https://koreaonpoint.org/articles/article_detail.php?idx=545

July 14, 2026

Key Takeaways:

1. Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s attendance should catalyze increased, NATO-wide defense sales to augment the already significant bilateral deals in place.

2. NATO Allies (excluding the United States) acknowledge their need to invest in capabilities and the obvious potential to partner with IP4 countries.

3. The IP4 countries remain cautious about their partnership with NATO to ensure no blowback from China and Russia.

4. NATO now publicly acknowledges the threat posed by China and North Korea and this could and should catalyze more cooperation, joint exercises and policy exchanges

NATO allies face threats from the Indo-Pacific and are affected by global unrest. While Russia remains the alliance's most direct threat, and has motivated NATO’s European allies to increase spending and boost capabilities, Moscow’s deepening alignment with Beijing and Pyongyang means that European and Asian security are indivisible. For over a decade, NATO’s approach to cooperation with Indo-Pacific partners has been limited: summits, statements, observation, and dialogue. Allies have been reluctant to engage and Indo-Pacific partners fearful of pushback (or worse) from China and Russia. That is starting to change. At the July 7-8 NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye, faced with the United States’ wavering approach to the Alliance, a reckoning has occurred that European (and Canada) Allies must boost their capabilities and invest more in defense, and the countries best positioned to facilitate are not new allies, but existing partners whose defense industries NATO increasingly needs.

I

NATO’s threat perception begins with Russia. The alliance’s 2022 Strategic Concept calls Russia “the most significant and direct threat to Allies' security and to peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area," accusing Moscow of seeking "to establish spheres of influence and direct control through coercion, subversion, aggression and annexation." This marked a sharp break from NATO’s 2010 posture, which had still framed Russia as a potential partner.  With Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 and further, full-scale attack in 2022, Europe has a clear danger on its eastern border that it must address.  While Europe has supported Ukraine to the best of its ability, it has lacked capacity to do so without U.S. support, munitions, and intelligence.  European Allies are now focused on building capabilities so they can defend themselves through their support of Ukraine.

China’s place in NATO’s threat assessment has only been a recent addition, and one that has escalated quickly. NATO first acknowledged Beijing in its 2019 London Declaration, cautiously noting that "China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance." By the release of its 2022 Strategic Concept, NATO’s caution had grown into concern, stating that the PRC’s "ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interests, security and values," and highlighting the “deepening strategic partnership” between China and Russia as a direct threat to the organization’s member nations. Secretary General Mark Rutte highlighted China, Iran, and North Korea’s support for Russia in the war in Ukraine, emphasizing the threat they pose to the Alliance.

Beyond state actors, NATO has increasingly treated cyber and emerging technology as threats demanding structural responses. Its Digital Transformation Implementation Strategy, updated in May 2026, names cybersecurity as one of NATO’s core strategic deliverables. On the AI front, NATO aims to accelerate AI’s integration into military capabilities through measurable commitments in NATO’s formal defense planning process. That same push toward adoption of new technologies in response to the increased pace of modern warfare shaped the Rapid Adoption Action Plan, endorsed at the 2025 Hague summit, which set a 24-month target for turning any new technology into a fieldable capability, down from timelines that used to stretch much longer.

 II

Outreach to the Indo-Pacific has been building for over a decade, mostly through dialogue. Australia, Japan, South Korea, and New Zealand, together known as the Indo-Pacific 4 or IP4, have deepened ties with NATO gradually: starting with attendance at foreign ministerial meetings since 2020, and signing a 2022 partnership on cyber defense and emerging technology.  The IP4 leaders attended a NATO summit for the first time in Madrid in 2022. They have returned every summit since, launching new cooperation projects on cyber defense, disinformation, and AI, and joining a NATO defense ministerial for the first time in October 2024.

This pattern of engagement is not new to NATO. The alliance has worked with Asian partners before, most notably in Afghanistan, where operations for two decades led NATO to coordinate with countries far outside its traditional territory. The 2022 Strategic Concept explicitly draws on that experience, citing "lessons learned over the past three decades, including through our operations in Afghanistan," as a model for future cooperation with partners at “strategic distance.” The Indo-Pacific is not a NATO mission area at all, and no one is proposing that NATO deploy to the region or that it become an area of operations. NATO has also been explicit that it will not expand membership to the region and has no intention of taking on a new collective defense obligation there. Instead, the opportunity NATO is pursuing is narrower and, potentially, more durable. NATO is not searching for shared missions, but shared capability.

 III

South Korea has spent years building a sizable defense export business with European members, particularly Poland, which alone accounts for nearly half of Korea's sales to the continent, a relationship worth over $24 billion since 2022[1]. Ahead of the Ankara summit, presidential national security advisor Wi Sung-lac announced that Korea "must advance partnerships with NATO based on the alliance's standards to facilitate exports of defence materials," with clear language focused on market access, rather than alliance solidarity. Beyond the standard leaders’ summit, Lee attended NATO’s defense industry forum and delivered a speech there, telling attendees, “I propose that we elevate our current defense cooperation, focused mainly on weapons system transactions, to a 'Korea-NATO Defense Industry Partnership 2.0.'" Korea keeps its pitch transactional and not geostrategic, likely with an aim to avoid perturbing China. Korea hopes that NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte’s formal launch of the NATO Front Door for Industry, a new channel connecting outside suppliers directly to NATO procurement, will catalyze further sales.

Japan and Australia have been steady NATO partners for years, but neither has made Korea’s kind of explicit commercial pitch, at least not yet. Japan spent decades restricting arms exports to a handful of non-lethal categories; in April 2026, Tokyo issued a Cabinet decision revising its export rules and opened lethal exports to seventeen partner nations, citing a chance to strengthen its defense-industrial base. Australia holds a different asset: rather than finished weapons, the raw materials the broader Western defense-industrial base increasingly needs, a gap significant enough that NATO devoted an entire session to “Defence Critical Raw Materials” at this week’s industry forum in Ankara. Canberra has already signed a framework deal with Washington on rare earths, on the explicit premise that critical minerals are themselves defense assets, an arrangement that could extend naturally to NATO’s own supply chain.

New Zealand is a different case again. Its government has made no pitch resembling Korea’s, but its companies are engaged. Syos Aerospace has signed a contract to sell drones to the UK for use in Ukraine, and Dawn Aerospace is under contract to support European military satellite work. Wellington hasn’t asked for a seat at NATO's industrial table, but its companies are determined to partner with Allies.

 IV

While NATO now acknowledges the threat from China, and there is a clear path toward greater industrial cooperation with the IP4, there is still much more to be done.  NATO could and should seek ways to expand its partnerships with the IP4 but also with Southeast Asian countries.  Threats to NATO Allies in the age of cyber and AI come from everywhere, and greater cooperation with Asia and greater focus on the Indo-Pacific would make NATO stronger, more resilient, and more equipped to handle future global threats and crises.  Unfortunately, President Lee of South Korea was the only IP4 head of state or government to attend the summit. Despite this, the industrial track deepened, thanks in large part to South Korea’s efforts and capabilities.  NATO is a global alliance facing global threats, and the more the Alliance faces this fact, the better able it will be to defend itself in the years to come.
Sources:

 1.     https://www.iiss.org/globalassets/media-library---content--migration/files/research-papers/2025/12/south-korea-as-a-rising-defence-exporter_122025/iiss_south-korea-as-a-rising-defence-exporter_122025.pdf
2.     https://www.act.nato.int/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/290622-strategic-concept.pdf
3.     https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2019/12/04/london-declaration
4.     https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2026/05/26/natos-digital-transformation-implementation-strategy
5.     https://www.nato.int/en/about-us/official-texts-and-resources/official-texts/2025/06/25/summary-of-natos-rapid-adoption-action-plan
6.     https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_227237.htm
7.     https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/partnerships-and-cooperation/relations-with-partners-in-the-indo-pacific-region
8.     https://www.cfr.org/articles/natos-indo-pacific-aspirations
9.     https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/south-koreas-president-attend-nato-summit-ankara-visit-mongolia-2026-07-03/
10.  https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/07/nato-launches-new-initiatives-to-accelerate-defence-industrial-cooperation
11.  https://nato.int/en/news-and-events/articles/news/2026/07/07/tens-of-billions-in-new-procurements-revealed-at-the-nato-summit-defence-industry-forum-in-ankara
12.  https://www.nato.int/en/news-and-events/events/event-programmes/2026/07/2026-ankara-nsdif
13.  https://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/online-analysis/2026/04/japan-loosens-the-reins-on-defence-exports/
14.  https://www.csis.org/analysis/unpacking-us-australia-critical-minerals-framework-agreement
15.  https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australias-u-s-critical-mineral-pitch/
16.  https://thediplomat.com/2025/09/new-zealand-looks-to-europe-for-defense-industrial-partnerships/
17.  https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/2025/10/united-states-australia-framework-for-securing-of-supply-in-the-mining-and-processing-of-critical-minerals-and-rare-earths/

https://n.news.naver.com/article/469/0000939886?sid=104

July 2, 2026

The rules being written under the AI Basic Act this year are not paperwork. They are Korea's opportunity to define what trustworthy AI means for the world.

In the years I worked alongside Korean colleagues at the U.S. Embassy in Seoul, I heard one phrase from foreign analysts more often than any other: “fast follower.”

It was always out of date, and in artificial intelligence it has now been turned on its head. In January, Korea became one of the first countries in the world to bring a comprehensive AI law into force. The European Union, by contrast, has recently agreed in principle to push back its own high-risk AI rules to the end of 2027, and the United States continues to rely on voluntary arrangements at the federal level. On AI governance, Korea is not following anyone. It is leading the charge, and the world is watching what it does next.

What it does next is the important part. The AI Basic Act is a frame; the picture is being painted now. Its enforcement decree took effect alongside the Act in January, fixing the headline parameters. Through this year, the Ministry of Science and ICT is writing the ministry notices, safety guidelines, and supervisory practice that will determine what the Act means in practice: how high-impact classification works in practice, what safety evaluation actually requires, how incidents are identified and handled, and what operational mandate the Korea AI Safety Institute will carry. The grace period before enforcement begins is sometimes described as a delay. It is better understood as a design window, and the government is right to use it deliberately.

Korea's choices in this window will carry weight far beyond its borders, for a simple reason: the AI era runs on Korean technology. Korean companies supply the overwhelming majority of the high-bandwidth memory chips that frontier AI systems are trained on. Korea is one of very few countries building sovereign foundation models in its own language. And under the K-Moonshot initiative, its national program for applying AI to major scientific and technological challenges, it is mobilizing compute, talent, and research institutions at a scale few nations can match. When a country occupies this position in the global technology order, its standards do not stay domestic. They travel through supply chains and partnerships to everyone who depends on them.

This is why safety regulation, done well, is an export asset rather than a burden. The same logic that puts Korean cars, ships, and electronics at the forefront of the global market applies to AI: in the long run, the products that win global markets are the ones the world trusts. Demonstrably safe AI, backed by credible evaluation and transparent incident handling, will command preference in every trusted technology partnership Korea participates in. Rigorous, predictable standards also serve Korean companies at home, giving Naver, Samsung, SK Hynix, and thousands of startups a stable foundation to build on rather than a shifting regulatory landscape to guess at. The world's leading AI scientists, and the governments that gathered at Bletchley Park in 2023 and in Seoul in 2024, recognize that advanced AI systems could pose serious, even catastrophic, risks if left unchecked. And as AI capabilities advance, the risks advance with them; the governments that understand those risks early will be the ones trusted to manage the technology, and to sell it.

Within this rulemaking process, two opportunities stand out where Korea could define the international benchmark rather than adopt someone else's.

The first is incident reporting. Jurisdictions around the world, from Brussels to California, are converging on the same insight: governments need to learn quickly and reliably when something goes wrong inside an advanced AI system. Korea can build the version of this that actually works, with clear, time-bound reporting duties for serious incidents and protected channels through which engineers can raise safety concerns without fear. Done well, this becomes a national early-warning system for AI risk, and a template the rest of Asia, and beyond, will study. Korea's deep bench of technical talent and its dense, integrated AI industry make it better placed to design these mechanisms than almost any country on earth.

The second is evaluation of Korean-language models. Nearly all the world's AI safety evaluation science has been developed in English, for English-language systems. Nobody is better positioned than Korea, home to sovereign foundation models and a new AI Safety Institute, to build the methodology for rigorously evaluating Korean-language and multilingual AI. This is a contribution to global AI safety that no other country can make in Korea's place, and it is exportable expertise across Asia and the wider world.

Both opportunities point to the same enabling condition: a strong Korea AI Safety Institute. The institute already represents Korea in the international network of AI safety institutes. Giving it the technical staffing, the legal authority, and the industry access to match its mandate is where the ambition of K-Moonshot and the promise of the AI Basic Act meet.

Korea has the law, the laboratories, the chips, and the window. The rules being written this year are the chance to ensure that in the age of artificial intelligence, “made in Korea” means what it has come to mean in every industry Korea has led: at the cutting edge, and trusted everywhere.

https://keia.org/analysis/presidential-hopefuls-should-book-seoul-before-they-book-iowa/

May 2026

Would-be 2028 presidential candidates should book a trip to Seoul in 2026. Once the November midterms clear, the calendar belongs to Iowa diners and New Hampshire town halls, and serious foreign travel—the kind that helps build policy credentials—becomes politically untenable. South Korea offers more substantive ground than almost any destination on the map: the inter-Korean border, U.S. troops on the peninsula, U.S. strategy toward China, civil nuclear cooperation, shipbuilding, and a cultural pull on young voters that Europe cannot match.

The case starts with a question about the issues that will shape 2028. If foreign policy and national security become more dominant or significant issues in the 2028 presidential campaign due to the conflict in Iran or otherwise, candidates who do not have executive branch experience with a foreign policy focus (e.g., anyone who is not JD Vance or Marco Rubio) on either side of the aisle would do well to travel overseas and build foreign policy credentials. 

South Korea offers a more compelling case than any peer destination on the calendar. First, South Korea would allow candidates to travel to the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and “face off” with North Korea from the overlook where presidents and vice presidents have gone to burnish their cold warrior credentials. Second, it would offer time with troops serving overseas away from the Iran conflict, giving candidates deeper insight into soldiers’ support, deployment, and broader strategic thinking in the Indo-Pacific. Third, and linked to this, a trip to South Korea offers a chance to discuss China and China policy, both economically and in terms of Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the U.S.-China competition. 

Fourth, South Korea has the potential to be a key partner to the United States and U.S. companies in developing the U.S. civil nuclear energy industry to power data centers across the United States and provide power to developing countries, rather than China and Russia. Who wins and provides the bulk of new energy supplies over the next twenty years via nuclear power could be one of the most significant factors shaping how relations develop between the West and the Global South. Fifth, a candidate could discuss the U.S. shipbuilding industry and how the United States could cooperate with South Korea to build more ships and create more high-paying jobs for American workers, checking off national and economic security concerns. 

Sixth, and maybe most importantly, South Korea is cool in a way that separates it from other destinations. Europe has a lot of historical and cultural baggage and does not offer dynamism or partnership in every security and economic realm as South Korea does. And South Korea is cool. Get on the BTS bandwagon. Or Stray Kids, or Blackpink, or any of the many bands that no U.S. voter over forty knows about, but every sixteen-year-old would-be first-time voter in 2028 does.

