https://issuu.com/mh183/docs/energy_insights_2025/123

Northeast Asia’s Energy Outlook: Potential Through Innovation and Cooperation

Japan and South Korea: Energy Leaders in the Years Ahead

Japan and South Korea play central roles in the energy ecosystem despite not having any significant domestic energy supplies. They do this by driving technological advances and energy-related innovations out of necessity. In addition to individually remaining central to the global energy market, experts anticipate that the two countries will expand trilateral cooperation on energy with the United States.

Currently, the two countries import significant amounts of LNG — roughly 113 million metric tons combined in 2024 or 14% of U.S. LNG exports — and are intimately connected with the U.S. energy market given significant imports. Japan and South Korea combined imported 12% of U.S. oil and refined product exports in 2024. This has been boosted by the recent new trade deals signed between the United States and each country: July 23, 2025, for Japan and July 30, 2025, for South Korea. Another contributor is the significant Inflation Reduction Act of 2022-facilitated investments during the 2022–24 period in energy-related manufacturing, including semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), and EV batteries. Thanks to the new trade deals, investment in the United States will continue to grow.

Economic Size Matters

Japan’s and South Korea’s economies remain significant, with Japan the fifth largest economy with a GDP of over four trillion and South Korea the twelfth with a GDP of almost two trillion. While neither country will likely experience significant growth given demographic and economic trends — projected growth for Japan is under 1% in 2025 and 2026; projected growth for Korea is 1% in 2025 and 2.2% in 2026 — the two economies will remain significant drivers of the energy economy for decades to come given their significant manufacturing capacity, focused research, continued reliance on fossil fuels to power their advanced economies, and per capita GDP.

Driving Demand: AI, Energy Evolution, and Beyond

Japan and South Korea have placed great emphasis on research and investment in the energy field, both for economic growth and for the need to innovate due to a lack of natural resources. Coupled with the drive to innovate, there will likely be significant electricity demand increases: Japan predicted at 40% and South Korea at 113% by 2050. Both countries are investing heavily in AI and related fields and rapidly moving toward the cloud to support their AI industries in addition to working with the major U.S. cloud companies such as AWS, Azure, and, now, in South Korea, Coupang. One of the stipulations for more extensive cloud adoption is server and data center expansion. The number of data centers in Japan is expected to double over the next 3–5 years and quadruple in South Korea by 2029 which will further contribute to the increase in energy demand.

Energy Diplomacy: Key to Future Cooperation

To ensure that the evolution of energy access will meet increasing demand (in addition to these two countries’ climate change and emission goals), active energy diplomacy will continue to play a central role. For both Japan and South Korea, their relationship with the United States is paramount to both energy security and geopolitics. Given the shared energy needs and technical capabilities of Japan and South Korea, the two countries would be well served to increase trilateral energy cooperation.

Similarly, bilateral energy diplomacy has a role despite challenges related to Japan’s 1910–45 colonization of Korea. While there are no current bilateral flashpoints, odds are high that inevitable conflicts will arise over history, especially given the low expectations in Japan about South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, given his past statements.

That said, sending South Korea’s foreign minister Cho Hyun to Tokyo as his first overseas visit on July 29, 2025, relieved tension and could extend the current honeymoon phase between Lee, who entered office on June 4, 2025, and his counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. If the two countries can put differences aside and focus on cooperation and partnership regarding energy, there is great potential and opportunity.

While the trilateral diplomatic construct has the most potential overall regarding energy policy, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan —could also play an important role. The Quad just established a Quad Critical Minerals Initiative to boost their supply chains and reduce reliance on China. South Korea could also participate in this initiative as an observer and the grouping could serve as a useful diplomatic vehicle. The U.S. could encourage and invite South Korea to play such a role, a logical move given South Korea’s current role as chair of the Minerals Security Partnership.

Energy Sources

Civil Nuclear: Both Japan and South Korea are already global leaders in the civil nuclear sector, given their production capacity and reliance on nuclear power for energy production. Going forward, the two countries have bet big on small modular reactors (SMRs); have invested heavily in U.S. and U.K. SMR companies, such as between several South Korean companies and NuScale in the U.S., and between the U.K.’s National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA); and look to play a central role in the production of the SMRs globally. Japanese and South Korean companies are set to play a key role in the supply chain to produce the SMRs as well, with Doosan Enerbility and GS Energy working closely with NuScale.

Nuclear power will contribute significantly to the increase in electricity demand and the two countries could benefit from collaboration in the commercial space and/or with the research and development community. Perhaps a trilateral summit, focusing on energy diplomacy or nuclear power specifically, could unlock commitments from the two countries and their leading energy companies to invest in or sign long-term LNG commitments, in potential Lower 48 states and/or the Alaska LNG projects. This could also lead to commitments to coordinate critical minerals supply chain efforts and coordinate on civil nuclear production, research and exports, and shipbuilding.

Hydrogen: Japan and South Korea both have roadmaps to develop significant hydrogen markets and infrastructure. While progress remains slow, any strides the two countries make in the next 10 years could provide an example for other countries seeking to increase hydrogen production. The two markets are dense enough that infrastructure development to support a hydrogen market could make sense, if prices come down for the fuel and if technology improves so that related infrastructure is less unwieldy and expensive. While the United States remains a global leader in gray hydrogen and a potential leader in clean hydrogen (given low-cost U.S. natural gas), growing trade in clean hydrogen could be another area for cooperation.

Solar: South Korean company Hanwha Q Cells invested $2.5 billion dollars in the United States to produce solar panels and offer a non-Chinese option for panels in the United States. Japan has invested in perovskite and titanium technology as well as rooftop solar in order to offer a new tech alternative now that China has captured 80% of global solar panel production.

Wind Industry: Wind is another energy sector where South Korea and Japan are industry leaders. Japan has a vast amount of potential wind power capacity. According to experts, if harnessed, the offshore wind in Japan could produce enough electricity to power Japan. However, there remain significant challenges to harness economically the offshore wind power, transmit it, and resolve the intermittency concerns through battery storage or otherwise. With Japan’s and South Korea’s production capacity, shipping innovation, and vibrant manufacturing sectors, the two countries will likely play a central role in providing a non-China option for countries looking to expand their wind power.

Electricity Storage Batteries: For both solar and wind power, if battery technology continues to improve, the storage challenges related to these options could become more manageable. On batteries, there are innovative new companies like Standard Energy in South Korea that have developed advanced technologies to improve energy efficiency in data centers, manage the volatility of AI workloads, and better address the intermittency of renewable energy.

The vanadium ion battery (VIB) developed by Standard Energy is fundamentally different from traditional vanadium redox flow batteries and lithium-ion batteries. The VIB has already solved the flammability issues associated with lithium-ion batteries while achieving high efficiency, high power, fast response, and ultra-long cycle life. These characteristics could drive significant battery adoption across data centers, indoor energy storage systems (ESSs), urban infrastructure, and public transportation, and Standard Energy is exploring investment and co-investment with U.S. companies.

Minerals: The U.S., Japan, and South Korea play central roles in the Minerals Supply Partnership, with Korea chairing the group that seeks to develop more coherent and non-China-based minerals supply chains. Japan spearheads the recycling group while both of the countries, with their mining and processing capabilities through their industries as well as their state-sponsored entities, are key players in the critical minerals space. The two countries launched more formal bilateral cooperation in February 2025 to cooperate on mining projects in third party countries.

They both rely on inputs from China, like the United States and most other countries, but to become less reliant on China for rare earths along with processed lithium, cobalt, and other key minerals, Japan and South Korea should play a central role. Both Japan and South Korea have interests in Southeast Asia, Australia, Africa, and South America for mining and processing.

There are numerous examples of Japanese and South Korean companies working to develop alternatives to China and to Chinese processing methods. South Korean company POSCO aims to develop an alternative cobalt processing method in the Philippines that would be less environmentally harmful. If the United States opens some of its mining in order to increase domestic production and build a non-China supply chain for critical minerals, Japanese and South Korean companies would likely be involved in the process. One existing example of this is U.S. company Energy Fuels, which is cooperating with POSCO to process minerals from its Utah mine.

CCUS and Gas Reserves: One area for potential bilateral cooperation is an exploration of the Sea of Japan. While there could be some gas, a more likely benefit would come from carbon capture opportunities rather than gas production. But given the overlapping economic zones and the billions of investment required to develop such an opportunity, it would behoove the two countries to collaborate on a plan if either country sees real potential in this area.

Similar to the possible Alaska LNG pipeline project that could offer increased energy security to Japan and South Korea if realized — even if the project is not a moneymaker — it may still make sense to explore or even to develop. To advance in the Sea of Japan and develop a viable carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) capacity, it would require extensive diplomatic efforts, cooperation, and shared investment. Additionally, partnering with an industry leader such as Chevron or Exxon could provide needed experience and expertise as well as capital.

Conclusion: Japan and South Korea Are Key Energy Partners for the US

All of these energy trends in Northeast Asia point in one direction — Japan and South Korea will continue to play an outsized role in the energy economy, in the world of energy diplomacy, and in research and innovation as well as in production and manufacturing. The more that U.S. firms and the U.S. government focus on Japan and South Korea as partners in research, investment, and commercial advocacy, the more effectively the three countries could compete with Chinese alternatives and spur significant economic growth over the coming decades as well as cooperating on regional security in Asia.

October 2025

President Donald Trump's "America First" policies, which include tariffs and domestic production incentives, have significantly disrupted global supply chains. In response, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) can strengthen their collective supply chain resilience by leveraging and expanding existing partnerships. This report analyzes how current ROK-EU bilateral agreements in key sectors—civil nuclear, critical minerals, car manufacturing, defense, and emerging technologies— offer opportunities and can be used to counteract these protectionist measures. It also proposes policy initiatives for the ROK government to promote the diversification of strategic investments and enhance ROK-EU collaboration.

The Impact of Trump's Policies
In order to protect domestic jobs and national security, the Trump administration has implemented tariffs on key imports and encouraged reshoring. Recent trade agreements with South Korea and the European Union have placed tariffs on products such as steel, aluminum, autos, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. These measures, while intended to promote local sourcing, have created uncertainty in US-ROK and US-EU relationships incentivizing the acceleration of nascent Korea-EU efforts to expand economic activity.

Tariff Agreements & Trade Relations (US-ROK, US-EU): President Trump's administration has actively pursued new trade agreements and tariff regimes. In July 2025, the United States and the EU announced a trade agreement stipulating that the EU would pay a 15% tariff rate on various products, including autos, auto parts, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. However, existing 50% sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper remain unchanged, with discussions planned for securing supply chains for these materials. Similarly, a July 30 trade agreement with South Korea outlined a path via investment to avoid higher tariffs, with South Korea agreeing to a 15% International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariff rate and a 15% tariff on automobiles and auto parts, down from a potential 25%. However, the tariffs currently remain at 25% until the details of the agreement are ironed out.  Reaching a final agreement has been complicated by the recent immigration raid at the Hyundai-LG factory in Georgia and H1-B policy changes. The 50% tariff rate on aluminum, steel, and copper products for Korea, as with Japan, remain in place. These tariff actions aim to rebalance economic relationships and encourage local sourcing and reshoring production. Earlier suggestions to repeal U.S. 232 steel tariffs and quotas on South Korea were proposed as a way to stimulate economic gains and revitalize the U.S. steel industry through partnerships, rather than tariffs.  With the 232 tariffs expanded, Korea should consider how to enter the EU market.

Framework for Shared Resilience
The ROK-EU relationship is built on a series of foundational agreements and offers a strong framework for enhancing supply chain resilience against global disruptions. The Framework Agreement (2010) and the Free Trade Agreement (2011) form the bedrock of this partnership, significantly boosting bilateral trade and including crucial commitments on fair competition, which are especially important for sectors like semiconductors.

A key development that expands on this foundation comes in the Digital Partnership (2022), a forward-looking initiative that fosters cooperation on cutting-edge technologies. This partnership, governed by a ministerial-level council, promotes joint work on semiconductors, next-generation networks (5G/6G), AI, and cybersecurity. Within this framework, ongoing economic security dialogues have been established to create early warning systems and coordinate on industrial policies and export controls for critical technologies. The ROKG could propose an expanded scope and investment into this partnership.

In contrast to a U.S. emphasis on fossil fuels, the Green Partnership (2023) demonstrates a shared commitment to a clean energy transition. This collaboration aligns with the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and South Korea's "Carbon Free Alliance," supporting the diversification of mineral sources for EV batteries and promoting sustainable energy solutions.  While Korean companies have invested heavily in wind turbines, EV charging stations and other green tech supply chain opportunities in the United States, Korean companies could find additional or even complementary or linked investment opportunities in the EU’s green tech supply chain. It should be noted that with all opportunities, Korea and Korean companies should seek accommodations—both regulatory and tax-related—from Brussels to incentivize investment.  The more comprehensively the ROKG bundles proposed investment, the more likely the EU could relax some of its exceedingly complex administrative and regulatory hurdles to facilitate such investment.

