, however appealing standing up to the United States might be to some in the Democratic Party of Korea, South Korea ultimately wants its president to get it right with the United States. If, while maintaining a good relationship with the United States, there are moves toward “sovereignty” or “independence,” all the better, but first, the goal is not to harm South Korea’s only ally and most important economic partner.

Lee shared he learned from The Art of the Deal that though Trump might use threats during negotiations, ultimately, he would not “cause a wound” or damage relationships that matter. He got this right as Trump seemed ready to send Lee down the Zelensky/Ramaphosa route with his early August 25 (just hours before the Oval Office meeting) salvo via Truth Social about the “purge and revolution” going on in South Korea, but ultimately smoothed things over publicly and privately to focus on the alliance, trade, investment, shipbuilding, security, and North Korea.

Lee struck the only note he could—South Korea has one ally, one relationship that represents the future, and that is the relationship with the United States. Therefore, the South Korean people will judge Lee, like they have every South Korean president before him, by his ability to manage the relationship with the United States. Lee did what he needed to do—artfully flatter Trump, not fall into the trap of contradicting Trump, and pivot from controversial (for example on comfort women) to less thorny issues (such as Japan-ROK ties are important or golf in North Korea) and avoided the bizarre (let’s fly to Beijing together) while focusing on reassuring topics (South Korea is ready to work with the United States to manage and compete with China).

On North Korea policy, there has occasionally been daylight between the United States and South Korea. In many instances, at the heart of the matter is a desire by both the United States and South Korea to engage in bilateral talks with the North, sharing more or less what they are attempting. Even when the Six-Party Talks were the main negotiating vehicle (2003–2009), keeping all parties aligned and keeping track of the various bilateral initiatives featured as main diplomatic tasks. 

The Trump-Lee summit featured extensive discussions on North Korea, with both leaders signaling their eagerness to reengage with Pyongyang. Lee praised Trump’s past diplomatic overtures, while Trump himself expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un again, describing their relationship as “very good.” Lee’s framing of himself as a “pacemaker” to Trump’s “peacemaker” role could position South Korea as a partner in any future talks. However, the path to a breakthrough remains uncertain, as Kim Jong-un has not yet shown interest in dialogue, and his comprehensive strategic partnership with Moscow likely limits his ability to engage.

On the security front, Lee affirmed South Korea’s commitment to the alliance by announcing a planned increase in the defense budget. This move, which was well-received by the United States, aims to modernize the South Korean military and bolster its capabilities. While some questions remain about the details of defense cost-sharing and how to interpret “strategic flexibility,” along with Trump’s public comments that the United States could take ownership of military base land, the overall tone of the summit on security matters was positive and forward-looking.

In the wake of the July 30 trade agreement and commitment by South Korea to invest $350 billion and purchase up to $150 billion in fossil fuels, focus on economic and industrial collaboration featured prominently at the summit. While the investment commitments were substantial, shipbuilding emerged as the strategic centerpiece for Lee’s visit. Discussions at the industry roundtable, attended by executives from major South Korean and U.S. companies, suggested a deal is in the works that could see greater South Korean participation in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. HD Hyundai, Cerberus Capital, and the Korea Development Bank agreed to form an investment strategy to attract and focus tens of billions into revamping the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This builds upon the $150 billion South Korean “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again” proposal. The initiative, which could potentially involve a modification or modernization of the Jones Act, aligns with President Trump's “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” agenda. To further highlight this partnership and the potential for such a partnership, Lee visited the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on August 26, which Hanwha Ocean purchased for $100 million and reportedly will invest an additional $70 million to expand the facility.

Lee’s visit to Washington exceeded all expectations and was a success. The next opportunity to build on this success is a possible Trump visit to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit at the end of October. If Trump does travel to Gyeongju, and possibly Seoul as well, it could help to catalyze real progress on Korea’s investment commitments, to refine the trade agreement, and to define what modernizing the alliance will mean for the two countries. The possibility of North Korea engagement could boost chances for Trump to invest further in the relationship with Lee and the relationship with South Korea.

Energy and Resilience: Policy Briefs 2025

June 13, 2025

Trilateral Recommendations for Pacific Energy and National Security Focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and two of its critical allies in the Pacific, recommending trilateral U.S.-Japan–South Korea energy cooperation. 

Goal: Incorporate trilateral energy cooperation as a central pillar if Camp David trilateral engagement continues and/or start a separate, trilateral energy coordination mechanism for the United States, Japan, and South Korea. 