The destination matters, but the timing matters as much. A trip to Seoul in 2026 offers the candidate a low-pressure opportunity to add serious policy experience to their quiver. Even if foreign policy does not feature prominently during the campaign, it is still a good investment. And if a global approach and understanding of the world become a key differentiator, a trip to Seoul will enrich a would-be president with stories and experiences to draw on across all fronts in a way that is additive and less charged than what trips to Europe or other possible destinations offer.

As the primary cycle approaches, the window for substantive international engagement will close, replaced by trips to Des Moines and Manchester. If a candidate has not put some foreign policy experience into the hopper before the campaign starts, it is hard to imagine any advisor supporting even a brief trip overseas, let alone to Asia. 

By locking in a high-level, multi-day trip to South Korea now, a candidate secures a policy reservoir they can tap into for months. When a debate moderator inevitably asks about the fragility of global supply chains or the specificities of the Indo-Pacific security architecture, the candidate who has walked the floor of a Samsung semiconductor plant or sat with Hyundai’s shipbuilders can reply with confidence based on direct experience.

Leaning into the Korean wave provides a rare bridge to a demographic that remains notoriously difficult to capture: Gen Z and first-time voters. While traditional foreign policy discussions seem soporific to young voters at best, South Korea’s cultural vibrancy offers a modern, fun entry point. A candidate who can talk global trade agreements and BTS in the same breath would highlight a worldview that lives outside the beltway.

South Korea fits what voters want from an ally: pushback on China without another open-ended war in the Middle East. It is a story of a thriving democracy, a technological powerhouse, and a reliable security partner. For any serious contender looking to prove they can lead on the world stage without losing sight of American jobs and interests, the road to the White House has few better starting points than Seoul. A trip not only will prepare a candidate for policy debates, but it could also be part of a boost that secures the candidacy or even an electoral victory.

April 2026

https://emma-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/0oueb/21908a5238d814ce8fae34eb6205a805/2026_GWIKS_FPF_Pub_07-Final.pdf

Abstract: This paper argues that nuclear power is re-emerging as a decisive geoeconomic instrument in an AI-driven era where electricity abundance confers national security and industrial advantage. China and Russia are moving fastest, pairing standardized reactor designs with state-backed finance and long-term fuel-service relationships that can shape geopolitical alignment for decades. The United States, Japan, and South Korea can compete by integrating their strengths—U.S. capital and innovation, Japanese precision manufacturing, and Korea’s proven delivery and heavy-industry “foundry” capacity—into a joint design-build-finance platform for domestic deployment and exports. Because capital dominates the nuclear levelized cost of electricity (LCOE), the plan prioritizes export credit and bundled data center–nuclear plant packages, while managing Korea’s fiscal exposure.

Imagine an emissions-free energy asset where two central power units covering an area not much bigger than a couple of city blocks can yield as much raw energy output as one of the world’s largest offshore oil and gas platforms. This is not science fiction: it is nuclear energy. We’re describing the two reactors at the South Texas Project near Houston.

We are entering into a world where energy density equals energy abundance and improvement in the human condition. It is also a world where rapid expansion of AI data centers plus industrialization mean that affordable and reliable electricity is not just nice to have–it is a national security asset and a competitive advantage. All the more so for countries capable of building global industrial fabrics and design-build-finance stacks that make their offerings more internationally attractive. Nuclear offers a competitive edge. 

We have talked in prior years about the importance of gas geoeconomics. Now, it is nuclear energy’s turn for serious geoeconomic consideration. An industrial fabric weaving together Japanese, South Korean, and American nuclear supply chain participants would offer a solid foundation for construction and expansion of a nuclear geoeconomics policy. 

Why the United States and its Partners Need to Compete

China, Russia, and the United States are all jockeying for competitive advantage as the world reconsiders nuclear power amidst a resurgence of geopolitical tensions and growing demand for electricity. From an American perspective, an important question arises: is it time for an Atoms for Peace 2.0? If so, should the United States offer a vision for a safe nuclear future built hand-in-hand with Japan and South Korea? Providing energy abundance can confer long-term geostrategic advantage. It can also reduce global energy insecurity for the one billion still lacking access, making those lives better and also increasing global stability. But decision-making time is short because the U.S. presently trails its civil nuclear competitors.

If President Eisenhower were to deliver the Atoms for Peace Speech today, a core line might be, “the capability is here—now-- today—but who will achieve the scale needed to dominate production and construction?” Energy is the indispensable “base layer” for all industrial and technology stacks globally. 

Ceding the 5G market to Huawei was a strategic error. Letting China National Nuclear dominate the global nuclear power would be far worse because of 60-to-80-year asset life and fuel lock in. For countries around the world, buying nuclear reactors will be a bit like buying fighter jets: it won’t be a “cash and carry” transaction. Rather, the signing will usher in a multi-decade technological partnership and the price tag will be in the billions or tens of billions of USD. Nuclear energy systems are perhaps the ultimate physical manifestations of long-term international partnership. Fighter jets create a 25 year partnership, but nuclear reactors can anchor one for 60 years or more, making nuclear power an essential component of great power competition.

Chinese nuclear dominance would also exert geopolitical alignment effects, and likely, technology standards dominance that would come at the expense of the Japanese, Korean, and U.S. industrial bases. Choosing nuclear power equipment suppliers and the build out of corresponding supply chains will likely coincide with (or help create) broader geopolitical and technological alignments. This dynamic unfolds now in Kazakhstan as it has chosen Rosatom to build its first large nuclear power station but immediately expressed a desire to have China build a second.

It is now clear that civilian nuclear exports are an intensely contested space that will yield long-term strategic advantages to the countries that become the global providers of choice. It is also contested in a way few other international business spaces are. Buyers sign contracts for gas turbines as a purely private matter but nuclear technology sales occur with national interests standing right next to the table.

For the US and its partners, competing with state-owned Chinese and Russian entities therefore requires an integrated nuclear geoeconomic strategy that not only promotes scalable deployment in home markets but also offers competitive alternatives for other countries seeking energy security. Speed, scale, technical excellence, and geopolitical reliability and desirability will all factor into national decisions on nuclear procurement. 

The Competitive Challenge

The Trilateral Nuclear Geoeconomics group has no time to spare because Russia and China are both already on the move.

Russia

The Russian nuclear industrial base is already highly mobilized around a handful of reactor designs. Rosatom’s Podolsk plant currently has 8 RITM-200 reactors in various stages of production for nuclear-powered icebreakers, floating power plants, and a first of its kind onshore plant in Yakutia. The company has already produced 10 such reactors for existing icebreakers. Moreover, it is now building the first of 6 RITM-200 reactors slated to be sited in Uzbekistan. On the higher-risk, higher innovation path, Rosatom is also building the BREST-OD-300 lead-cooled fast reactor with a closed fuel cycle and the ability to utilize plutonium and existing reactor waste as fuel.

Russia has 36 operable reactors providing approximately 19% to 20% of its domestic electricity as of early 2026. The state-owned corporation Rosatom is currently managing the construction of at least six reactors within Russia, deployed the world's only operational floating nuclear power plant, the Akademik Lomonosov, and is currently constructing several more floating units (using RITM-200 reactors) for the Baimsky mining project, as well as its first land-based Small Modular Reactor (SMR) in Yakutia. Looking ahead, the Russian government has officially targeted a 25% nuclear share in its energy mix by 2045, a goal that requires the construction of up to 38 new nuclear units to offset the decommissioning of approximately 18 older reactors. Beyond domestic expansion, Russia remains the world’s leading exporter of nuclear technology, with 20 VVER reactors currently under construction in countries such as China, India, Turkey, and Egypt, in addition to the aforementioned six-unit SMR plant in Uzbekistan.

China 

The People’s Republic of China (China) nuclear industry is also mobilized. China does not yet appear to be scaling up production of a specific SMR reactor design (or designs). That said, based on the experience with the domestic Hualong One large reactor (1090 MWe, 5 reactors in service, 13 under construction, and 11 planned or approved), once the technological winners are chosen, rapid scaling will likely follow.