ROK's association with Horizon Europe (2025), the EU's key research and innovation program, allows Korean researchers and organizations a structured framework for joint R&D projects in areas critical to supply chains, such as semiconductors, AI, and sustainable technologies. Now that Korea can participate as an associate member (first Asian country to do so), Korea should focus on applying for funding and leading collaborative research projects.

In addition, the incorporation of educational and cultural exchange programs such as Erasmus+, the EU's flagship student mobility program, will support the expansion of ROK-EU cooperation. Erasmus+ facilitates student and staff exchanges between European and South Korean universities, allowing participants to study, conduct research, and intern abroad. Expanding Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe and perhaps the formation of a Korean equivalent to these two excellent programs could encourage more targeted research cooperation in high tech fields and lay the groundwork for next generation industries such as batteries, SMR, AI, quantum and green tech.  Korea would be well served to fund an expansion of Erasmus+ from sponsoring hundreds of scholars a year to thousands.

The Security and Defense Partnership (2024) further deepens cooperation in the defense industry, addressing hybrid threats and critical infrastructure. By fostering collaboration on defense technology and production, this agreement enhances the resilience of military supply chains.  Korean companies have made great strides in recent years selling billions of defense equipment to Poland, Romania and other EU states. As the EU looks to bolster its defense capabilities and reinforce Ukraine’s deterrent capability, there is opportunity for Korea and Korean companies to fit more systematically into EU defense procurement by focusing efforts on outreach to policymakers in Brussels to complement the current member state focus.

Key Sectors for Cooperation
The ROK-EU partnership can significantly increase shared resilience in critical sectors by leveraging existing agreements and coordinating strategies to counter the disruptive potential of Trump's "America First" policies.  The policies of the U.S. government should serve as a catalyst to allow Korea to seek more concessions and cooperation from EU institutions.

Civil nuclear: South Korea, a global leader in nuclear plant construction and advanced reactors such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), is an ideal partner for the European Union (EU). Expanding their "Green Partnership" would allow them to jointly promote secure nuclear energy. This initiative is further supported by the proposed multilateral "JUKE" grouping (Japan, U.S., Korea, EU), which prioritizes nuclear power and the energy transition. JUKE met once at a Commerce-led meeting during the Biden administration and could be revived to focus solely on civil nuclear.  With the global market for nuclear energy projected to double to a $1 trillion industry over the next 25 years, South Korea's expertise in producing key supply chain components on schedule and budget presents a significant opportunity for collaboration with the EU.  However, this sector requires U.S. support and even participation, so while expansion of ROK-EU cooperation on production of components for the industry could reap benefits, a broader JUKE (or similar) association that includes the United States is critical for comprehensive sector development.

Minerals Security: The EU and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are deepening their cooperation on securing critical minerals, a partnership that aligns with their mutual goal of diversifying supply chains away from China. This collaboration is largely facilitated through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), which the ROK chairs. The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act and Batteries Regulation complement South Korea's strategy, providing a framework for joint policy and investment coordination.  Korea could seek to sponsor and lead mining projects with EU Member States drawing on EU connections to the Middle East and Africa to facilitate expanded joint projects for mining and processing, through MSP or bilaterally.

Car Manufacturing: South Korean companies like Hyundai and KIA, along with battery manufacturers, have established some EV plants in Europe. Korean companies should immediately expand this effort with a comprehensive proposal to Brussels to offer significant investment and in return, seek remedies to visa issues (with the EU helping Korea work with the immigration authorities in target countries) as well as regulatory barriers that could impede quick action.  

Industrial Defense: The ROK-EU Security and Defense Partnership promotes joint R&D and co-production and should be just the first step toward increased co-production as well as sales.  Korea could expand its after sales efforts, mirroring U.S. defense sales practices that would not only secure a longer profit timeline, but integrate Korea more fully into the EU defense industrial supply chain.  To facilitate such integration, Korea should focus more on securing accommodations for such projects at the EU institution level as much as seeking to secure ad hoc sales.

Semiconductors, AI, and Emerging Technologies: the ROK-EU Digital Partnership seeks to address supply chain vulnerabilities. Both sides are working together on semiconductors to strengthen supply chain transparency and advance research. This includes initiatives like the ROK-EU Forum for Semiconductor Researchers and shared export control coordination.    

Security Dialogues and Cooperation Mechanisms
Beyond specific agreements, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) have strengthened their shared resilience through various dialogues and mechanisms. The ROK-EU Joint Committee has consistently advocated for closer cooperation on economic security and supply chain resilience. The Supply Chain and Industrial Policy Dialogue, launched in December 2023, specifically focuses on monitoring and responding to disruptions. Additionally, the EU's Economic Security Strategy (June 2023) promotes diversifying critical dependencies ("de-risking") and partnering with like-minded countries, including the ROK, on initiatives like foreign investment screening and export control coordination. The proposed "JUKE" grouping (Japan, U.S., Korea, EU) could further serve as a diplomatic forum for coordinating policy on critical areas, such as supply chain security, nuclear, AI, and cybersecurity. 

Conclusion and Recommendations
Under the unpredictable and protectionist policies of President Donald Trump, South Korea and the European Union have a significant opportunity to expand their partnership. By leveraging existing bilateral agreements—including the Framework Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, and partnerships in digital, green, and security sectors—they can collaborate to diversify critical supply chains and strengthen a rules-based international order. The South Korean government should offer the EU a substantial investment package in exchange for regulatory support, visa accommodation, and expanded governmental, academic, and institutional exchanges.

To further enhance shared resilience, specific recommendations include:

1. Elevate and Formalize Supply Chain Coordination: Transform the ROK-EU Supply Chain and Industrial Policy Dialogue into a more frequent and structured mechanism. By creating joint early warning systems and coordinated response protocols, we can address disruptions in critical sectors like semiconductors, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing. This could be a binding annex to the Digital Partnership or Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

2. Strategic Co-investment and Joint Ventures: Actively promote and co-finance ROK-EU joint ventures and direct investments in key industries like civil nuclear, EV batteries, and semiconductors within both regions and in third countries. Maximizing and expanding the use of Horizon Europe for large-scale industrial R&D projects will be crucial for these initiatives.

3. Harmonize Export Controls and Investment Screening: Establish formal mechanisms, possibly within the Digital Partnership and aligned with the EU's Economic Security Strategy, for coordinating export control policies and inbound/outbound investment screening related to critical and emerging technologies (semiconductors, AI, quantum). 

4. Enhance Talent Mobility and Skill Development: Fully implement and expand the initiatives on skills and mobility outlined in the Digital Partnership. This includes creating more robust research and exchange programs, joint training initiatives in ICT, AI, and quantum technologies, and developing pathways for skilled workers in critical sectors across both regions. A temporary, non-immigrant E-4 visa category, as proposed for Koreans in the U.S., could serve as a model for ROK-EU (or at ROK-Member State level) visa facilitation to address labor shortages in critical industries. Promote Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe to encourage expanded education and research cooperation in high tech fields.

5. Strengthen Multilateral Advocacy for Open Trade: Jointly advocate for multilateralism and rules-based trade within international fora such as the WTO, G20, and the Minerals Security Partnership. Expanding cooperation within the MSP should focus on securing diversified supply chains for critical raw materials.

6. Integrate defense Industrial Bases: Strengthen the Security and defense Partnership to boost joint R&D, co-production, and integrated supply chains. This will provide Korean companies with greater access to the EU market, and it will also streamline the acquisition and delivery of defense materials, particularly for shared security goals like supporting Ukraine.

7. Develop Shared Standards and Governance Frameworks: Deepen cooperation on digital standardization, AI governance, and cybersecurity under the Digital Partnership to align norms and values. 

By taking these concrete actions, the ROK-EU relationship can navigate the challenges presented by President Trump's policies and emerge as a more resilient and influential force in shaping a stable and prosperous global economy.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/analysis-first-trump-lee-summit

August 27, 2025

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung achieved his top goal: a productive and cordial meeting with President Trump. He did so and more, hitting all the right notes. From his speech at CSIS to his interactions with Trump, Lee consistently emphasized the importance of the alliance, underscored the need for continued cooperation with the United States against China, and highlighted the shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea. His use of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) slogan, “We go together,” resonated with Washington’s South Korea watchers, who were looking for signs that Lee would seek to weaken the alliance in favor of “balancing” the relationship with a more conciliatory China policy.

Some liberal South Korean (ROK) presidents have sought a new path with the United States—because of such attempts, both Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in had challenging starts to their relationship with Presidents Bush and Trump as they channeled the desire of some of their core liberal supporters to stand up to “big brother” and shed any sense of dependency on the United States. Despite this, by the end of their respective terms, on alliance issues, China policy, economic cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, the two presidents had the U.S. relationship on stable ground and at the nexus of South Korea’s foreign policy and, arguably, the U.S.-ROK relationship at the center point of their presidencies.

While many critics expected Lee to stumble out of the gate on the world stage after a career laser-focused on domestic ROK policy and politics, he clearly learned two important lessons before arriving in Washington and did not miss a step. First, the relationship with the U.S. president and the United States is pivotal; therefore, he should seek to get off on the right foot with Trump and with the U.S. government. Second, he realized that, however appealing standing up to the United States might be to some in the Democratic Party of Korea, South Korea ultimately wants its president to get it right with the United States. If, while maintaining a good relationship with the United States, there are moves toward “sovereignty” or “independence,” all the better, but first, the goal is not to harm South Korea’s only ally and most important economic partner.

Lee shared he learned from The Art of the Deal that though Trump might use threats during negotiations, ultimately, he would not “cause a wound” or damage relationships that matter. He got this right as Trump seemed ready to send Lee down the Zelensky/Ramaphosa route with his early August 25 (just hours before the Oval Office meeting) salvo via Truth Social about the “purge and revolution” going on in South Korea, but ultimately smoothed things over publicly and privately to focus on the alliance, trade, investment, shipbuilding, security, and North Korea.

Lee struck the only note he could—South Korea has one ally, one relationship that represents the future, and that is the relationship with the United States. Therefore, the South Korean people will judge Lee, like they have every South Korean president before him, by his ability to manage the relationship with the United States. Lee did what he needed to do—artfully flatter Trump, not fall into the trap of contradicting Trump, and pivot from controversial (for example on comfort women) to less thorny issues (such as Japan-ROK ties are important or golf in North Korea) and avoided the bizarre (let’s fly to Beijing together) while focusing on reassuring topics (South Korea is ready to work with the United States to manage and compete with China).

On North Korea policy, there has occasionally been daylight between the United States and South Korea. In many instances, at the heart of the matter is a desire by both the United States and South Korea to engage in bilateral talks with the North, sharing more or less what they are attempting. Even when the Six-Party Talks were the main negotiating vehicle (2003–2009), keeping all parties aligned and keeping track of the various bilateral initiatives featured as main diplomatic tasks. 

The Trump-Lee summit featured extensive discussions on North Korea, with both leaders signaling their eagerness to reengage with Pyongyang. Lee praised Trump’s past diplomatic overtures, while Trump himself expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un again, describing their relationship as “very good.” Lee’s framing of himself as a “pacemaker” to Trump’s “peacemaker” role could position South Korea as a partner in any future talks. However, the path to a breakthrough remains uncertain, as Kim Jong-un has not yet shown interest in dialogue, and his comprehensive strategic partnership with Moscow likely limits his ability to engage.

On the security front, Lee affirmed South Korea’s commitment to the alliance by announcing a planned increase in the defense budget. This move, which was well-received by the United States, aims to modernize the South Korean military and bolster its capabilities. While some questions remain about the details of defense cost-sharing and how to interpret “strategic flexibility,” along with Trump’s public comments that the United States could take ownership of military base land, the overall tone of the summit on security matters was positive and forward-looking.

In the wake of the July 30 trade agreement and commitment by South Korea to invest $350 billion and purchase up to $150 billion in fossil fuels, focus on economic and industrial collaboration featured prominently at the summit. While the investment commitments were substantial, shipbuilding emerged as the strategic centerpiece for Lee’s visit. Discussions at the industry roundtable, attended by executives from major South Korean and U.S. companies, suggested a deal is in the works that could see greater South Korean participation in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. HD Hyundai, Cerberus Capital, and the Korea Development Bank agreed to form an investment strategy to attract and focus tens of billions into revamping the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This builds upon the $150 billion South Korean “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again” proposal. The initiative, which could potentially involve a modification or modernization of the Jones Act, aligns with President Trump's “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” agenda. To further highlight this partnership and the potential for such a partnership, Lee visited the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on August 26, which Hanwha Ocean purchased for $100 million and reportedly will invest an additional $70 million to expand the facility.