Option 1: Camp David Summit Agenda picked up by Trump Administration.

Method: Build a government-led trilateral energy pillar separate from and in support of the Camp David Agenda based on a Baker Institute-led study and in collaboration with Stanford’s Hoover Institute to develop the most effective areas to focus on based on Japan’s recently released energy strategy and the approach of the new U.S. administration.2 

• Hold a series of joint webinars and meetings with Japanese, Korean, and U.S. officials and energy policy experts to build a trilateral energy agenda. 

• Convene a track 1.5 trilateral energy security dialogue based on the agendas and preparatory work done between January and March. 

• July 2025 onward: Trilateral Energy Security Dialogue held in Korea, Japan, and the U.S., alternating and on a quarterly or biannual basis. 

Option 2: Camp David Summit Agenda not adopted by Trump Administration 

Method: Focus efforts on Track 2 work to build trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Host a webinar to discuss the potential for trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Kick off in-person meeting with think tanks and energy industry officials. 

• Invite ROKG, GOJ and USG participants or observers. 

• Launch a biannual series of in-person meetings, alternating between the United States, Korea and Japan to encourage greater trilateral coordination. In 2026, present findings and progress along with recommendations to the three governments, offering a specific way forward should the governments choose to adopt trilateral energy cooperation as a key area of focus. 

Areas of Focus: Three Potential Sample Policy Areas for Trilateral Coordination 

1. Minerals Security Partnership (MSP):

• The MSP continues as a core multilateral organization since it works to Trump 1.0 goals to secure critical minerals and develop a secure supply chain not dependent on China.3 That trilateral coordination within the MSP would serve as a key driver, for policy, projects, and investment. 

• Ultimately, the USG would consult with the ROKG and the GOJ before any MSP meeting, much as the USG does now with the P3 (France, UK and the United States) before any UN meeting or as the USG does now with the quad (UK, France, Germany) before any NATO meeting to coordinate approach and ensure cohesion among the leading countries. 

• To develop such an approach, all three governments should develop a greater awareness and understanding of their current leadership role (Japan served as the chair of the MSP until June 2024, Korea currently serves as chair) as well as the potential for this type of coordination. 

  • Engage with Trump administration State and DOE teams to highlight the potential and lay out how to institute and institutionalize such an approach. 

  • Approach Seoul and Tokyo with the same pitch through in-person meetings with their top diplomatic and energy officials. 

• Agree on several key initiatives and targets that the three countries could advocate for within the MSP. 

• Highlight the wins of a more effective MSP, energized by the three countries that have most at stake and have most capacity to invest capital, mineral extraction, and processing ability to help boost non-China dependent mineral supply chains. 

• Potential areas for cooperation: 

  • Japan and the United States could join the ROK-led MSP working group on the Mahenge Mine project.4 

  • Japan (JOGMEC, JBIC) could offer a virtual briefing to Korea and the United States to describe Japanese private sector investments in upstream and midstream minerals (e.g., Sumitomo, Mitsui). 

2. Methane Abatement 

• Japan, the ROK, the United States, and other countries issued a Joint Statement in July 2023 to collaborate on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly methane from LNG imports and exports. JERA and KOGAS also launched the CLEAN Initiative, a voluntary effort where gas buyers would seek methane emissions data from producers to prioritize procurement of lower-methane gas. 

• Establish regular meetings in which the United States, Japan, and Korea discuss policy and industry steps to mitigate methane and CO2 emissions from internationally traded fossil fuels, including through implementation of the CLEAN initiative. We recommend inviting technical experts (governmental, academia, industry, NGOs, etc.) to brief the United States, Japan, and the ROK on tools that can be used to measure and mitigate greenhouse gases (methane and CO2) from imported fossil fuels, including assessing existing policy levers, examining price and market impacts, and assessing internationally aligned approaches to cut emissions from traded fuels. 

• Assemble a team of experts, working with other institutions, to brief USG, ROKG, and GOJ officials, planting the seed for regular track 1.5 and track 2 trilateral meetings to advance methane abatement coordination. 

• Brief industry representatives based on the findings assembled during the meetings in order to encourage them to take efforts to reduce methane emissions. 

3. Technical Assistance Coordination in the Pacific Islands Counties (PICs) 

• USTDA has funded a mini-grid feasibility study evaluating site configurations for 75 priority sites in Fiji. USTDA is also conducting a site selection study supporting renewable energy in Tonga. USTDA is actively considering several other activities in the region from rooftop solar and BESS to utility-level smart grid roadmaps. 