China’s nuclear power sector is expanding more rapidly than any other country, positioning the nation to likely surpass France by 2026 and the United States by 2030 to become the global leader in nuclear capacity. As of early 2026, China operates 59 nuclear reactors with an installed capacity of approximately 62.2 GW, accounting for about 5% of its total electricity generation. Despite not yet fully committing to SMR buildout, commercial operation of the Linglong One (ACP100), the first commercial SMR, is scheduled to occur in the first half of 2026. 

China's future strategy, driven by its "dual carbon" goals of peaking emissions by 2030 and reaching carbon neutrality by 2060, involves scaling operational capacity to 110 GW by 2030 and 150 GW by 2035. This growth is supported by a consistent approval rate of 6 to 10 new reactors annually and a focus on domestic Generation III and IV technologies, such as the Hualong One and high-temperature gas-cooled reactors.

The Opportunity: Global Nuclear Revival

The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that by 2050, the global nuclear power capacity should roughly double 2020 levels in order to meet increasing energy demand.  In the next 25 years, hundreds of millions will gain access to electricity, hundreds of millions will move into the middle class and use more electricity, and we could see a 30 percent year on year growth of demand for electricity from AI data centers.  The revival is not just about decarbonization—it’s about who supplies the base layer of electricity for the AI age

Overall energy consumption is projected to increase four percent a year.  Conservative estimates suggest that the amount of energy produced from nuclear plants could double in the next twenty-five years, and the high-case scenario from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests a 250 percent increase in nuclear power by 2050 from 416 GWe to over 1000 GWe and to provide 25 percent of global electricity production, up from its current 9 percent share of the overall energy mix. The conservative market value for nuclear power contracts over the next twenty-five years is valued at USD 500–740 billion.

The United States essentially put its nuclear power plant production capacity on the scrap heap after the Three Mile Island incident in 1979, cancelling 67 planned plant builds since that date.  In 2023 and 2024, the first new U.S. reactor, built by Westinghouse and Bechtel, came on line in Georgia , vastly over budget (final cost over twice the projected amount) and seven years past the deadline.  Despite, or because of the United States’ challenging history and limited manufacturing experience, President Trump signed an executive order in 2025 aiming to have ten large nuclear reactors under construction by 2030.  

Small Modular Reactors

The United States has a leading role, with a large portion (43) of the 127 designs originating from American companies (e.g., NuScale, GE Hitachi, X-energy, Oklo).  Over half of global SMR designs require HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium) fuel. Currently, Russia and China are the only nations with the infrastructure to produce HALEU at a commercial scale, though the U.S. is racing to establish its own supply via companies like Centrus Energy.  The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) in 2020 allocated $2.7 billion to set up domestic enrichment capacity.

To achieve "modularity," companies will rely on global supply chains. For instance, the GE Hitachi BWRX-300 is actively setting up a dedicated supply chain in Canada despite being a U.S.-based design. NuScale is proof positive that the trilateral approach between the United States, Japan and South Korea to project development and build out is alive and well. NuScale relies on IHI and other Japanese manufacturers while Korean companies Doosan Eneribility, Samsung and GS Energy form the core of the supply chain and manufacturing know-how.

Strategic Partners for Competition: Japan and South Korea

International cooperation, both at the corporate and diplomatic level, bilaterally, and multilaterally, are essential if the United States hopes to compete with China and Russia, let alone out-compete them. As we look to double the nuclear footprint globally to respond to energy demand and the need to do so in a relatively clean way, hundreds of billions of dollars are in play.  China and Russia have highly integrated supply chains and support for their domestic and overseas export sector.  

To compete with their obvious strengths, Japan and South Korea have all the elements, if combined with U.S. capital, companies, and researchers, to build out the global nuclear infrastructure as an alternative to China and Russia.  Further, European players could participate and support non-China/Russia efforts by integrating more into existing and emerging international supply chains and by participating in massive financing plans to provide capital for the support of new technologies, the development of advanced supply chains, and research for the technologies of tomorrow.

Get Financing Right

Because nuclear equipment costs more upfront and plants can take longer to build than gas turbines, coal, or wind and solar units, financing plays an incredibly important role. Projects can take a decade to build and bring online, but private financiers will want immediate commencement of loan payback. That means paying interest for years before the plant puts its first electron on the grid. Accordingly, the majority of the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) ultimately delivered, and the plant’s ability to compete with alternative energy sources, comes down to the terms at which developers can obtain capital.

State-owned developers that can access and offer financing under highly preferential terms in package deals subsidized by their sovereign backer thus enjoy advantages. A US-Japan-South Korea nuclear geoeconomics structure will have to immediately confront such competition.

One of the reasons Russian nuclear plants are attractive to customers from emerging economies is that the Russian government is willing to either (1) provide government-to-government project finance loans as it did for the El Dabaa project in Egypt and the Paks II project in Hungary or (2) carry project risk on the state balance sheet, as it is doing with the Akkuyu project in Turkey. At Akkuyu, Rosatom utilizes a Build-Own-Operate model in which Rosatom assumes full responsibility for financing, designing, building, owning, and operating the plant for its entire lifecycle. Turkey provides the site, regulatory oversight, and a long-term Power Purchase Agreement, but pays no upfront capital costs.

Financing Tool 1: Export Finance

Export Credit Agencies (ECA) are government-backed institutions that provide direct loans, guarantees, and insurance to foreign buyers of national exports. ECAs like the Export-Import Bank of the United States (EXIM), Korea Trade Insurance Corporation (K-SURE), and Japan’s Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) can mitigate "sovereign risk" in emerging markets.

How ECAs could facilitate trilateral nuclear power exports would depend on the type of reactors and plants being sold. For “traditional” large reactors, ECAs and development finance corporations could be leveraged to provide capital on terms matching those of Russian and Chinese state-owned competitors. Capital from the U.S., Japan, and South Korea also can bring greater regulatory certainty if the three countries more closely harmonize standards and approval processes, and also bring proximity to powerful commercial societies with rule of law. For SMRs, some leading American firms such as Oklo are already building their businesses around a Build-Own-Operate concept that uses private investor capital to fund what Rosatom obtains from the Russian state. 

For exports of SMRs, the Japanese, South Korean, and American ECAs could provide favorably structured export credits to help foreign buyers afford the reactors. They could also potentially partner with the U.S. Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and its Japanese and South Korean equivalents to help financially underwrite and provide political risk insurance for power purchase agreements in the host country, potentially including Contracts for Difference that could cover revenue shortfalls caused by price fluctuations or revenue collection challenges.

Financing Tool 2: Data Center Package Deals

Global information power depends on more than just software; it requires secure physical foundations — AI compute and the electricity grids that power it. The U.S. and its partners risk ceding strategic advantage to China by neglecting the “Cloud-Grid Nexus.” By treating data centers and power grids as a unified security asset, Washington can work to ensure the global AI ecosystem runs on “allied rails,” preventing a repeat of the 5G infrastructure crisis and securing the physical layers of information power.

Nuclear reactor exports would readily fit into this policy framework. ECA and development finance support for data center deals can be coupled with small modular reactor export packages designed to serve data center power needs plus potentially be upsized to also supply additional electricity to the grid directly. SMRs would be especially well-suited to this structure because many of the concepts would allow the addition of 50 to 100 megawatts of generation capacity per unit, similar in size to the electricity demand increments by which data centers commonly expand as they add additional server racks.

Build More Domestic Reactors, Faster

It is hard to imagine that the United States could initiate construction of more than one reactor in the next five years given its recent track record, let alone ten. However, if the United States works closely with Japan and South Korea, the possibility of progress toward this goal starts to come into focus.  Operation of nuclear power plants in the United States remains off limits for foreign firms, but the ADVANCE Act of 2024 relaxes restrictions to allow investment and construction of reactors.  