Lee’s visit to Washington exceeded all expectations and was a success. The next opportunity to build on this success is a possible Trump visit to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit at the end of October. If Trump does travel to Gyeongju, and possibly Seoul as well, it could help to catalyze real progress on Korea’s investment commitments, to refine the trade agreement, and to define what modernizing the alliance will mean for the two countries. The possibility of North Korea engagement could boost chances for Trump to invest further in the relationship with Lee and the relationship with South Korea.

https://issuu.com/mh183/docs/energy_and_resilience_policy_briefs_2025/34?fr=sY2YzZTg2MzM0MjQ

Energy and Resilience: Policy Briefs 2025
June 13, 2025

Trilateral Recommendations for Pacific Energy and National Security Focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and two of its critical allies in the Pacific, recommending trilateral U.S.-Japan–South Korea energy cooperation. 

Goal: Incorporate trilateral energy cooperation as a central pillar if Camp David trilateral engagement continues and/or start a separate, trilateral energy coordination mechanism for the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Option 1: Camp David Summit Agenda picked up by Trump Administration.

Method: Build a government-led trilateral energy pillar separate from and in support of the Camp David Agenda based on a Baker Institute-led study and in collaboration with Stanford’s Hoover Institute to develop the most effective areas to focus on based on Japan’s recently released energy strategy and the approach of the new U.S. administration.2 

• Hold a series of joint webinars and meetings with Japanese, Korean, and U.S. officials and energy policy experts to build a trilateral energy agenda. 

• Convene a track 1.5 trilateral energy security dialogue based on the agendas and preparatory work done between January and March. 

• July 2025 onward: Trilateral Energy Security Dialogue held in Korea, Japan, and the U.S., alternating and on a quarterly or biannual basis. 

Option 2: Camp David Summit Agenda not adopted by Trump Administration 

Method: Focus efforts on Track 2 work to build trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Host a webinar to discuss the potential for trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Kick off in-person meeting with think tanks and energy industry officials. 

• Invite ROKG, GOJ and USG participants or observers. 

• Launch a biannual series of in-person meetings, alternating between the United States, Korea and Japan to encourage greater trilateral coordination. In 2026, present findings and progress along with recommendations to the three governments, offering a specific way forward should the governments choose to adopt trilateral energy cooperation as a key area of focus. 

Areas of Focus: Three Potential Sample Policy Areas for Trilateral Coordination 

1. Minerals Security Partnership (MSP):

• The MSP continues as a core multilateral organization since it works to Trump 1.0 goals to secure critical minerals and develop a secure supply chain not dependent on China.3 That trilateral coordination within the MSP would serve as a key driver, for policy, projects, and investment. 

• Ultimately, the USG would consult with the ROKG and the GOJ before any MSP meeting, much as the USG does now with the P3 (France, UK and the United States) before any UN meeting or as the USG does now with the quad (UK, France, Germany) before any NATO meeting to coordinate approach and ensure cohesion among the leading countries. 

• To develop such an approach, all three governments should develop a greater awareness and understanding of their current leadership role (Japan served as the chair of the MSP until June 2024, Korea currently serves as chair) as well as the potential for this type of coordination. 

  • Engage with Trump administration State and DOE teams to highlight the potential and lay out how to institute and institutionalize such an approach. 

  • Approach Seoul and Tokyo with the same pitch through in-person meetings with their top diplomatic and energy officials. 

• Agree on several key initiatives and targets that the three countries could advocate for within the MSP. 

• Highlight the wins of a more effective MSP, energized by the three countries that have most at stake and have most capacity to invest capital, mineral extraction, and processing ability to help boost non-China dependent mineral supply chains. 

• Potential areas for cooperation: 

  • Japan and the United States could join the ROK-led MSP working group on the Mahenge Mine project.4 

  • Japan (JOGMEC, JBIC) could offer a virtual briefing to Korea and the United States to describe Japanese private sector investments in upstream and midstream minerals (e.g., Sumitomo, Mitsui). 

2. Methane Abatement 

• Japan, the ROK, the United States, and other countries issued a Joint Statement in July 2023 to collaborate on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly methane from LNG imports and exports. JERA and KOGAS also launched the CLEAN Initiative, a voluntary effort where gas buyers would seek methane emissions data from producers to prioritize procurement of lower-methane gas. 

• Establish regular meetings in which the United States, Japan, and Korea discuss policy and industry steps to mitigate methane and CO2 emissions from internationally traded fossil fuels, including through implementation of the CLEAN initiative. We recommend inviting technical experts (governmental, academia, industry, NGOs, etc.) to brief the United States, Japan, and the ROK on tools that can be used to measure and mitigate greenhouse gases (methane and CO2) from imported fossil fuels, including assessing existing policy levers, examining price and market impacts, and assessing internationally aligned approaches to cut emissions from traded fuels. 

• Assemble a team of experts, working with other institutions, to brief USG, ROKG, and GOJ officials, planting the seed for regular track 1.5 and track 2 trilateral meetings to advance methane abatement coordination. 

• Brief industry representatives based on the findings assembled during the meetings in order to encourage them to take efforts to reduce methane emissions. 

3. Technical Assistance Coordination in the Pacific Islands Counties (PICs) 

• USTDA has funded a mini-grid feasibility study evaluating site configurations for 75 priority sites in Fiji. USTDA is also conducting a site selection study supporting renewable energy in Tonga. USTDA is actively considering several other activities in the region from rooftop solar and BESS to utility-level smart grid roadmaps. 

• The three governments share information on projects through regularly scheduled calls to minimize overlap and interference in other countries’ efforts. 

The Center for Energy Studies at the Baker Institute at Rice University has served to enhance collaboration between industry, think tanks and governments of ROK, Japan and US over the past year and would be willing to be a convener and policy advisor for Trilateral Energy Cooperation going forward.

Notes

1. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The Trilateral Leaders Summit at Camp David.” The American Presidency Project (U.S. National Archives), August 18, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp david/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20ROK%E2%80%A6 

2. METI Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. “Basic Plan on Energy and the Environment.” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 19, 2025. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/. 

3. U.S. Department of State. “Minerals Security Partnership.” U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership. 

4. U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on Establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership Finance Network.” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, September 23, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint statement-on-establishment-of-the-minerals-security-partnership-finance-network/. 

5. European Commission. “EU and Global Partners Reaffirm Their Commitment to Tackling Methane Emissions in the Natural Gas Value Chain.” European Commission, DG Energy, July 18, 2023. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-global-partners-reaffirm-their-commitment-tackling-methane emissions-natural-gas-value-chain-2023-07-18_en. 

6. Čučuk, Aida. “KOGAS, JERA to Reduce Methane Emissions in the LNG Value Chain.” Offshore Energy, July 19, 2023. https://www.offshore-energy.biz/kogas-jera-to-reduce-methane-emissions-in-lng-value-chain/

7. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Advances Rural Electrification in Fiji.” May 18, 2023. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-advances-rural-electrification-in-fiji/. 

8. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Signs Infrastructure Deal in Tonga, Expands Pacific Island Commitments.” April 22, 2022. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-signs-infrastructure-deal-in tonga-expands-pacific-island-commitments/.

https://www.hankyung.com/article/202507301146i

July 31, 2025

Facing ongoing trade frictions along with tariffs and negotiations about non tariff barriers, Korea could win diplomatic points globally by continuing to step up its overseas development aid donations.  If Korea does so, it could highlight global leadership and win plaudits from U.S. allies - and eventually from the United States itself.  While the United States has decided to shutter its overseas aid agency USAID, and curtail much of its development aid, Secretary of State Rubio highlighted that “It’s important to understand we are not walking away from foreign aid,” and highlighted South Korea’s graduation from recipient to donor.  Some may think that highlighting Korea’s impressive and growing global role in development might seem to be counterintuitive.  However, mirroring the painful adjustments Trump’s NATO allies are making to defence budgets in Europe, it could instead serve as a key talking point for Korea to show how it is heeding Trump’s call for U.S. allies to bear more of the burdens the U.S. has traditionally taken on in world affairs, and take up the mantle in supporting and sustaining global health and prosperity at a critical time.  While right now, managing the turbulent relationship with the United States is paramount, by showing greater global leadership, Korea would boost its standing with other countries in ASEAN, Africa, and South America as well as among OECD countries, that are all central to Korea’s growth and continued economic expansion.

Beyond the near-term pitch that Korea could make to get credit for its efforts in global development, Korea has a compelling success story to tell as the only nation to successfully transition from a major aid recipient to a significant donor nation.  This message is objectively impressive, but could be further tailored for a USG audience by highlighting the fact that Korea is now giving back in recognition of the generous support it received from the U.S. and others during its own development journey: taking a greater share of the burden to support U.S. priorities such as vaccine development, pandemic preparedness, and limiting the outflow of migrants fleeing the poverty and instability that often go hand in hand with development failures.  At the same time as Korea builds that narrative for the Washington audience, it could advance its own leadership with other partners as among the only OECD countries in recent times to increase, year-on-year, its development budget.  

Korea could further enhance its image and prestige by modelling best practice and international solidarity in adopting more effective, evidence-based aid strategies: for example, pledging more monies through effective institutions like GAVI and the Global Fund as well as the Korea-headquartered IVI, and partnering with cutting edge foundations such as the Gates Foundation and Open Philanthropy rather than trying to build up its domestic aid agency that is already overmatched following the commendable increase in funds Presidents from both sides of the political divide put in place over the past several years.  With the Global Fund and Gavi both conducting major replenishments this year, significant early Korean contributions to each would be a powerful statement of intent. Additionally, demonstrating initiative in fighting new, neglected challenges such as lead poisoning, that other countries have not to date focused on, could offer Korea another chance to lead on the global stage.  One unique asset Korea can bring to bear on these problems is the popularity of K-culture. We have seen how powerful this can be in raising popular awareness and assent for major global issues, through their adoption by a major Korean cultural icon. What this could look like is a popular band such as BTS or BlackPink, or an up-and-coming band like Stray Kids taking on a particular cause such as lead or malaria as a comprehensive, sustained campaign rather than just on an ad hoc basis.  

In addition to boosting Korea’s international stature, development investment also offers substantial benefits to Korea’s pharmaceutical and biotech sectors as well as offering new opportunities for Korean research and development collaboration and leadership with other countries.  Finally, to connect back to how this would support the bilateral relationship with the United States, President Lee Jae Myung and his team could highlight how Korean bio-pharmaceutical companies are engaged in joint ventures with U.S. companies, investing in the United States, and sharing research and development facilities.  At a time of heightened economic tensions and concerns about burdensharing and strategic flexibility, Korea could utilize its untapped potential to give more and to lead in the philanthropic space in order to help manage relations with the United States while also garnering greater global support and further economic opportunity.

https://www.mk.co.kr/en/economy/11340043

June 11, 2025

사진 확대

President Lee Jae-myung has been inaugurated as the 21st president of the Republic of Korea. The direction of bilateral relations now depends on whether President Lee will be able to overcome a number of major challenges at home and abroad in the short term, and develop a comprehensive strategy for Korea to build and develop a successful relationship with the United States. President Lee should adopt a multi-faceted and active strategy for successful Korea-U.S. relations. It is necessary to prioritize personal diplomacy to strengthen ties with U.S. President Donald Trump. It should also change President Trump's perception of South Korea through his intended message.

In particular, Korea's contribution to large-scale investment and job creation in the United States should be highlighted, and bilateral cooperation in key industries such as shipbuilding and nuclear power plants should be actively promoted. Such a comprehensive approach will help ensure Korea's national interest by defining the Korea-U.S. alliance as a source of Korea's national power and global influence and enhance Korea's national wealth and international status on international stages such as the G7 summit.

President Lee faces two major challenges. First, the deadline for trade negotiations is approaching. If Seoul and Washington fail to reach an agreement, the destructive tariffs will be reimposed from July 8. Second, the Trump administration will try to renegotiate the South Korea-U.S. defense cost sharing. The two issues are actually much more burdensome because Seoul's foreign officials have fewer people to communicate with in Washington since the U.S. government reshuffle, and Lee's work to form a new government will take several more weeks. For example, direct dialogue and coordination between the White House and the presidential office may be difficult because the director-general for South Korea is currently vacant at the U.S. National Security Council. In addition, South Korea is one of the major importers of U.S.-made liquefied natural gas (LNG), and although energy cooperation plays a key role in bilateral relations, the U.S. team, which was in charge of energy diplomacy and policy, has been disbanded.