• The three governments share information on projects through regularly scheduled calls to minimize overlap and interference in other countries’ efforts. 

The Center for Energy Studies at the Baker Institute at Rice University has served to enhance collaboration between industry, think tanks and governments of ROK, Japan and US over the past year and would be willing to be a convener and policy advisor for Trilateral Energy Cooperation going forward.

Notes

1. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The Trilateral Leaders Summit at Camp David.” The American Presidency Project (U.S. National Archives), August 18, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp david/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20ROK%E2%80%A6 

2. METI Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. “Basic Plan on Energy and the Environment.” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 19, 2025. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/. 

3. U.S. Department of State. “Minerals Security Partnership.” U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership. 

4. U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on Establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership Finance Network.” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, September 23, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint statement-on-establishment-of-the-minerals-security-partnership-finance-network/. 

5. European Commission. “EU and Global Partners Reaffirm Their Commitment to Tackling Methane Emissions in the Natural Gas Value Chain.” European Commission, DG Energy, July 18, 2023. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-global-partners-reaffirm-their-commitment-tackling-methane emissions-natural-gas-value-chain-2023-07-18_en. 

6. Čučuk, Aida. “KOGAS, JERA to Reduce Methane Emissions in the LNG Value Chain.” Offshore Energy, July 19, 2023. https://www.offshore-energy.biz/kogas-jera-to-reduce-methane-emissions-in-lng-value-chain/

7. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Advances Rural Electrification in Fiji.” May 18, 2023. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-advances-rural-electrification-in-fiji/. 

8. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Signs Infrastructure Deal in Tonga, Expands Pacific Island Commitments.” April 22, 2022. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-signs-infrastructure-deal-in tonga-expands-pacific-island-commitments/.

Korea Economic Daily

July 31, 2025

When the US demands burden-sharing from its allies, it must demonstrate global leadership and expand its influence.

Recently, Koreans' attention has been focused on the US tariff war and trade friction. I want to discuss something else: Official Development Assistance (ODA). I ​​understand that there's a tendency to view ODA as a leisurely topic. With even the US seeking to drastically reduce its development assistance, some may question Korea's need to step up.

However, now is the perfect time for Korea to increase its aid. By increasing its contributions, Korea can solidify its diplomatic standing in the international community and demonstrate global leadership. This will earn Korea praise from the US and its allies.

While the United States is in the process of drastically reducing its development assistance, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has emphasized that the U.S. government is not withdrawing from foreign aid. Furthermore, the U.S. appreciates South Korea's transition from aid recipient to donor.

Therefore, increasing aid now would be beneficial to maintaining the relationship with the United States. Like NATO partners grappling with defense cost adjustments, development assistance could be a way for South Korea to meet demands from U.S. allies for greater burden-sharing. It would also be a key differentiator in supporting global health and prosperity at a critical time.

Furthermore, it would strengthen South Korea's standing among the growing economies of ASEAN, Africa, South America, and OECD countries.

Beyond the potential credit from the United States for its expanded global development role, South Korea possesses a compelling narrative as the only country to transition from a major aid recipient to a significant donor. This compelling message, emphasizing that South Korea is reciprocating the support it received from the United States and others in the past, could resonate deeply with American audiences.

Specifically, actively cooperating with US priorities such as vaccine development and pandemic preparedness could have a positive impact on fundamentally reducing the demand for migration driven by economic poverty and political instability.

South Korea's aid support not only builds this narrative in Washington, but also strengthens its leadership position among other partner countries as one of the few OECD countries to have increased its development cooperation budget annually in recent years.

Korea is a prime example of effective, evidence-based aid strategies. For example, it could pledge additional contributions to organizations like Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, the Global Fund, and the Korea-based International Vaccine Institute (IVI), and collaborate with foundations like the Gates Foundation and Open Philanthropy.

This approach is preferable to expanding Korea's aid agencies, which are already stretched to their limits by recent funding increases. With the Global Fund and Gavi holding their financial commitment meetings this year, Korea's proactive and meaningful contributions would send a powerful message.

Taking the lead on addressing neglected issues like lead poisoning, which other countries have yet to address, presents another opportunity for Korea to demonstrate global leadership. Korean popular culture, or K-culture, is a unique asset in raising awareness of key issues. For example, if popular groups like BTS or Blackpink adopt long-term campaigns to address issues like lead poisoning or malaria, they could attract global attention through ongoing activities rather than one-off promotional activities.