It also accelerates nuclear deployment by directing the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to streamline licensing for new reactors, reducing regulatory costs, and relaxing restrictions. Given the U.S. approach starts with an expansion of its domestic capacity, if the United States does allow Japanese and South Korea integration domestically, it could not only help the United States achieve its power supply goals, but chart a model for how the three countries could cooperate in winning overseas contracts in South East Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. 

South Korea’s national nuclear entities Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO) and Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power (KHNP) have built five reactors domestically in the last ten years and completed a four reactor project in the UAE in 2023.  KEPCO aims to export ten reactors in the next five years, to include the already contracted Czechia project along with builds in, potentially, the United States, Saudi Arabia and elsewhere.  Westinghouse won the contract to build a nuclear reactor with Bechtel in Poland, with a projected start date of 2036.  

Japan and South Korea are both aggressively revitalizing their nuclear sectors to meet surging electricity demand from AI data centers while pursuing decarbonization goals. Japan first must focus on restarting its idle nuclear fleet after it shut all 55 plants down in the wake of the Fukushima disaster.  It has a goal to nearly double nuclear power's share of its energy mix to 20% by 2040, a target that requires bringing at least 15 to 16 additional reactors back online. As of early 2026, progress is accelerating with the planned restart of Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Unit 6, the first for Tokyo Electric Power Company since the 2011 Fukushima accident. Meanwhile, South Korea has reversed its previous nuclear phase-out policy; under its 11th Basic Plan for Electricity Supply and Demand (2024–2038), it aims to increase nuclear's share to 35.2% of its energy mix by 2038. This plan includes the construction of three new large-scale reactors—such as Saeul Unit 3, which received operational approval in late 2025—and the deployment in 2035 of the country’s first commercial SMR.

Forge Common Corporate Supply Chains to Accentuate Advantages

Both Japan and South Korea are global leaders in SMR technology and supply chains. South Korea is developing its own i-SMR (Smart100) design, featuring passive safety systems and a 60-year design life, with a 700 MWe demonstration plant officially incorporated into government energy plans for completion by the mid-2030s. Major South Korean firms like Doosan Enerbility, SK, GS Energy, and Samsung C&T are also heavily invested in and formally integrated into the supply chains for U.S. SMR developers like NuScale and TerraPower. 

Japan's SMR strategy involves both domestic development and international partnerships; Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI) is leading the design of a demonstration sodium-cooled fast reactor slated for the 2040s, while Hitachi (through its GE Hitachi joint venture) is deploying the BWRX-300 SMR globally and Japanese companies are also, to a lesser extent, invested in, and part of the supply chains for, U.S. SMR companies. To support these initiatives, Japan is utilizing innovative financing, such as GX Transition Bonds, to mobilize up to $1 trillion in public-private investment for green energy infrastructure.

New technology in Japan and South Korea must always keep competition with China in mind - over the last decades, China has overtaken Japan and South Korea in key industries like shipbuilding and electronics and is working to catch up in semiconductors and other high-tech sectors.  The pace of China’s nuclear energy development and expansion may have spurred bilateral cooperation between Japan and South Korea, as they are effectively operating as strategic "co-developers" of the next generation of nuclear technology. 

At the governmental level, the 2025–2026 Japan-ROK Trilateral Framework (including the U.S.) has established "Technology Prosperity Deals" that prioritize joint R&D in fusion energy and SMR safety standards. Research institutions like the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) and the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) have expanded their long-standing agreements to focus specifically on the fuel cycle for advanced reactors, such as the high-assay low-enriched uranium required for SMRs. 

In the corporate sector, the partnership is defined by a "complementary supply chain" model: Japanese giants like Hitachi and IHI often lead in engineering and control systems, while South Korean powerhouses like Doosan Enerbility, Samsung C+T and Samsung Heavy Industries provide the heavy forge and manufacturing capacity. This is most evident in the floating SMR sector, where Korean shipbuilders are integrating Japanese components to create mobile "power barges" for global export, effectively combining Japan’s precision engineering with Korea’s unmatched industrial scale.  This is a bilateral detente forged out of the shared understanding that alone, they cannot hope to out-compete or out-research China.

To take the cooperation out of the domestic market and compete for overseas bids, Japan and South Korea have begun coordinating on financing packages for large-scale "traditional" reactor bids in Europe and Southeast Asia to prevent undercutting each other and to provide a "Western-aligned" alternative to competitors.  

A few other key ways the two countries are cooperating include Japanese firms sourcing heavy forgings from South Korea's Changwon plant, while Korean SMR startups utilize Japanese testing facilities for seismic and thermal-hydraulic validation. Under the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) project and bilateral MOUs, researchers are sharing data on superconducting magnets and plasma control—technologies that are critical for the long-term goal of commercial fusion power.

South Korea has solidified its position as a global "foundry" for nuclear energy, leveraging a massive industrial infrastructure that spans both traditional gigawatt-scale reactors and emerging SMRs. Doosan Enerbility serves as the centerpiece of this capacity; as of early 2026, the company has successfully supplied 34 major reactor units and 124 steam generators worldwide. To meet the skyrocketing demand for SMRs—driven largely by the energy needs of AI data centers—Doosan recently invested roughly $596 million (807 billion won) to build the world’s first dedicated SMR fabrication facility in Changwon, in coordination with NuScale, numerous other Korean and Japanese companies, along with Seoul National University (SNU) to incorporate a research component to the facility. This plant is designed to produce approximately 20 SMR units annually, a significant leap from the 12 units achievable through its existing traditional reactor lines.

KHNP has moved from a domestic operator to a global investor and co-developer, marking the first time a Korean state-run company has taken a direct stake in a global SMR developer like TerraPower. This strategy ensures that as U.S. designs like the Natrium or Voygr reactors move toward commercialization, the physical components—forged with the precision required for nuclear safety—will likely be "Made in Korea." This "Foundry Model" mirrors the semiconductor industry, where South Korea provides the essential high-tech manufacturing backbone for global innovators.

Execute Regulatory Reforms in the United States

Securing approval to design and build nuclear power plants, particularly SMRs, remains a challenge due to a "regulatory lag" where existing frameworks are tailored for massive, legacy gigawatt-scale plants. Developers must navigate a multi-year, billion-dollar gauntlet at the U.S. NRC, which involves proving that novel designs—often using unproven cooling systems or fuels—can meet deterministic safety standards written decades ago. 

This friction was most visible in the NuScale Carbon Free Power Project (CFPP) in Idaho. Despite NuScale achieving a historic milestone as the first SMR design to receive NRC certification, the project was ultimately terminated in late 2023. The "First-of-a-Kind" (FOAK) nature of the project led to surging costs—driven by inflation and the immense civil engineering required for its submerged reactor pool—which caused the target power price to jump from $58 to $89 per megawatt-hour. Consequently, the Utah Associated Municipal Power Systems (UAMPS) could not secure enough utility subscriptions to make the project financially viable, illustrating that even with regulatory approval, the economic hurdles of transitioning from design to the first shovel in the ground can be insurmountable for pioneering SMR projects.  

Barriers to Nuclear Deployment

The path from a blueprint to a grid-connected reactor in the United States is blocked by three primary "chokepoints":

• Licensing Costs and Timelines: Standard design certification can take over 500,000 staff hours of NRC review and cost hundreds of millions of dollars before a single part is manufactured.

• The "Valley of Death" for FOAK: First-of-a-kind projects lack the "learning curve" benefits of mass production, meaning the first unit is always the most expensive and risky for investors.

• Supply Chain Maturity: Advanced SMRs often require HALEU (High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium), a fuel type currently lacking a robust commercial domestic supply chain in the U.S. 