President Lee should come up with an approach to maintain Seoul-Washington relations under such unfavorable conditions. The United States is South Korea's most important ally, friend, economic partner, and also a major exporter of K content, culture, and tourism. For a successful strategy, Lee needs to focus on two different approaches.

First of all, it's on a personal level. This president should be able to build a personal bond with President Trump. For example, they share their experiences of "legal persecution" that they both experienced. In fact, President Lee got off to a good start by sharing his opinions on the political difficulties they each experienced in their first phone call with President Trump and proposing a golf round. If the two leaders form a personal link, President Lee will help change President Trump's perception of South Korea and himself to a "precious partner who makes a key contribution to the U.S. reshoring and friend-shoring in global competition with China," rather than a "country that does not properly pay for defense costs."

In addition to President Lee's personal diplomacy, CEOs of major Korean conglomerates, including Samsung, SK, Hyundai and Hanwha, will also help strengthen ties between Seoul and Washington. They already have direct contacts with the Trump family in Washington and Mar-a-Lago. This is helping President Trump and his staff to understand how much Korean companies are contributing to the U.S. economy.

Such an approach certainly helps to develop the bond between South Korea and the U.S. There is also an aspect that pay-to-play diplomacy seems to have become more important in forming relations with President Trump. If so, Korean conglomerates may play a key role by investing or cooperating in virtual currency and other businesses involving the Trump family.

Lee should direct a comprehensive and consistent strategy for strategic messaging and a shift in U.S. perception. Whenever there is any mention of trade or trade deficit with Korea in terms of messages, Lee and Seoul should highlight the case of Seoul's investment in the United States, either publicly or privately. This should shift the existing perception that makes Korea appear to be at the top of the list of countries that "use" the U.S. to a story that focuses on creating jobs in the U.S. through Korean investment.

Rather than highlighting only Korea's requirements in the negotiations or responding defensively to criticism of Korea's economic practices, it should also highlight what key role Korea plays in its competition with China. It should be explained in the framework that all investments made by Korea in the United States play a role in preventing Chinese companies from taking control of key industries. It is also worth highlighting that many Korean investments are with U.S. partners, whether investors or joint ventures. Emphasizing such a bilateral approach to joint ventures and partnerships should be at the heart of President Lee's message.

Lee and his aides should give Trump the recognition that South Korea is a key U.S. partner and the most important partner in the competition with China. President Trump now sees South Korea as a country trying to strike a "balance" between the U.S. and China. Some in South Korea are concerned that such an approach could lead to a backlash from China, but it is impossible to fully satisfy China as long as South Korea is an ally of the United States.

Balancing the U.S.-China balance is different from pursuing a less confrontational bilateral relationship with China. I don't think China will recognize South Korea as a true partner. It is also near impossible for any South Korean government to find a balance between Washington and Beijing as long as they have a firm alliance with the United States. Building a less confrontational relationship with China may also seem impossible, but it is not without possibility if it can improve awareness of Korea's approach to China from a U.S. perspective.

There are many things Lee can do without direct clashes with China. Development of the Pacific Islands, increased support for global infrastructure projects, and cooperation with U.S.-led organizations such as the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Blue Dot Network will enable Korea to join the U.S. global strategy without provoking China.

The Alaska LNG pipeline project is a good opportunity for South Korea to "all-in" on the Trump administration's core business and promise to take a leading role from the research and exploration stage. This can give Washington's key policymakers the impression that South Korea is actively participating in the U.S. policy to strengthen its energy advantage.

Whether this project actually materializes is a secondary issue. Most importantly, Korea can change its position in the United States by investing tens of millions of dollars to support the project and actively supporting it ahead of other countries such as Japan. Korean conglomerates can also sign long-term purchase contracts when the pipeline is operational. In the end, if the project becomes a reality, Korea will benefit from it. Whether this plan is economical will be assessed for years.

South Korea has invested tens of billions of dollars annually in the United States over the past few years. Repeating this in the future seems difficult both in terms of finance and in terms of investment demand in Korea required for infrastructure and R&D. In order for Korea to maintain a leading position in key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, and semiconductors, it is inevitable to expand investment in the country.

Lee promised to focus on promoting the dynamism and growth of the Korean economy. For this reason, even if companies continue to consider overseas investment, it will be politically burdensome for them to announce expensive overseas investment plans in the early days of the new government.

However, Korean companies are already actually creating a lot of jobs in the U.S. In particular, not only large companies but also medium-sized and small- and medium-sized companies are actively investing in the United States. SPC, for example, plans to open hundreds of Paris Baguette stores in the U.S. and set up factories in Texas to produce products to supply stores. Solum, which was spun off from Samsung Electro-Mechanics, has acquired stakes in U.S. tech companies and is expanding its electronic price tag (ESL) business.

President Lee and the Korean government should be able to work with Korean businessmen to explain how much Korean companies invest in the U.S. every year and how their influence goes beyond simple investments. This may differ from the usual cross-border dialogue on trade, but it will serve as a strong narrative that will not only fully appeal South Korea's contribution to President Trump and his staff, but also justify South Korea's political and economic participation in the United States.

There are areas where President Lee can promote bilateral cooperation so that South Korea and the United States can build global leadership together. Typical examples are shipbuilding and nuclear power generation. South Korea is the world's leading shipbuilding, maintenance, and maintenance (MRO) powerhouse and an ally of the United States, and can contribute to strengthening U.S. merchant ships and U.S. military fleets. The aging U.S. warship MRO market is the most obvious opportunity, and Korean companies have already begun to enter the field.

Although direct shipbuilding in Korea is blocked by the Jones Act, there is also a possibility that the two countries will pursue an "Ikea-style" partnership. This means that Korean companies make "ship kits" and send them to the United States, and assemble them in the United States. Such cooperation goes beyond simple investments, and even provides an opportunity for President Trump to claim that he has worked with allies to revive key U.S. industries and enhance U.S. military power.

In the case of nuclear power plants, Korea is the only country except Russia and China that has the capacity to build nuclear power plants on a large scale in line with the budget and schedule. This is a great opportunity for Korean companies that can power and profit from the U.S.

In particular, the small module nuclear power plant (SMR) market is an area that can generate billions of dollars in profits through bilateral cooperation. Currently, TerraPower and NewScale Power, SMR leaders, are both U.S. companies, but cooperation with Korea is actively underway.

All of these cases are things that President Lee can highlight when he meets with President Trump. Capital and technology will come from the United States and significant profits will go back to the United States, but Korea's manufacturing capabilities have tremendous potential for both countries in that they can play a key role in making the U.S. SMR industry an expandable and exportable industry.

https://csds.vub.be/publication/president-lee-jae-myung-the-united-states-perspective/

June 6, 2025

The most important result of the 3 June 2025 election from the United States’ (US) perspective is that South Korea can now fully engage with Washington on the full range of national security and economic issues. After six months of an acting president after Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed 3 December 2024 declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment, South Korea-US relations can get back on track. Additionally, democratic rule is assured in a key ally and President Lee Jae-myung has established as one of his top priorities to limit the ability of the president to declare martial law. With authoritarianism making advances, this election will strengthen South Korea’s democratic path and could banish both the nostalgia for military rule and the ability of a president to backslide to authoritarianism. A more stable, solidly democratic South Korea is in the United States’ national interest.

What are the views of the US regarding Lee Jae-myung?

With the election of Lee Jae-myung, South Korea has chosen a president who has pledged, as a top priority, to continue to strengthen the relationship with the United States and focus his security and diplomatic policy on an “ironclad” relationship with the US. This focus, along with his pledge to continue to emphasise trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, should help to build up a positive view in the US of the new president.

Lee has visited the US two times, very briefly, and remains relatively unknown to most policymakers in the United States. In past interviews, Lee has suggested that South Korea should “balance” its relationship with the US and its relationship with China and this, along with his limited international experience or exposure to foreign leaders, leaves some in Washington unconvinced Lee will partner well with the US. Lee has emphasised that while he will follow his predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol’s blueprint to foster good relations with the US and Japan, he will also seek better relations with China and attempt to engage with North Korea. It is unlikely his policy regarding China or North Korea will diverge significantly from past Korean presidents, but some in Washington believe Lee is willing to attempt to improve relations with China because Lee touts himself as willing to chart new policy directions if in the interest of South Korea.  North-South engagement seems unlikely in the aftermath of the 2024 signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between North Korea and Russia. The fact that Lee has named Ambassador Wi Sung-lac as his National Security Advisor will almost certainly improve the views of Lee in Washington. Wi is well known in Washington as a very strategic, reasonable policymaker. Wi is respected by many based on close cooperation over the years with many US diplomats and officials based on his time at the Korean Embassy in Washington, and as Assistant Secretary in charge of US policy at the Foreign Ministry, in addition to his time as North Korea negotiator.

Given few formal connections between Lee and his close aides in the Democratic Party and policymakers in Washington, there will be great attention paid to Lee’s first moves, starting with his personnel choices, his first call with President Trump, his initial speeches and his first entree on to the international stage, likely at the NATO Summit in late June. Beyond his introductory moves, visits to the UN General Assembly in September 2025 and hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in October 2025 in Korea, along with an eventual invite to Washington, could serve as opportunities for US counterparts to develop a more nuanced understanding of Lee while also offering Lee chances to articulate his approach to key foreign, security and trade policies.

What are the key short-term priorities for the South Korea-US relationship?

The month of June would challenge any Korean president – with possible G7 and NATO summit attendances, along with trade and burdensharing negotiations with the United States, the weeks ahead are fraught. They are even more consequential and formidable because Lee takes over the presidency with no transition period, and an extremely short campaign period; therefore, less policy preparation and coordination among his team and fewer personnel decisions are in place. To top it off, there will be National Assembly hearings for his cabinet. While the hearings will be relatively straightforward with a strong majority supporting Lee, the domestic calendar will take significant time and attention in his first weeks.

Therefore, the key priority for the Lee government will be to avoid missteps on the international stage, to establish a good working relationship with President Trump and the US administration and manage relations with South Korea’s sole Ally, while also getting his domestic team up and running. The priority for the relationship is to establish enough trust in the early days such that the Trump administration allows Lee time to get his officials in place who can serve as counterparts for the Trump team and negotiate effectively. Beyond the priority to build governmental ties and trust in order to manage the ongoing negotiations between the two allies, developing a personal connection with Trump could help Lee, South Korea and the relationship.  There is potential for a strong personal tie developing based perhaps on the fact that the two leaders have both faced numerous legal challenges and criminal trials they perceive as politically motivated.

The biggest policy challenge for Lee will be to convince Trump and his administration that South Korea is not seeking to find any “balance” between the US and China but that South Korea remains fully committed to the primacy of the relationship with the United States. He could do this by highlighting areas of alignment and opportunities for shared leadership in sectors such as nuclear power and shipbuilding.

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/1198274.html

May 19, 2025

Past and Present

South Korea occupies a singular position in the history of international development, as the only nation to successfully transition from a major aid recipient to a significant donor nation. Reflecting this evolving responsibility, Seoul's official development assistance reached a record ₩6.3 trillion in 2024, equivalent to 0.21 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), the highest share since Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010.

Successive administrations have demonstrated a growing commitment to this cause. Building on gains under the Moon Jae-in government (2017-22), President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration (2022-24) set out its intention to see ODA reach 0.30 per cent of GNI by 2030. While still below the DAC member average, this goal better reflects Korea's economic stature as the fourth-largest economy in Asia and the twelfth-largest globally. Significant strides have been made, but the coming year is critical. With a new president taking office on June 4 and the government set to fix its five-year aid budget  (2026-30) this autumn, 2025 will be a litmus test for Korea’s global vision.

The Capacity Gap

Korea’s laudable expansion of  ODA has come with growing pains. The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has faced challenges managing its expanding portfolio, underscoring the need for broader,  stronger delivery channels to ensure each taxpayer won achieves maximum impact.

Leveraging the expertise and evidence-based approach of established international organisations is an important first step in narrowing this gap. Partnerships with the top research-driven institutions - such as the Gates Foundation and Open Philanthropy, which rigorously identify the most cost-effective interventions - can supply invaluable evidence and methods. By collaborating with such partners, Korea can ensure its contributions are optimised for lives saved per won spent, thereby setting a powerful example for other donor nations.

Maximising Impact

To deliver on this impact-focussed approach, Korea should in turn prioritise support to the most impactful organisations. Countless studies demonstrate that a won spent in support of the best multilateral global-health initiatives is far more impactful than the same won spent bilaterally. COVAX - to which Korea provided generous support - is a clear recent example of the power of multilateralism. 