Development investment also benefits Korea's pharmaceutical and biotechnology sectors, creating new opportunities for research and development (R&D) cooperation. To support the Korea-US bilateral relationship, President Lee Jae-myung's administration could propose ways for Korean biopharmaceutical companies to form joint ventures with US companies, directly invest in the US, and share R&D facilities.

Amidst growing economic tensions and concerns about defense cost-sharing, if Korea takes a leading role in philanthropy, leveraging its untapped potential, it will not only effectively manage its relationship with the US, but also secure global support and expand economic opportunities.on text goes here

Published November 7, 2024

Korean companies have invested 114 billion dollars in the United States in the last three years, creating tens of thousands of American jobs and helping to rebuild our manufacturing base in the United States. Korea, Korean companies, and the Korean people have put “all their chips” on the United States and the benefits for our country are many.  To encourage Korea to continue to place its bet on us and to chart its future with us, and not with Europe, Southeast Asia, or even China, in a way that is most beneficial to the American people, and the U.S. economy, the next U.S. president and Congress, could make long-discussed changes that would boost the relationship with Korea to new heights, make our country safer, the alliance more robust, and create more new jobs in the United States.

First, the United States could repeal its 232 steel tariffs and quota on South Korea. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimated that each job saved in the steel industry due to the tariffs came at a cost of nearly $650,000 to consumers. Repealing the tariffs would likely reverse many of these economic distortions and lead to overall economic gains for the United States. Partnerships, not tariffs, offer a way to revitalize our steel industry. The stalled Nippon Steel acquisition of U.S. Steel means that not only are U.S. customers paying more for steel, if something is not done to facilitate this type of partnership, it seems likely that the U.S. steel industry will not survive Chinese competition.  If the Nippon-U.S. Steel acquisition remains politically impossible, or even if it succeeds, the U.S. steel industry could and should explore forming a joint venture with South Korean companies or re-imagine a partnership with Nippon Steel in order to preserve not only jobs but the industry. Such a partnership could serve both Korean and U.S. industry and reestablish a viable steel industry for the future, powered by partnerships and American jobs, in the United States.  

Second, another industry that a revitalized relationship with Korea could resuscitate is shipbuilding.  South Korean companies have dipped their toes into the U.S. market with the $100 million purchase of U.S. shipbuilder Philly Shipyard. However, in order to save the shipbuilding industry and preserve U.S. capability to supply ships for the future—to our military as well as for cargo—we should take a far more sweeping approach and modify the Jones Act to allow production of needed vessels outside the United States such as LNG vessels that have not been built here since the 1970s. To encourage more shipbuilding in the United States, a joint ownership structure for a new, modern, and automated shipyard(s) in the United States could allow innovative South Korean companies to make significant investment in the United States that could not only preserve U.S. shipbuilding capacity and introduce thousands of new jobs into the United States, but could also help us retake a global leadership role in building the most advanced ships for our military and our industry.

Lastly, to facilitate even more Korean investment in batteries, semiconductors, and other industries of and for the future, and to ensure support for U.S. jobs and key industries as well as a viable future for industries like steel and shipbuilding, Congress should fast-track and promulgate the Partner with Korea Act introduced on October 8 to create a temporary, non-immigrant E-4 visa category for Koreans.  Previously, when the United States concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with a country, the deal came with special visa categories to help facilitate the increase in trade and investment that logically accompanies an FTA.  Congress decided with the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in 2010 that such visa provisions did not belong in an FTA.  That does not change the fact that such visa provisions are helpful to the United States and support the increased FDI that comes with an FTA. Therefore, Congress could rectify this and add in the jobs provisions to allow Koreans to more easily manage their significant investments in our industrial base, to support efforts to invest even more, and to create even more jobs in the United States. The KORUS FTA is, outside of NAFTA/MSCA, the largest trade deal for the United States, and the lack of more specialized visas means there are billions of Korean investment that are taking longer to materialize or, worse for the American people, are being redirected to Southeast Asia or elsewhere.  If the E-4 visa bill goes through, it would catalyze even more Korean investment with more Korean companies launching new investments in the United States. Currently, the bulk of Korean investment comes from South Korean conglomerates (chaebols), but expanding the visa program could lead to smaller, new high-tech Korean companies to expand their investment approach in the United States.

The U.S.-Korea relationship is strong and built for the future, but a few political tweaks could launch the next decades of cooperation and investment, boosting prosperity in both countries.