To accelerate the deployment of nuclear energy in the United States, regulatory reforms must pivot from a "one-size-fits-all" model designed for massive 1970s-era plants to a flexible, performance-based framework. The primary fix being implemented as of early 2026 is the finalization of 10 CFR Part 53, a "technology-inclusive" pathway that allows SMRs and non-light-water designs to be licensed based on actual risk profiles rather than rigid, prescriptive requirements. 

Key legislative drivers like the ADVANCE Act and recent Executive Orders have mandated binding licensing deadlines—targeting no more than 18 months for new reactor decisions—and capped the "mission-indirect" fees that previously forced small startups to pay for NRC overhead, travel, and training. Furthermore, streamlining the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) reviews to allow for high-volume, standardized licensing of micro-reactors is essential to treat these units more like factory-produced products than bespoke civil engineering projects. By decoupling design certification from site-specific approvals and preventing mid-construction design changes, the U.S. aims to eliminate the "regulatory lag" that historically inflated costs and deterred private investment.

Critical "Pillars" of Regulatory Reform

To reach the U.S. goal of quadrupling nuclear capacity by 2050, the following structural shifts are being prioritized:

• Manufacturing Licenses: Allowing companies like Doosan Eneribility or NuScale to license the factory process itself, enabling them to build reactor modules in bulk before a specific site is even selected.

• Brownfield Incentives: Expediting approvals for SMRs built on former coal-fired power plant sites, which already possess the necessary grid interconnection and cooling water infrastructure.

• International Harmonization: Establishing a framework where the NRC can "credit" or accept safety reviews from trusted international regulators (like those in Canada or South Korea) to avoid redundant testing for global reactor designs.

• Staffing & Reorganization: The 2025–2026 NRC reorganization has integrated licensing and inspection teams into "business lines" to ensure that the people approving the blueprints are the same ones inspecting the factory floor, reducing communication delays

Get the Westinghouse Litigation Behind Us ASAP

The long-standing intellectual property dispute between Westinghouse Electric Company and South Korean entities KEPCO and KHNP—centered on whether the APR1400 reactor design violates Westinghouse’s intellectual property rights—reached a significant turning point with a global settlement announced on January 16, 2025. Historically rooted in a 1997 licensing agreement and exacerbated by KHNP’s selection for the Czech Dukovany project in 2024, the dispute saw Westinghouse alleging that South Korea’s export of APR1400 technology required U.S. government approval under 10 CFR Part 810, while KHNP claimed independent development. 

The January 2025 agreement led to the final signing of the Czechia project with KHNP for APR1000 reactor(s) to come online in 2036.  The government-to-government MOU between the U.S. and South Korea, aimed to resolve pending litigation and arbitration, allowing, in theory, both sides to move forward with global nuclear projects. 

However, the agreement is reported to have established a long-term framework requiring South Korea to pay significant royalties and purchase equipment from Westinghouse for each reactor exported over the next 50 years, while restricting KHNP from independently entering key markets in the U.S. and Europe, leaving ongoing debates regarding the extent of technological sovereignty, the specific costs of the deal, and the precise boundaries of future joint ventures.

Consider Multinational, Interlocking Corporate Ownership Structures

The U.S. government could allow a Korean chaebol, such as Doosan Enerbility or Hyundai Engineering & Construction, to acquire Westinghouse.  A Korean conglomerate could possibly succeed in such an acquisition by navigating US national security hesitations by offering a strategic "American-led" joint venture, rather than aiming for a direct takeover. 

By partnering with a major U.S. industrial firm—or, as suggested by recent market activity, by bringing the U.S. government on as a passive shareholder in a potential IPO—the Korean company could perhaps mitigate concerns regarding the transfer of sensitive nuclear technology, particularly in light of the January 2025 IP settlement and MOU.  Such a proposal could maintain Westinghouse as an independent U.S.-based entity, with senior management remaining American, while leveraging Korean manufacturing expertise to lower costs and accelerate the deployment of AP1000 reactors (and ultimately more sophisticated models) to meet U.S. domestic energy demand, thereby aligning with U.S. "energy dominance" goals. 

By ensuring compliance with the NRC and securing approval from the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) through strong security protocols, the Korean company would position itself as a trusted partner.  If such a Korean bid focused initially on offering a roadmap toward the President’s goal of initiating ten plants by 2030, perhaps this could offer the justification to allow approval for such a merger.  The follow-on from such a domestically-focused approach could allow for streamlined bids on overseas builds.

Ghana (tender), Uzbekistan (construction), Kazakhstan (vendor selection completed), Rwanda (exploratory phase), Philippines (planning), and Saudi Arabia (preparing) are all actively pursuing nuclear power. There is also continued interest in Eastern Europe coupled with broad international interest in developing and deploying SMR technologies. As such, the next 5-10 years will be decisive for nuclear power and the time to complete industrial and supply chain positioning is now. This positioning will depend to some extent on gas prices but is largely driven by a desire for dependable, low-emissions baseload electricity sources that are insulated from international fuel price swings.  The ongoing conflict in Iran and resultant price volatility should catalyze additional global support for nuclear initiatives and boost efforts to cooperate. There is a strong probability that if the west - mainly Korea, Japan and the United States - do not cooperate, China (and Russia to a lesser extent) could win the lion’s share of overseas contracts, setting up 80+ year relationships with countries, both in energy terms, but also in a fiduciary sense, given the massive capital outlays required for such a build out, particularly relative to the GDP of developing countries hoping to add nuclear power to their energy mix.

Find a Third Country To Build the First Trilateral Nuclear Project

The KEPCO-Westinghouse bid to initially build two nuclear power plants in Saudi Arabia and, ultimately, 14 plants by 2040, is positioned to win thanks to support from the U.S. Government. The KEPCO-Westinghouse partnership, reinforced by a U.S.-Saudi, civil nuclear agreement that is in the works, aligns with U.S. efforts to counter Chinese influence in the region. However, significant pitfalls could allow a Chinese bid, such as the Hualong One, to win if the KEPCO-Westinghouse intellectual property (IP) dispute is not resolved, leading to legal hurdles and delays. Furthermore, if the U.S. insists on strict non-proliferation standards—specifically opposing domestic uranium enrichment in Saudi Arabia—Riyadh might turn to Beijing, which often offers fewer restrictions on technology transfer and a more direct route to realizing their nuclear ambitions.

Crank up Trilateral Nuclear Diplomacy to Reshape Standards in Our Favor

Diplomatic efforts regarding civil nuclear power between the United States, Japan, and South Korea have evolved from decades of bilateral agreements into recent trilateral commitments to cooperate on advanced reactor technology. For over 70 years, the U.S. has maintained "123 Agreements" for peaceful nuclear cooperation with both Japan and South Korea, establishing legal frameworks for the trade of nuclear materials and technology while ensuring nonproliferation standards. 

Historically, these relationships were marked by negotiations over sensitive capabilities; for instance, while Japan was granted advance consent for reprocessing and enrichment in 1987, South Korea's 2015 "successor agreement" focused on balancing its desire for similar fuel-cycle capabilities with U.S. nonproliferation goals. Recently, this cooperation has shifted toward a trilateral model, memorialized with 2025 statements after meetings in Brussels and New York emphasizing collective efforts to develop and deploy advanced civil nuclear reactors and SMRs to meet global energy needs under high safety and security standards

Trilateral and minilateral diplomatic efforts among the United States, Japan, and South Korea have the potential to reshape the global nuclear market by standardizing SMR designs and harmonizing regulatory frameworks. By establishing joint safety protocols and pre-licensing systems, these nations can create a "plug-and-play" model for nuclear exports that reduces the time and cost of deploying new reactors. 

While cooperation will remain challenging with the EU for the remainder of the Trump administration (2025-29), there is opportunity diplomatically with Japan and South Korea to reshape the trilateral relationship and catalyze financing, research and manufacturing.  There are regular opportunities for bilateral and trilateral leader engagement - the United Nations General Assembly week in September, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in China in November, G20 in Miami in December, etc.  At these leader engagements, the topic of nuclear power cooperation is on the agenda.  