Indeed, the global-health mechanisms consistently rated the most effective are Gavi and the Global Fund.  Their  transparency, accountability and rigorous monitoring and evaluation, coupled with a focus on support to the world’s most vulnerable communities, means they offer world-beating value in delivering impact: saving lives and strengthening health systems.Gavi is responsible for vaccinating half of the world’s children. Its  role expanding routine immunisation in the world’s poorest settings is transformative in improving  child survival and global health security. The Global Fund plays a critical role in fighting HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, each a scourge on human progress that disproportionately affects the world’s most vulnerable citizens. 

Gavi and the Global Fund are both seeking fresh international funding this year, in a very difficult climate for global health work. Substantial Korean contributions to each would demonstrate Seoul’s leadership and compassion, and place it at the centre of a historic effort to end preventable disease.  Fundamentally, such backing is among the most cost effective and transparent way to  control epidemics, save millions of lives, and reinforce health systems worldwide.

Leadership Opportunities

Beyond lifting ODA volumes, Korea can showcase distinctive leadership by harnessing its scientific and technological edge to apply data-driven approaches to its aid allocation. While in part that should involve channelling resources to high-impact multilateral organisations like Gavi and the Global Fund, there are also opportunities that Korea is uniquely well placed to lead.  .

Today’s geopolitical fault-lines have left critical gaps in development finance. Korea’s expanded ODA can help stabilise fragile regions, shore up democratic partners and rebalance influence across Asia and beyond.

Korea’s COVID-era digital-health platforms -now globally admired for remote diagnostics and contact tracing - could be piloted across ASEAN to revolutionise disease surveillance and telemedicine.

Perhaps most promisingly, Korea can also champion solutions to health challenges that remain badly underfunded. Lead poisoning - often described as a silent pandemic - kills an estimated one million people each year and blunts the potential of some 800 million children. Yet proven, affordable remedies exist. By directing a slice of its expanded ODA to initiatives like the Lead Exposure Action Fund (LEAF) and Pure Earth, Korea could become a pivotal national actor in addressing this neglected crisis, drawing on lessons from its own path from heavy industry to clean technology. The gains - in human health and Korean prestige -would be immense.

Benefits and Prospects

A well-designed, scaled-up ODA programme can bring Korea tangible economic and political dividends. Supporting global procurers such as Gavi and the Global Fund would stimulate demand for Korea’s fast-growing pharmaceutical and biotech industries, opening new markets and fuelling innovation. This synergy of development aid and industrial competitiveness is economic diplomacy at its smartest.

Crucially, a substantial and effective ODA contribution is a hallmark of advanced global powers and a key criterion for deeper engagement in forums like the G7. By showing it can meet global challenges with impactful aid, Korea would burnish its credentials as a responsible stakeholder and strengthen its claim to a seat among the world’s leading democracies. The direction of Korean ODA over the next few years will reveal how fully Seoul intends to translate economic success into commensurate global influence.

Conclusion

I hope both ruling and opposition parties in the National Assembly will unite behind a vision for Korean global ODA leadership, making Korea’s leading role and contribution an area of bipartisan unity and national pride. 

The Republic of Korea stands at a pivotal juncture. With the economic strength and moral authority born of its own development miracle, Seoul can claim greater global leadership through an enhanced, sharply focused ODA programme. By prioritising effectiveness, funnelling resources through proven multilateral partners and championing neglected high-impact areas, Korea will save lives, spur sustainable development and strengthen its own economy - all while cementing its place among the world’s foremost nations. This commitment would crown Korea’s journey from aid recipient to benefactor, a transformation the world has witnessed with deep respect.

https://keia.org/the-peninsula/how-the-u-s-and-south-korea-can-power-the-globe-with-nuclear-energy/

April 28, 2025

On January 9, 2025, the United States and South Korea signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on principles of nuclear export and cooperation that could unlock new dimensions of the partnership and tens of billions of dollars in profit for construction and nuclear industries in both countries. In addition to its clear economic implications, the deal allows for a credible path toward delivering an alternative to Chinese and Russian nuclear offerings and, therefore, has significant geopolitical implications. The deal sets a precedent for an expanded bilateral partnership based on common understandings about nonproliferation, emerging technology, export controls, and the increased demand for nuclear power generation due to the burgeoning AI ecosystem.

In the next decade, nuclear power will play a significant role in satisfying the growing demand for electricity, which will continue to increase well beyond the capacity that fossil fuels can provide. Even if the peak demand for oil does not occur in 2030, and even if the move to decarbonize the global economy does not hit the climate targets outlined in the Paris Agreement, electricity production from nuclear energy will likely increase given the growing demand and the amount of ongoing investment and research. Electricity consumption is expected to rise 4 percent annually from energy-intensive sectors, including transportation and AI data centers. That translates to a doubling in demand over the next twenty years. As a “plug and play” technology, nuclear power from small modular or traditionally large nuclear plants can connect seamlessly to existing electrical grids. Some experts suggest that companies could install small modular reactors (SMRs) on the sites of coal plants and connect them immediately to the existing coal-generation grid. Utilizing molten salt reactors could ease retrofits of coal plants to nuclear plants and provide more stability than light-water reactors.

Conservative estimates suggest that the amount of energy produced from nuclear plants could double in the next twenty-five years, and the high-case scenario from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests a 250 percent increase in nuclear power by 2050 from 416 GWe to over 1000 GWe and provide 25 percent of global electricity production from its current 9 percent. The conservative market value for nuclear power contracts over the next twenty-five years is valued at USD 500–740 billion, representing a substantial economic opportunity for countries such as South Korea with advanced nuclear technology and strong production, research, and construction capacity. Not only does South Korea have capable government-backed research, construction, and operation organizations in Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), but it also has companies like Hyundai and Samsung that are capable of building and operating plants domestically and overseas.

South Korea is dependent on imported coal (33 percent of its energy mix in 2023) and LNG (26.8 percent of its energy mix in 2023) to fuel the manufacturing production of semiconductors, batteries, chips, and electric vehicles (EVs). While fossil fuels will continue to power much of South Korea in the near term, sustainable and alternative energy sources are needed to meet the country’s carbon neutrality commitments by 2050. During his presidency, Yoon Suk Yeol renewed South Korea’s commitment to nuclear power as a domestic energy source and outlined plans to build three new nuclear reactors, increasing nuclear-generated power to 35 percent of the country’s energy supply by 2038. Lee Jae-myung, the leading presidential candidate for the Democratic Party ahead of the presidential election in June, has stated his support for nuclear power domestically and as an export. Meanwhile, any potential conservative candidate would likely continue Yoon’s policy approach.

South Korea has invested heavily in developing advanced reactors, and its standardized designs reduce construction time by minimizing changes and ensuring smooth project execution. On average, South Korea is able to construct nuclear power plants in fifty-six months, more than three times faster than the global average. In addition to developing traditional and next-generation reactors, including SMRs and high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs), South Korean companies are investing in U.S. companies like NuScale Power and TerraPower and will likely provide engineering know-how to U.S. SMR companies. The recent settlement agreement between Westinghouse, KEPCO, and KHNP positions South Korea to more effectively operate in the global market and fulfill contractual obligations for building plants in the Czech Republic and the United Arab Emirates and compete for contracts in Egypt, Finland, Ghana, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey. In the best-case scenario, the United States would support South Korea’s bids and even engage in commercial advocacy to boost its bid over China or Russia. This could look similar to U.S. efforts to support Nokia and other non-U.S. telecommunication organizations globally to counter China’s Huawei due to the lack of a practical U.S. alternative. While this could sound counterintuitive in the current Donald Trump administration, the preferred path for the United States—due to the lack of competitive U.S. alternatives and the economic benefits that would accrue from South Korea-led projects to Westinghouse and other U.S. companies—would be to support South Korea’s bids on traditional reactor projects and invest heavily in SMR technology.

The United States is the world’s largest producer of nuclear power, accounting for about 30 percent of global nuclear electricity generation. Nuclear power has contributed almost 20 percent of electrical generation in the United States and remains the single-largest contributor to non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power in the United States. Despite past success building in the United States and abroad, the export of nuclear reactors has declined in recent years, and U.S. companies now fail in speed and expense to match state-owned enterprises, especially those from China and Russia. Reports indicate that of the ninety reactors expected to be completed worldwide by 2030, only three will be supplied by U.S. companies and ten from South Korea—compared to forty-three from China and twenty-nine from Russia. China and Russia prioritize rapid deployment and cost-effectiveness over stringent safety and security measures. This contrasts with the United States’ projects, which emphasize robust nuclear security protocols but also come with cost overruns and delays. Emerging markets that choose Chinese or Russian reactors due to the lack of alternative options may face a heightened risk of accidents or security breaches and, with the forty- to fifty-year production life of a typical reactor, become locked in a decades-long relationship of economic dependency on China and Russia.

South Korea’s capabilities, coupled with U.S. research and capital, could answer many of the world’s energy demand questions now that the path forward is clear for close cooperation and collaboration. In addition to offering clean energy and energy access to the billions who currently lack such resources, the United States and South Korea could do so while also providing a safer and more geopolitically aligned alternative to China and Russia’s offerings.

March 3, 2025

https://podcasts.apple.com/be/podcast/energy-security-is-national-security-the-case-of/id1752856119?i=1000697371009

https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/profit-and-power-opportunities-us-south-korea-energy-sector

February 18, 2025

Expanding US-South Korea Energy Collaboration

South Korea is one of the United States’ most industrially-capable international partners, but due to its lack of energy resources, it relies on U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), among other sources, to fuel its industrial output. Increased U.S.-South Korea energy cooperation would strengthen an already robust treaty alliance and economic partnership. Over the last five years, South Korea has expanded its trade and investment relationship with the U.S., becoming its largest foreign investor, while the U.S. has overtaken China as South Korea’s top export market. In 2024, South Korea was the largest importer of U.S. LNG, receiving 5.7 million metric tons.

South Korea’s already strong participation in the U.S. energy sector was supercharged by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA). Its incentives significantly boosted South Korea’s investment and engagement in the green economy, accelerating growth in electric vehicles (EVs), charging stations, small modular reactors (SMRs), wind turbines, solar panels, and more. In the coming years, given the potential for profit, energy sector cooperation is likely to continue to increase.

Fueling the Energy Transition

The IRA and CHIPs and Science acts have attracted billions of South Korean energy-related investment, funding projects and plants in Texas, Georgia, Alabama, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee and Michigan to produce EV batteries, solar panels, wind turbines and related supply chain components that support the U.S. and global effort to catalyze the energy transition. South Korean investment has added manufacturing capacity throughout the supply chain for EVs and EV batteries and supported expansion of related infrastructure.

In addition to this existing cooperation in the EV space, South Korea and the U.S. are starting to expand their cooperation in clean hydrogen and ammonia. For example, U.S. company AirProducts invested $500 million to establish a clean hydrogen production facility in Gyeonggi Province that could be used to import U.S. production as well as the associated “crackers” that are used to break down heavier fuels. Cracking is an energy intensive process and development of an efficient and affordable hydrogen-driven cracking process would result in a significant reduction of greenhouse gases. Syzygy Plasmonics, a startup based on Rice University-developed technology, set up a test ammonia cracker in Ulsan, South Korea in November 2024 and is working with South Korean companies to expand cooperation in the hydrogen sector.

Key to US-South Korea Energy Ties

The most significant U.S.-South Korea energy partnership remains in LNG, with the U.S. as South Korea’s top supplier. LNG makes up 26.8% of South Korea’s energy mix and Korea is the third largest LNG importer globally after China and Japan. Less well known is Chevron’s decades-old joint venture with South Korean conglomerate GS (known as GS Caltex) that operates the fourth largest refinery in the world in Yeosu, South Korea.

As South Korea works to hit its net zero commitments and transition away from coal, U.S.-South Korea LNG trade should continue to increase. With the second Trump administration’s expected focus on reducing the trade deficit (over $50 billion in 2024), the pressure to further increase LNG, and perhaps crude oil, imports from the U.S. is likely to rise.

Renewed Focus on Nuclear Power and Exports

While fossil fuels will continue to power much of South Korea in the near term, the future is bright for nuclear power, both domestically and as a source for overseas manufacturing and operating. After former President Moon Jae-in (2017–22) pledged to abandon nuclear power for environmental reasons in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, President Yoon Seok-yeol (2022–TBD) renewed South Korea’s commitment to nuclear power as a domestic energy source and a source for jobs and overseas sales.

Ahead of likely spring presidential elections in South Korea, all major candidates support increased focus on nuclear power, both domestically and as an export opportunity. Following the signing of a civil nuclear memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and South Korea on Jan. 9, 2025, civil nuclear cooperation is expected to accelerate, with the U.S. likely supporting the previously-disputed deal for Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) to build nuclear reactors in Czechia.

South Korean companies are investing in U.S. companies like NuScale and TerraPower, while also developing their own reactor models and continuing to export traditional South Korean reactors. The new MOU unlocks great potential for U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation. Leveraging U.S. research expertise alongside South Korea’s construction capacity and experience, the coming decades could position this sector at the core of a shared energy future and broader economic cooperation.

Energy Cooperation Spans Conglomerates, Tech, and Startups

South Korea is at the cutting edge of technological development in the energy sector. The following examples highlight this progress:

• Korea Zinc, a 50-year old leader in recycling and smelting, operates extensively in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere.

• MajorSouth Korean conglomerates like Samsung, SK, Lotte, LG, and Hanwha are investing heavily in U.S. companies across the supply chain. South Korea’s second-largest conglomerate, SK, plans to invest over $50 billion in batteries, chips, and energy-related factories over the next 10 years.

• South Korean startups like Gaoncell are forging partnerships in the U.S., Poland, and Saudi Arabia to expand energy cooperation. Gaoncell is developing cutting-edge hydrogen fuel cell technology to create portable energy solutions for a variety of uses ranging from defense to data centers and drones.

• South Korean company CS Wind owns and operates the largest wind turbine manufacturing facility in the world in Pueblo, Colorado.

Fueling US Energy Innovation

Gaoncell exemplifies the type of cooperation expected going forward — research and production capabilities developed in South Korea, combined with global capital, sales and production. Similarly, the CS Wind investment and partnership illustrates how South Korean companies bring three key benefits to the U.S.:

1. Investing in the U.S. and creating jobs.

2. Leading research and development to create advanced technologies for the energy sector.

3. Providing manufacturing capacity and ability to meet deadlines and cost targets.

Although political challenges remain in aligning the bilateral relationship — and with Japan in trilateral arrangements — energy sector partnerships are expected to grow. Looking forward, established South Korean companies and conglomerates will likely continue to find investment and cooperation opportunities in the U.S. To strengthen this cooperation, research institutions and governments should expedite existing initiatives that support smaller companies and startups, driving further profitability in the U.S.-South Korea energy partnership.

South Korea’s Role in Shaping the Future of Minerals

South Korea also plays a leading role in the mineral sector, which is expected to grow in importance as the global energy economy shifts away from fossil fuels. As the current chair of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a U.S.-led collaboration of 14 countries and the EU, South Korea is spearheading efforts to secure a steady supply of critical minerals. With major conglomerates like POSCO at the forefront, South Korea is a key player in the global effort to diversify mineral sources, even as China maintains a dominant position in mineral production and processing. While a true mineral decoupling from China is unlikely to occur in the next decade, South Korean investments are contributing to a more balanced and resilient global supply chain.

Key Dialogues and Future Opportunities

When representatives of the U.S. and South Korea met at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy in Houston on April 29–30, 2024, for their tenth annual energy security dialogue, it marked a significant shift. For the first time, business and academic experts joined what had previously been a government-to-government policy dialogue. Building on the success of that event, the Baker Institute sponsored a follow-up U.S.-Korea Business Energy Dialogue on Nov. 21, 2024, which served as a half year check-in on this critical bilateral energy relationship.

Guided by a government-drafted agenda and led by energy experts from academia and business, participants discussed not only continued cooperation in traditional sectors like LNG, but also ways to accelerate industrial collaboration in support of the energy transition. In both dialogues, experts and officials discussed coordinating policies to enhance collaboration and identified areas for growth, shared research, and cross-investment in sectors such as carbon capture, wind and solar power, geothermal, and hydrogen. During the November session, participants agreed that, as the second Trump administration begins, all should seek to frame cooperation as an opportunity to support U.S. efforts to compete with and counter China.

South Korea and the U.S. already cooperate extensively across government and private sectors, and this collaboration is expected to intensify as both nations seek to compete with and offer an alternative to China’s influence. The 2024 discussions at the Baker Institute underscored that the most promising areas for U.S.-South Korea cooperation lie in carbon capture, utilization and storage, nuclear energy, minerals supply chain coordination, and LNG exports — sectors that hold the potential to shape a more secure and sustainable global energy future.

https://csds.vub.be/publication/south-korea-impeachments-and-next-steps/

January 20, 2025

President Yoon impeached

Since President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s hours-long declaration of martial law 3 December 2024, the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) brought two impeachment motions against Yoon, with the second one successful on 14 December securing twelve votes (204 total) from the ruling Peoples Power Party (PPP), enough to secure the necessary two thirds of votes. All 192 of the DPK legislators voted to impeach Yoon. Following the vote, Yoon was relieved of his duties and then-Prime Minister Han Duk-soo took over as acting president.

Acting President Han impeached

The Constitutional Court is charged with certifying (or not) the National Assembly’s impeachment vote. The opposition believed that only a full court of nine judges could produce a fair outcome. Six Constitutional Court judges must certify a presidential impeachment to validate the ruling and there were just six judges on the Court on 14 December when the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon. Since then-acting President Han refused to appoint judges to fill the three empty seats on the Constitutional Court – Han said he would only appoint consensus candidates, impossible given the political cleavage –, the opposition DPK party brought forth and approved an impeachment motion against Han by a majority vote on 27 December 2024. A two thirds majority (200 votes) in the National Assembly is necessary to impeach a President in South Korea, but the Assembly can impeach any other official with a simple majority (151 votes). Therefore, the opposition DPK and its coalition partners, with 192 of 300 seats, could impeach Han despite the absence of the 108 ruling party lawmakers at the vote.

Acting President Choi takes over

After Han’s impeachment, then-Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok became acting President and on 31 December appointed two judges to the Constitutional Court. On 3 January 2025, investigators from the Corruption Investigation Office (COI) attempted to execute a warrant for Yoon’s arrest and interrogation related to the various charges levied against him, including a charge for insurrection as a result of his failed self-coup. The Presidential Security Service (PSS) formed a human wall, blocking police and investigators to prevent Yoon’s arrest as Yoon remains holed up in his hilltop villa in central Seoul. After the warrant expired, government authorities extended the warrant on 7 January.

Yoon arrested

On 15 January 2025, the CIO investigators executed the warrant and brought Yoon in for questioning. Before he left his residence, Yoon issued a video stating that the arrest was illegal. He will be questioned by the CIO, the police and then the prosecutors and held at the Seoul Detention Center until the trial at the Constitutional Court concludes.

Constitutional Court hearings begin

Hearings in the Constitutional Court began 14 January and five sessions are scheduled between 14 January and 4 February 2025. The 14 January session lasted just minutes as Yoon did not appear. Yoon’s lawyers attempted unsuccessfully to exclude one of the justices and requested that former Prime Minister Han’s impeachment hearings proceed before the Constitutional Court considers Yoon’s case. Regarding the two previous impeachments, then-President Roh Moo-hyun regained office in March 2004, two months after his impeachment when the Court dismissed the motion. And in March 2017, the Constitutional Court upheld then-President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and presidential elections were held in May 2017, six months after the 9 December 2016 impeachment vote related to charges that Park abused her power.

Next steps

If the Constitutional Court does not certify Yoon’s impeachment, Yoon would resume office as President of South Korea. Since then-President Yoon publicly declared martial law, most experts presume that the Constitutional Court will uphold the impeachment motion and South Korea will hold presidential elections in the April-June timeframe depending on how the court case proceeds. The Constitutional Court must rule within 180 days of the impeachment vote, and, once the Court rules, an election must take place within 60 days of the ruling.

Consequences

Many Koreans have expressed concern that the domestic political turmoil that is ongoing in the wake of the impeachments and now arrest and detention of deposed President Yoon will damage South Korea’s ability to work effectively with the United States and the incoming Trump administration, and affect Korea’s reputation as a leading democracy. With Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025, there is concern that an acting President in South Korea is not well positioned for a strong start with Trump and his team. Some foreign observers have concerns that instability in South Korea could lead to a loss in momentum on several key issues such as trilateral relations with Japan and the US, coordination on supply chain and economic security, and overall coordination vis-a-vis China. The US Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister visited Seoul in January, seeking to ensure coordination, especially regarding North Korea, remains solid. Most anticipate that Trump and his team will look to South Korea to take a strong position with the US to counter China and an acting President in Korea could face considerable domestic opposition to new initiatives if they could cause increased friction with China.

Conclusion

The end of the stand-off between Yoon and the CIO led to a boost in Korean markets as some semblance of political “normalcy” has returned, the Constitutional Court hearings can proceed, and expectations are that the process will now lead to a presidential election in the Spring. Polling suggests that DPK party leader Lee Jae Myung is the odds-on favourite to win the presidency while a number of conservative candidates are now seeking to unite the anti-Lee, anti-impeachment sentiment and preparing to challenge Lee.

https://csds.vub.be/publication/south-korea-impeachments-and-next-steps/

November 7, 2024

Korean companies have invested 114 billion dollars in the United States in the last three years, creating tens of thousands of American jobs and helping to rebuild our manufacturing base in the United States. Korea, Korean companies, and the Korean people have put “all their chips” on the United States and the benefits for our country are many.  To encourage Korea to continue to place its bet on us and to chart its future with us, and not with Europe, Southeast Asia, or even China, in a way that is most beneficial to the American people, and the U.S. economy, the next U.S. president and Congress, could make long-discussed changes that would boost the relationship with Korea to new heights, make our country safer, the alliance more robust, and create more new jobs in the United States.

First, the United States could repeal its 232 steel tariffs and quota on South Korea. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimated that each job saved in the steel industry due to the tariffs came at a cost of nearly $650,000 to consumers. Repealing the tariffs would likely reverse many of these economic distortions and lead to overall economic gains for the United States. Partnerships, not tariffs, offer a way to revitalize our steel industry. The stalled Nippon Steel acquisition of U.S. Steel means that not only are U.S. customers paying more for steel, if something is not done to facilitate this type of partnership, it seems likely that the U.S. steel industry will not survive Chinese competition.  If the Nippon-U.S. Steel acquisition remains politically impossible, or even if it succeeds, the U.S. steel industry could and should explore forming a joint venture with South Korean companies or re-imagine a partnership with Nippon Steel in order to preserve not only jobs but the industry. Such a partnership could serve both Korean and U.S. industry and reestablish a viable steel industry for the future, powered by partnerships and American jobs, in the United States.  

Second, another industry that a revitalized relationship with Korea could resuscitate is shipbuilding.  South Korean companies have dipped their toes into the U.S. market with the $100 million purchase of U.S. shipbuilder Philly Shipyard. However, in order to save the shipbuilding industry and preserve U.S. capability to supply ships for the future—to our military as well as for cargo—we should take a far more sweeping approach and modify the Jones Act to allow production of needed vessels outside the United States such as LNG vessels that have not been built here since the 1970s. To encourage more shipbuilding in the United States, a joint ownership structure for a new, modern, and automated shipyard(s) in the United States could allow innovative South Korean companies to make significant investment in the United States that could not only preserve U.S. shipbuilding capacity and introduce thousands of new jobs into the United States, but could also help us retake a global leadership role in building the most advanced ships for our military and our industry.

Lastly, to facilitate even more Korean investment in batteries, semiconductors, and other industries of and for the future, and to ensure support for U.S. jobs and key industries as well as a viable future for industries like steel and shipbuilding, Congress should fast-track and promulgate the Partner with Korea Act introduced on October 8 to create a temporary, non-immigrant E-4 visa category for Koreans.  Previously, when the United States concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with a country, the deal came with special visa categories to help facilitate the increase in trade and investment that logically accompanies an FTA.  Congress decided with the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in 2010 that such visa provisions did not belong in an FTA.  That does not change the fact that such visa provisions are helpful to the United States and support the increased FDI that comes with an FTA. Therefore, Congress could rectify this and add in the jobs provisions to allow Koreans to more easily manage their significant investments in our industrial base, to support efforts to invest even more, and to create even more jobs in the United States. The KORUS FTA is, outside of NAFTA/MSCA, the largest trade deal for the United States, and the lack of more specialized visas means there are billions of Korean investment that are taking longer to materialize or, worse for the American people, are being redirected to Southeast Asia or elsewhere.  If the E-4 visa bill goes through, it would catalyze even more Korean investment with more Korean companies launching new investments in the United States. Currently, the bulk of Korean investment comes from South Korean conglomerates (chaebols), but expanding the visa program could lead to smaller, new high-tech Korean companies to expand their investment approach in the United States.