To move the diplomatic agenda off the leaders statement page and into results that offer increased opportunity for coordination in research, financing, bidding, regulations, and manufacturing, the three countries should launch a nuclear power summit, either an Atoms for Peace 2.0 or a more anodyne “Nuclear: Powering the Future” title that has a two-tiered structure.  First, a trilateral structure, complete with an executive body and has a ministerial and a leaders-level meeting annually.  This should be accompanied by a full plenary session where all are invited to attend. While the real work would occur trilaterally, it is important to have a global approach as well to allow for international discussions of regulations, research and access.  

By including all, it could increase the opportunity for the three leading countries to both assess future partners and to sell the trilateral model of collaboration to the emerging markets. Finally, it could show that even in a time when international organizations are in retreat that there is a way for countries to convene and address the most critical issues.  Energy demand and energy access are already critical to economic prosperity, but as resilience becomes more valued, the ability to offer countries tools to be more energy resilient is essential.  Just as now AI summitry is a given, nuclear power (or energy access if nuclear in the title is troubling) discussions should be a fixture if we are to hope to manage the emergence of AI and the emergence of another billion people from developing status to developed with the accompanying energy requirements.

Fiscal Implications for South Korea

KEPCO is controlled by the Korean Development Bank, the government of South Korea, and South Korea’s National Pension Service. It is a substantially private company but one in which instrumentalities of the Korean government hold enough shares to exert substantial steering influence. This creates several major fiscal implications.

First, KEPCO’s ability to raise project financing differs from that of fully privatized nuclear utilities such as Constellation, Duke Energy, or Vistra because it benefits from implicit state backing. This helps de-risk nuclear export projects as well as domestic plants.

One illustration of how state control alters KEPCO’s financial parameters came in December 2023, when Korea’s National Assembly raised KEPCO's bond issuance ceiling from 2x to 5x capital and reserves. Shareholders of a fully private firm with nuclear operations would be extremely unlikely to support such a change in financial structure, even if it amplifies the company’s global competitiveness.

Second, significant state ownership promotes technology standardization around the APR-1400 reactor design and the build-out of a robust Korea-centric nuclear supply chain. It is an approach optimized for scale and cost-effectiveness.

Third, domestic nuclear plant construction improves Korea’s national balance of payments. Each new 1,400 MW APR-1400 reactor operating at ~90% capacity factor produces approximately 11 TWh per year, displacing equivalent LNG-fired generation and saving an estimated $500–700 million annually in fuel imports at moderate LNG prices. Reduced import dependence also bolsters the country’s energy security.

The net result is that every nuclear investment decision by KEPCO’s nuclear energy subsidiary KHNP is, in effect, a government fiscal commitment. The benefits of these commitments likely substantially outweigh potential fiscal costs. Among key upsides, the ownership structure enables the South Korean state to align financing, industrial policy, and reactor deployment in support of overseas projects. Such vertical integration gives KEPCO a competitive model that partially resembles state-backed nuclear exporters such as Russia’s Rosatom.

Conclusion: Cooperate and Compete

The challenge posed by state-backed nuclear expansion in China and Russia is significant, but the path toward a competitive trilateral alternative is clearer than ever. The alignment of the United States, Japan, and South Korea is not merely a diplomatic convenience; it is a geoeconomic necessity. With the (near) resolution of the long-standing KEPCO-Westinghouse IP dispute and the establishment of high-level trilateral technology agreements, the primary internal hurdles to a unified Western approach have been overcome. We are positioned to leverage American innovation and finance, Japanese precision manufacturing, and South Korea’s proven, on-time construction and fabrication expertise. This unified front offers emerging nations a reliable, high-standard, and geopolitically secure nuclear energy partner, demonstrating that the future of emissions-free, energy-abundant power can be aligned with democratic values and nonproliferation principles.

To fully realize this potential, the trilateral partnership must immediately shift from framework agreements to aggressive, coordinated action. The core prescription is to operationalize a "plug-and-play" SMR export model by fast-tracking the harmonization of regulatory standards (NRC, Japanese, and Korean) and establishing a joint, multi-billion-dollar financing vehicle. 

This would allow the alliance to offer competitive, integrated bids that counter the turnkey offerings from Beijing and Moscow, particularly in key test cases like Saudi Arabia and emerging markets in Southeast Asia and Africa. By acting with speed and scale—leveraging South Korea's "Foundry Model" for component fabrication and committing to build U.S. SMR facilities collaboratively—the three nations can create a resilient, non-Chinese supply chain that secures long-term technological and geostrategic advantage for the West and its partners for the next 60 years and beyond.

As a complement to the trilateral corporate, diplomatic, and financial cooperation, countries should consider how leader-level engagement and a possible new summit structure could help ensure that the progress we are seeing at a trilateral level is translated into not only action, but a coherent, global response to China and to global energy demands. A distinct choice lies ahead insofar as which set of “rails” global nuclear power will run on:  will it be Japanese/South Korean/American or will it be Russian and Chinese? 

https://emma-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/0oueb/02e2e3810c1b0f65680098432bb6ffc5/%E1%84%92%E1%85%A1%E1%86%AB%E1%84%86%E1%85%B5%E1%84%8C%E1%85%A5%E1%86%BC%E1%84%8E%E1%85%A2%E1%86%A8%E1%84%87%E1%85%B3%E1%84%85%E1%85%B5%E1%84%91%E1%85%B3_2%E1%84%8B%E1%85%AF%E1%86%AF%E1%84%92%E1%85%A9_GW_.pdf

February 2026

The economic landscape of South Korea has been fundamentally reshaped by a single entity: Coupang. As the largest U.S. investor in the country and its second-largest employer, Coupang is a logistical marvel that has redefined the "Korean speed" (ppalli-ppalli) culture for the digital age.  Between Korean unicorns Kakao and Naver and the continuing world-class excellence of Samsung, Hyundai and SK, Coupang offers a success story that fits Korea like a glove and has filled a niche between the tech and manufacturing giants to become the Amazon of Korea, but at a scale and level of service that even Amazon cannot provide.  U.S. investment and capital made Coupang’s rise and success possible.  Yet, in 2026, the corporate giant finds itself embroiled in numerous investigations and is the subject of high-level diplomatic engage. It should be a crowning achievement of U.S.-Korea commercial synergy and an exemplar for how the Korean domestic economy, with its dynamism and top-notch workforce, can serve as a pilot for innovation that could expand to Asia. Instead, it has devolved into a sharp bilateral irritant, threatening to destabilize trade relations and dampen investor sentiment.

The current tension between Coupang, the Korean government, and the National Assembly is a "lose-lose-lose" scenario. It undermines Korea’s reputation as a stable destination for foreign capital, threatens Coupang’s operational freedom and its ability to serve the Korean people, and introduces unnecessary friction into the vital U.S.-Korea security and economic alliance. To seek a possible resolution for this current impasse, we must understand the historical friction that laid the dry tinder and the 2025 data breach that acted as the spark that ignited the current tension. Only then perhaps can we see the path forward where Coupang is viewed not as a target, but as a blueprint for future cooperation.  How did we get to the place where the largest U.S. investor in Korea, the second largest employer in Korea, generates such animus while also delivering such service?  

A History of Friction: The Growth of a Giant
Coupang’s relationship with the Korean state has been tumultuous since it arrived in Korea in 2010 after it was founded by a group of Harvard Business School students. While its "Rocket Delivery" service, launched in 2014, won the hearts of consumers, its aggressive growth frequently placed it at odds with regulators and lawmakers.