The U.S.-Korea relationship is strong and built for the future, but a few political tweaks could launch the next decades of cooperation and investment, boosting prosperity in both countries.

https://www.csis.org/analysis/korean-support-kyiv-would-transform-ukraine-and-koreas-global-role

October 28, 2024

North Korea sends ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, Putin travels to Pyongyang and concludes a comprehensive strategic partnership, and North Korean special forces deploy to support Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Is there any doubt what Pyongyang and Moscow are up to? It is now abundantly clear that Russia has chosen its partner on the peninsula, and it is not South Korea. Now is the time for South Korea to acknowledge this fact and stand with the Ukrainian people, the United States, and Europe. If Seoul chooses to throw its full-throated support behind Ukraine, South Korean support could turn the tide on the entire conflict and even lead directly to a peace deal. While European and U.S. allies have limited capacity for armament production critically needed in a protracted ground battle such as in Ukraine, South Korea’s world-class companies have continued to develop, perfect, and produce exactly the weaponry needed in an ongoing industrial war. Now, South Korean companies are world leaders in producing military vehicles, ammunition, automated artillery, and other defense equipment that Ukraine desperately needs.

While this seems like a compelling argument for the South Korean government to step up and authorize Korean companies to engage directly with Kyiv, some balk, claiming donation or sales of lethal weapons could ratchet tension up with Pyongyang and Moscow. There is an equally strong case to make for supporting Ukraine that has nothing to do with responding to what North Korea has done or will do. Rather than calling out red lines (not something the United States would recommend as a diplomatic gambit—see Syria, 2013) and hinting that Korea may consider changing its policy and support Ukraine based on what North Korea and Russia do, Korea should make its case based on two other key factors: South Korea’s global role and responsibility, and the potential economic benefits to Korean companies and workers.

Korean politicians on both sides of the aisle, along with many pundits and scholars, have long advocated for and sought G7+ membership for South Korea. There is strong logic in favor of offering Korea a greater global role to correspond with its economic and military power and its global reach. The G7 weighs in regularly on the war in Ukraine and has sided clearly and repeatedly with Ukraine against Russia because Russia has chosen to wage a war of aggression, illegally redraw borders, and engage in genocide. Ukraine deserves more from Korean leaders than dithering about what actions might upset possible future trade with Russia or harm Moscow’s role in future peninsula talks. This is not a global approach. South Korea should take a position that is consistent with the universal values it supports and espouses. Global leadership entails making trade-offs and difficult decisions. And it does not seem that any Korean politician could say with a straight face that not supporting Ukraine is the right choice based on global values. The surest way for global powers to accept Korea in the G7+ is for Korea to make the right choice and go all-in and support Ukraine. 

Second, if Korea does make the choice to stand with the Ukrainian people, much as Colombia, Greece, Ethiopia, the United States, and others helped South Korea during the Korean War, there would be certain gain for Korea, directly and indirectly. Indirectly, if Korea marshaled its technical know-how and led efforts to shore up and protect Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and keep the Ukrainian people warm this winter, and if Korea sold its world-class weaponry to Ukraine permitting the Ukrainians to push back against Russian aggression and therefore trigger an end to the conflict, Korea’s global brand would skyrocket in value as leaders in Brussels and Washington, but also in Delhi and Bogota. Foreign leaders would acknowledge Korea’s geopolitical arrival and, if Korean support proves as decisive as I anticipate it could be, Korea would logically receive diplomatic accolades that would redound in other fora and result in a more effective voice for Korea to advance its interests across the globe. More directly, there is much at stake and much to gain. The European Union is poised to lead reconstruction efforts in Ukraine as soon as peace or an armistice is achieved. If Korea and Korean companies play a pivotal role in catalyzing such a peace, the future participation of Korean companies in the half-trillion-dollar task of rebuilding Ukraine would not only be assured, it could smooth the path for Korean companies to establish a significant presence in Ukraine, a country linked to the European Union, the largest market in the world. What could this mean? This wouldn’t just mean car, artillery, and battery factories in Ukraine, but Korean construction companies could find themselves at the top of the list to build airports, highways, and apartment buildings, and set to play a leading role in reconstructing Ukraine’s energy grid. 

Now is the time for Korea to help the Ukrainian people. If Seoul makes this difficult decision, it will benefit the Ukrainian and Korean people and could transform Korea’s global stature and global role.

https://csds.vub.be/publication/linking-europe-and-asia-for-the-future-time-for-the-juke-grouping-of-japan-united-states-korea-and-the-eu/

October 16, 2024

Key issues

There is untapped potential to boost policy alignment and implement capital-intensive initiatives through a diplomatic grouping between Japan, the United States (US), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) (“JUKE”). The group will build on common elements from the trilateral Camp David statement, the US-EU China Dialogue and the JUKE commerce-led dialogue on supply chain security to coordinate policy.

Nuclear power and the energy transition require immense investment that JUKE economies would support to marshal the research and capital needed to power the energy transition and achieve NetZero goals.

Track 2 dialogue in a JUKE grouping could identify the areas with most potential, and should be followed by Track 1.5 and Track 1 meetings. A few areas for potential focus are Ukraine support and reconstruction and deterring and engaging the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Introduction

Globalisation has been achieved for all practical purposes – not only are executives in Papua New Guinea tracking the New York Stock exchange in real time and investors in Europe forecasting Indonesian nickel supplies and prices, but kids from Paris, France to Columbus, Ohio exchange Pokémon cards and anticipate BTS concert dates. Global citizens think about issues that impact the world such as climate change and the next pandemic. Countries are increasingly interconnected and interdependent, however, diplomatic groupings tend to be regionally focused based on decades-old relationships. While these groupings are well intended and effective, it is necessary to review the diplomatic approach to transnational issues and adjust to galvanise an effective response to crises. Regionalisation of diplomacy is particularly acute in Europe and Asia. For good reasons, these two large continents have focused on their own regions. To spur action in response to global issues, it is important to consider minilateral groupings between Europe and Asia that are both more extensive than ASEAN, NATO or the Quad, and more cohesive with significant areas of alignment to facilitate diplomatic initiatives. NATO has done extensive outreach to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) but remains limited given the sensitivities of focusing too much on hard security in such proximity to China. Beijing stalemates action in any grouping it holds membership and therefore it is impossible to achieve a useful consensus or meaningful outcome.

Minilateral and ad hoc diplomatic groupings are most focused and effective when they attempt to respond to current and future threats and challenges, especially those emanating from China. While Europe-Asia dialogues need not focus exclusively on China, the groups could indeed discuss ways to constrain China while also looking at ways to respond together to transnational threats and challenges such as climate change and the energy transition, cyber security, etc. And, ultimately, when countries can discuss “China without China” there is more room to manoeuvre. For example, discussions of mineral security or supply chain security can rightly focus on potential actions from allies and partners. However, such discussions would be discussions of “China without China” since allies and partners would seek to achieve a collective response to protect from China’s malign intentions and/or predatory practices.

The US since 2017 has attained clarity on its approach to China and secured not only executive branch continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations, but also bipartisan agreement that China is a threat and a challenge to international order. While this is arguably the right starting point to compete and constrain China’s more hegemonic and malevolent goals, this does not offer a prescription for how to uphold the Biden administration’s strategy to “invest, align, compete”. Groups such as JUKE could do exactly that, working in concert with regional groupings, allies and partners.

In addition to revitalising NATO (thanks Vladimir Putin) and energising our bilateral alliances through outreach and friction reduction, the Biden administration brought new life to minilaterals such as the Quad and created new formats such as AUKUS and the Camp David Trilateral with Japan and the ROK. However, each of these formats has limitations and not one of them present options for significant impact on global policy coordination and implementation or provide an answer for how a non-China grouping could contribute to advancing prosperity and security. Furthermore, none of these groups specifically addresses the issue that I will seek to highlight – how to build more Europe-Asia connections, diplomatically and geopolitically.

The US has worked hard to expand its coordination with the largest economic bloc, the EU, and had great success in building trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK. This work could serve as a jumping off point for the JUKE. If the US, along with the second and fourth largest economies (the EU and Japan), and the sixth most “powerful” country economically and militarily (the ROK), combine efforts, there is unlimited potential for what the JUKE grouping could accomplish globally. The EU could piggyback on trilateral work being done in ASEAN countries as outlined in the Camp David statement. Both the US-EU dialogue and the Camp David Trilateral suggest greater cooperation on the Pacific Islands. A JUKE grouping would combine and expand that conversation to develop and enhance cooperation and investment. The investment needed over the coming years to stay ahead of China, let alone continue to offer opportunity and prosperity to the world, will require vast amounts of wealth and R&D from the US and its allies and partners. In addition, establishment of this partnership will provide a platform for current and future areas of mutual interest and global impact.

This CSDS Policy Brief will highlight potential areas where a JUKE grouping will contribute to increased policy alignment and support collective efforts by allies and partners in other multilateral fora. Additionally, the brief will outline a path forward to initiate a JUKE partnership.

Ukraine

Japan and the ROK have provided billions in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people as it continues to suffer an ongoing conflict with Russia. JUKE could serve as a useful vehicle to not only find ways to increase current support to ensure Ukraine can continue to hold off the Russian attack, but also to organise reconstruction once peace or an armistice is achieved. The group could discuss how to provide much-needed energy infrastructure to help bolster the grid that Russia targeted throughout the spring and summer of 2024. Reconstruction of Ukraine will require upwards of 500 billion dollars and not only will that money need to come from somewhere, Ukraine and its people will need support from companies and countries that can build and build quickly. Japan and the ROK are particularly well positioned to contribute, and coordination of these future efforts should start now.

Innovation and technology

The ROK, Japan, Taiwan, the US and the Netherlands have collectively managed to keep a five-year lead on China in commercial manufacturing of advanced logic chips and this serves as a prime example of how we can, collectively, keep our lead in critical industries of today and the future. Building on existing government support such as the US’ CHIPS act funding, the JUKE grouping could augment and complement the work of the Chip 4 Alliance. In addition to semiconductors, a building block for future development across all industries, the JUKE grouping is well positioned to discuss space, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum-related research, investment and regulatory policy. The grouping could look to the December 2023 US-ROK meeting of the Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET) Dialogue and increase cooperation in biotechnology and other technologies of the future. The Commerce Department-led meeting on supply chain security serves as a prime example of how this group could seek to develop answers to our most pressing questions and prescribe a response to China.

Energy transition and civil nuclear power

Currently, China is up to 15 years ahead of the US and its allies on the construction of advanced nuclear power technologies thanks in no small part to massive governmental investment and favourable loans that will result in the construction of up to 150 new reactors before 2035 in China. This is a particularly important technology where we should not fall further behind for two important reasons. First, the International Energy Agency suggests that to meet our NetZero goals, we should build dozens of new reactors each year to generate 550 gigawatts of new nuclear power by 2050. Second, a 1-gigawatt plant costs about $5 billion, which means almost three trillion dollars are both needed and up for grabs over the next 25 years. Despite lagging China currently, if the JUKE countries made nuclear power generation a key priority, it could catalyse rapid growth in large and Small Modular Reactor (SMR) plants since this grouping, if it cooperates rather than competes, has both the research and construction capability to lead this important field and retake leadership in the industry globally from China. There are currently 80 different SMR reactors in the design stage and numerous countries are signing 123 agreements to further civil nuclear cooperation with the US and partnering through the FIRST programme. Construction of SMRs and traditional plants globally will expand rapidly in the next 20 years and now is the time for us to work together to support this effort.

Cybersecurity and counterterrorism

Japan and the ROK could join efforts ongoing between the US and the EU to share information concerning identifying and responding to foreign information manipulation and interference. The work on this topic as well as exchanges on human rights could be enhanced and amplified if Japan and Korea joined their voices to the ongoing conversation and, using the September 2024 US-EU dialogue on China and the Indo-Pacific as a framework, pick up on themes of concern such as the DPRK’s continued arms transfers to Russia and Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Additionally, the grouping could serve as an effective forum to discuss ways to collectively respond to transnational threats such as cyber-attacks and terrorism. While cyber-attacks could come from China, they also could emanate from Russia, DPRK, terrorist groups and other malign actors so such discussions could offer the grouping more latitude to discuss ways to deter China as well as other actors without specifically calling out China, something that is problematic especially for the ROK. Another potential positive outcome from such discussions could be an increase in information and intelligence exchange between the countries and help the countries react more effectively and collectively in the case of a new threat in the future.

G7

The ROK, along with Australia and several other candidates, hopes to join a “G10” that expands the G7’s mandate beyond the current exclusive group and offers a greater voice to the Indo-Pacific. A JUKE grouping would offer the ROK a chance to showcase how aligned it already is with the G7 while also highlighting to the group the fact that the ROK brings capability, especially in construction and manufacturing both batteries and semiconductors but also tanks, artillery and other defence articles, that the other G7 countries lack. Shipbuilding, chips, batteries, nuclear power and arms production are a few areas where the ROK shines, but overall, the South Koreans retain a capability to produce goods and complete large scale, complex construction projects in a timely manner. This could be a critical piece of the puzzle as the JUKE (and future G10) seek to implement policies and produce results.

Cultural exchange and global health

The impact of soft power to address all global challenges should not be underestimated. The collective cultural influence of the US, EU, ROK and Japan can shape global narratives, counteract authoritarianism, promote human rights and sustain a rules-based international order. The JUKE grouping could develop both new ways to build cooperation and also augment current programmes such as Fulbright and Erasmus+ that have lasting impact. Research coordination amongst institutions and governments could boost ongoing efforts such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) to fight infectious diseases and prepare for or prevent the next pandemic.

DPRK

Japan and the ROK face an existential threat from the DPRK. While perhaps some in Europe can see the North Koreans as more of a regional threat, given the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as well as its cyber attacking capabilities, and its “strategic partnership” with Russia, it is a nation that poses a global threat. The JUKE grouping could offer the EU a chance to engage on the DPRK more actively. To more effectively deter the isolated nation, more information sharing and cooperation could make cyber defence against the DPRK more effective. On the engagement front, if the EU or some of its member countries participated in a new dialogue on and with North Korea, this could create a more balanced approach to talks and, ultimately, more buy-in for support for aid and ultimately the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the DPRK.

Action plan

Think tanks, experts and government officials could work together and develop JUKE along the lines below:

• Start a Track 2 JUKE grouping with a leading think tank and/or academic representative(s) meeting to suggest pillars for JUKE’s activities;

• Follow this with track 1.5 meetings based on the pillars with the most promise – supply chain resilience and Ukraine support and reconstruction are two that appear to have the most potential; and,

• In Seoul, Tokyo, Brussels and Washington, embassy representatives could meet to discuss informally, the way many capitals host Quad-format meetings, the merit of the JUKE grouping. Other capitals could also lead meetings on the topic with embassy representatives, thus sending back messages about potential areas for cooperation among the JUKE members.

Conclusion

The world is increasingly more interconnected and it requires a diplomatic forum to coordinate a global effort to ensure peace, security and prosperity across regions. Whether JUKE becomes as effective as the next Quad or AUKUS or not, Asia and Europe could and should engage in more formal and informal diplomatic coordination. The US, as an Atlantic and Pacific power, should continue to take on the role of pulling Europe to engage more in Asia and pushing Asia to invest more in its relationships with Europe. This trend is ongoing, but groupings like JUKE could accelerate and focus the evolution. Additionally, it could facilitate industry-government cooperation that will be needed to tackle the big challenges and marshal the necessary investments required to maintain economic security, counter China and tackle global challenges such as finding ways to satisfy Asia’s need for an additional ten terawatts of power by 2050, doubling the current demand.

https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-korea-ties-hinge-counter-china-efforts-energy-and-shipbuilding-sector-cooperation

December 19, 2024

For Korea to successfully navigate relations with the second Trump administration, South Korea and South Korean companies should highlight how they can help the United States compete with China, especially in the shipbuilding and energy sectors and through support of Ukraine. Serving in the last months of Trump’s first administration’s NSC, a singular focus on China directed every action. Even serving in the Europe directorate, I spent 90% of my day coordinating with key allies like the UK and Turkey on China-related issues. The Biden administration continued largely with Trump’s China approach but without the same singular focus, due in large part to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To best manage its relationship with the United States, South Korea should promote its companies in key sectors that offset U.S. deficiencies and help the United States compete with China, taking into account the significant relationship with China. However, if the Trump team sees Korea making an effort to “balance” its relationship with the United States with its approach to China, it could result in bilateral friction, economically and diplomatically.

Shipbuilding — Korean Companies Key to U.S. Building Renaissance

During my recent trip to Seoul following the U.S. election, contacts expressed concern about Trump’s approach to the Korean peninsula, but focused less on how to address Trump’s China concerns. President-elect Trump offered an indication of how he might approach the alliance when he spoke with President Yoon on November 6 and highlighted his hope for “close cooperation with Korea in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of ships” to support naval shipbuilding and repair. Trump likely focused on this topic given the extreme imbalance in the Chinese and U.S. shipbuilding industries that many, including NSA-nominee Mike Waltz, have pointed out publicly as a threat to U.S. national security. Korea and Korean business should take this as an invitation to work closely with the incoming team to find a way to contribute — to the U.S. economy, to U.S. national security, and to the struggle to compete with China both in terms of naval capacity as well as in our ability to move cargo and energy. To respond to such an invitation means Korean industry and the ROKG should offer specific proposals for how Korea could help the United States catch up with China, offering one approach that requires Jones Act reform and allows foreign companies to build ships in the United States with fewer impediments, and one less ambitious plan that focuses on coordination within the framework of the act. Ideally, competing Korean firms could work together to present the strongest offer, with the most expansive scale of ambition and investment, at the earliest date. 

Energy — Investment and Supply Chain Cooperation 

To secure and enhance strong overall bilateral ties throughout the next four years, South Korea could also cooperate with the United States to satisfy U.S. demand for electric power and to secure a global supply chain for the energy transition. Korea is uniquely positioned with its capability to build nuclear power plants and, when the Westinghouse and KEPCO negotiation concludes, Korean and U.S. firms could successfully compete for the trillions of dollars at stake as the world turns to nuclear power — with both traditional and small modular (SMR) reactors — to offer energy access to the billions of people who are currently without, power the continuing electrification of the transportation sector, and respond to the increased demand for electricity to support AI and quantum computing. In addition, China poses a threat to the United States and South Korea as it seeks monopolies by flooding the market with solar panels, inverters, electrolyzers, as well as the mineral building blocks for batteries, displays, and semiconductors. If there are not non-Chinese options for these materials and products, key to expanding the energy grid, boosting energy access and assuring the energy transition, China could weaponize its stranglehold on the modern energy sector much as Russia has weaponized its fossil fuel resources. 

Ukraine — Countering China Industrially and in Ukraine

South Korea offers an alternative to China as a world leader in many industries, from batteries to steel to semiconductors, and plays a critical role in bolstering the western supply chain and manufacturing capacity. South Korea could offer to arm Ukraine during the ongoing conflict if the U.S. sought to reduce its support, and then to rearm Ukraine after an armistice, hopefully in 2025. Korean companies are uniquely well-equipped to rebuild Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, from roads to buildings, airports to nuclear plants, and critical energy infrastructure. After spending years working on Ukraine-related issues, attending numerous one-on-one meetings with top Ukrainian business leaders as well as the current and former President, and attending President Zelensky’s inauguration in 2019 as part of our official delegation, I am convinced that Ukraine has all the ingredients to serve as an engine for European growth once Russia and Ukraine conclude an armistice. Korea’s engagement would not only benefit Ukraine, spurring growth and energizing the European market, it would result in significant profit for Korean companies, and it would allow the United States to focus more energy on its counter-China approach and to address urgent domestic concerns. 

If South Korea can effectively continue its cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and trilaterally, through efforts like the Fab 4 to secure semiconductor supply chains and through leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership that helps ensure the west has access to minerals needed for batteries, semiconductors and other key industries, Korea could offer a roadmap for how minilateral efforts can offer clear alternatives to China. Korea is currently the chair of the MSP and Korean companies like Posco play leading roles in securing critical minerals through projects like the Mehenge Project in Tanzania that offers a non-Chinese source for graphite.

Next Steps — Opportunities to Compete With China and Strengthen the Alliance 

Korean businesses could secure long-term growth and bolster our alliance with initial focus on investing in the U.S. shipbuilding and energy sectors. Such investment would serve to counter China while creating jobs and preserving manufacturing in the United States. Korea and Korean companies should, when they engage with the Trump team, frame their contribution, investment and potential cooperation with the United States first and foremost as part of the struggle to counter China. Korea will have good relations with the United States over the next four years if the Trump team sees Korea and Korean businesses not as competitors but as key players to help them implement their vision to compete with China.

https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawFirm-NewsLetter/203421

December 02, 2024

For Korea to successfully navigate relations with the second Trump administration, South Korea and South Korean companies should highlight how they can help the United States compete with China, especially in the shipbuilding and energy sectors and through increased support of Ukraine. Serving in the last months of Trump's first administration's NSC, a singular focus on China directed every action. Even serving in the Europe directorate, I spent 90 percent of my day coordinating with key allies like the UK and Turkey on China-related issues. The Biden administration continued largely with Trump's China approach but without the same singular focus, due in large part to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To best manage its relationship with the United States, South Korea should promote its companies in key sectors that offset US deficiencies and help the United States compete with China, taking into account its significant relationship with China. However, if the Trump team sees Korea making an effort to “balance” its relationship with the United States with its approach to China, it could result in friction bilaterally, economically and diplomatically.

Shipbuilding - Korean Companies Key to US Building Renaissance
During my recent trip to Seoul following the US election, contacts expressed concern about Trump's approach to the Korean peninsula, but less focused on how to address Trump's China concerns. President-elect Trump offered an indication of how he might approach the alliance when he spoke with President Yoon on November 6 and highlighted his hope for “close cooperation with Korea in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of ships” to support naval shipbuilding and repair. Trump likely focused on this topic given the extreme imbalance in the Chinese and US shipbuilding industries that many, including NSA-nominee Mike Waltz, have pointed out publicly as a threat to US national security. Korea and Korean business should take this as an invitation to work closely with the incoming team to find a way to contribute - to the US economy, to US national security, and to the struggle to compete with China both in terms of naval capacity as well as in our ability to move cargo and energy. To respond to such an invitation means Korean industry and the ROKG should offer specific proposals for how Korea could help the United States catch up with China, offering one approach that requires Jones Act reform and allows foreign companies to build ships in the United States with fewer impediments, and one less ambitious plan that focuses on coordination within the framework of the act. Ideally, competing Korean firms could work together to present the strongest offer, with the most expansive scale of ambition and investment, at the earliest date.

Energy - Investment and Supply Chain Cooperation
To secure and enhance strong overall bilateral ties throughout the next four years, South Korea could also cooperate with the United States to satisfy US demand for electric power and to secure a global supply chain for the energy transition. Korea is uniquely positioned with its capability to build nuclear power plants and, when the Westinghouse and KEPCO negotiation concludes, Korean and US firms could successfully compete for the trillions of dollars at stake as the world turns to nuclear power - with both traditional and small modular (SMR) reactors - to offer energy access to the billions of people who are currently without, power the continuing electrification of the transportation sector, and respond to the increased demand for electricity to support AI and quantum computing. In addition, China poses a threat to the United States and South Korea as it seeks monopolies by flooding the market with solar panels, inverters, electrolyzers, as well as the mineral building blocks for batteries, displays, and semiconductors. If there are not non-Chinese options for these materials and products, key to expanding the energy grid, boosting energy access and assuring the energy transition, China could weaponize its stranglehold on the modern energy sector much as Russia has weaponized its fossil fuel resources.

Ukraine - Countering China Industrially and in Ukraine
South Korea offers an alternative to China as a world leader in many industries, from batteries to steel to semiconductors, and plays a critical role in bolstering the western supply chain and manufacturing capacity. South Korea could offer to arm Ukraine during the ongoing conflict if the US sought to reduce its support, and then to rearm Ukraine after an armistice, hopefully in 2025. Korean companies are uniquely well-equipped to rebuild Ukraine's critical infrastructure, from roads to buildings, airports to nuclear plants, and critical energy infrastructure. After spending years working on Ukraine-related issues, attending numerous one-on-one meetings with top Ukrainian business leaders as well as the current and former Ukrainian President, and attending President Zelensky's inauguration in 2019 as part of our official US presidential delegation, I am convinced that Ukraine has all the ingredients to serve as an engine for European growth once Russia and Ukraine conclude an armistice. Korea's engagement would not only benefit Ukraine, spurring growth and energizing the European market, it would result in significant profit for Korean companies, and it would allow the United States to focus more energy on its counter-China approach and to address urgent domestic concerns.

If South Korea can effectively continue its cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and trilaterally, through efforts like the Fab 4 to secure semiconductor supply chains and through leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership that helps ensure the west has access to minerals needed for batteries, semiconductors and other key industries, Korea could offer a roadmap for how minilateral efforts can offer clear alternatives to China. Korea is currently the chair of the MSP and Korean companies like Posco play leading roles in securing critical minerals through projects like the Mehenge Project in Tanzania that offers a non-Chinese source for graphite.

Next Steps - Opportunities to Compete with China and Strengthen the Alliance
Korean businesses could secure long-term growth and bolster our alliance with initial focus on investing in the US shipbuilding and energy sectors. Such investment would serve to counter China while creating jobs and preserving manufacturing in the United States. Korea and Korean companies should, when they engage with the Trump team, frame their contribution, investment and potential cooperation with the United States first and foremost as part of the struggle to counter China. Korea will have good relations with the United States over the next four years if the Trump team sees Korea and Korean businesses not as competitors but as key players to help them implement their vision to compete with China.

tk soon