Before 2025, the friction was primarily domestic and focused on three pillars:

• Labor Practices: The sheer scale of Coupang’s fulfillment network – whose workers are not fully unionized – led to intense scrutiny over worker safety and nighttime shifts, particularly as domestic conglomerates struggled to compete with Coupang’s innovative dawn delivery service. High-profile incidents involving warehouse conditions often triggered National Assembly audits.

• Market Leadership: As Coupang outcompeted traditional retailers, the government faced pressure to enact stricter platform regulations to ensure "fair competition” and often turned toward Europe for regulatory inspiration despite significant concerns from the U.S. government and U.S. industry. 

• Regulatory Identity: As a U.S.-headquartered company with nearly ninety percent of its profits from operations in Korea, the company occupies a regulatory gray zone that has led to discussion over whether it should be treated as a "foreign" or "domestic" conglomerate.

Despite these tensions, the company was largely viewed as a part of everyone’s day-to-day life, and, perhaps as a domestic regulatory challenge for the National Assembly to address. That changed in the summer of 2025.

The Catalyst: The Summer 2025 Data Breach
In mid-2025, a data breach exposed the personal information of millions of users. While technically a cybersecurity failure, it became a political lightning rod stemming from sensitivity related to the fact that Coupang is so integrated into most Koreans’ daily lives, and from a long-simmering dispute over whether Coupang aimed to avoid Korea taxation by headquartering in the United States. The government’s response represented a major departure from past precedent and likely linked to this pre-existing disagreement. Historically, while domestic giants like SK Telecom or KT faced backlash for breaches, they rarely faced the kind of comprehensive governmental attention and criminal charges now directed at Coupang. Lawmakers and regulators have characterized the breach as a "management problem" resulting from "lax oversight," which spurred different and more scrutiny than previous breaches that were caused by more “traditional” cyber attacks.  

The National Assembly used the breach as leverage to intensify scrutiny on Coupang’s entire business model. Given the fact that almost all Korean households use Coupang, all politicians found this issue affected their constituents and became motivated to show they were investigating and seeking to protect their voters. Within weeks, authorities formed an unprecedented set of dedicated task forces (including a cross-ministerial “Coupang Task Force” later elevated to Deputy-Prime-Minister level, an 86-member police task force, and a 32-member Labor Ministry task force), launched multi-day search-and-seizure operations, and initiated large-scale ad hoc tax and customs inspections. This focus highlighted the government’s seeming desire to bankrupt Coupang and led to a high-stakes standoff: the government pushed for punitive fines and mandatory, costly infrastructure upgrades, while Coupang argued the measures were disproportionate and unfairly targeted a successful enterprise with foreign roots.  Coupang has responded to the data breach by activating incident-response procedures to block unauthorized access, reporting the incident to law enforcement, and pledging over $1 billion in compensation vouchers to affected users. After the incident, Coupang, working with security experts, has strengthened its security framework by implementing zero-trust architecture, enhancing employee offboarding, and adopting more rigorous data encryption standards to prevent future breaches. The company has pledged to continue working to strengthen its protections and be transparent with customers. Ongoing issues in dispute that continue to fuel the controversy include:

• The Scale of the Breach: Officials claim this is the "largest breach in Korea’s history," affecting 80% of the adult population (34 million accounts). The company claims the incident was the result of exploited internal access by a former employee that affected only 3,000 customers, whose data was stored only on the perpetrator’s devices. Two independent cybersecurity firms confirmed that only low-sensitivity data (phone/email) was accessed, no financial data was compromised, no data was actually “leaked” externally (beyond the perpetrator’s lone access), and there has been zero customer harm.

• The Nature of the Investigation: The ROK government claims an the investigation is not an “act of discrimination.” While the actions taken by the government have been legal, the leak has been used as a pretext for raids well-beyond the normal scale and scope with 11 unrelated agencies (tax, labor, customs, etc.) participating, the blocking of routine corporate transactions, and threats of business suspension and fines totaling 10–30% of global revenue. While Korean government officials claim they have not targeted Coupang, the response is objectively more comprehensive compared to more severe breaches at SK Telecom and Kakao. 

A Bilateral Irritant: Washington Steps In
By early 2026, the dispute crossed the Pacific. The political gravity was underscored by a high-profile exchange between Vice President JD Vance and Prime Minister Kim Min-seok. VP Vance expressed concern and asked that Korea not  "target American tech companies," and linked Korean actions against Coupangto U.S. investment confidence in Korea. Prime Minister Kim defended the stance that Korea has taken toward Coupang, stating that Korean had conducted its investigation in a “non-discriminatory and transparent manner in the same way we would have done against any Korean company that had a data leak.”

Such overt intervention is unusual. Friction between U.S. firms and Korean regulators is common (e.g., Google, Qualcomm), but high-level political intervention is generally reserved for trade agreements or national security, not data breaches. This escalation has been noted by The Chosun Daily, Korea's oldest and most influential newspaper of record. In a notable editorial, the Chosun Ilbo highlighted the stark contrast between the "chopstick threats" of Korean politics—where business leaders are often publicly humiliated—and the robust protection the U.S. government provides its corporations.

"Whenever an issue arises, the owner... must appear before the National Assembly and grovel to appease politicians... Korea should learn from the U.S. instead of blaming it." — The Chosun Daily, "Envious of Coupang’s U.S. Shield" (February 10, 2026).

As the leading voice for Korea's highly educated opinion leaders, the Chosun Ilbo’s critique signals a growing concern that the current political climate is becoming a liability for the nation's economic image.  Next up, the U.S. Congress has launched an investigation into Korea’s “discrimination against American companies” and held a closed-door hearing on February 23 to learn about how the Korean government is treating Coupang and other U.S. companies.  Thus far, no reporting has emerged from the seven-hour hearing.  The fact that Congress has taken this extraordinary measure – including issuing a subpoena to Coupang for documentary evidence related to the company’s interactions with the Korean government – shows that there is real concern about the investment climate in Korea.  

The Risk of Regulatory Churn
The current standoff risks having a "chilling effect" on the broader investment climate. Investors may interpret the Korean government's response as a shift toward a more nationalistic and less predictable regulatory environment. Indeed, five of Coupang’s major U.S. investors have already filed arbitration claims against the Korean government under the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS), which protects U.S. investors and companies against discriminatory acts and unfair trade practices. While KORUS may become a less effective tool for U.S. companies if President Trump continues to introduce uncertainty into the trade relationship, the arbitration claims send a chilling signal to multinational companies, potentially leading them to reassess expansion plans in favor of markets with greater regulatory stability.  

Reimagining Coupang: An Exemplar for Collaboration
Despite the animus and ongoing Sturm und Drang, Coupang represents the ultimate success story of U.S.-Korea synergy. It is the embodiment of what happens when U.S. capital meets Korean operational excellence. At this stage, Coupang is much more than an e-commerce company; it is at the forefront of AI, cloud and advanced robotics, all industries that are made for U.S.-Korea partnerships.  If the partnership appears on shaky ground, the result could affect various future investments and potential partnerships, to the detriment of U.S. and Korean companies

Instead of an irritant, Coupang should be viewed as an exemplar for three reasons:

1. The "Hybrid" Partnership Model: Coupang demonstrated that U.S. investment, bringing scale and technological expertise, can be paired with Korea’s digitally fluent workforce and consumer base. 

2. Economic Utility: By pioneering "Rocket Delivery," Coupang acted as a massive job creator and a utility that introduces efficiency and access to products, offers opportunities to SMEs and reduces prices through their network of suppliers to modern Korean life.

3. Exporting Success: Coupang is now taking its "Korea-proven" logistics model to Taiwan and Japan. This showcases how a U.S.-Korea partnership can scale beyond national borders to capture diverse Asian markets and benefit both Korea and the United States.

Conclusion
The Coupang standoff offers a test to the maturity of the U.S.-Korea economic and geopolitical relationship. We got to this moment of tension through a combination of rapid growth and a series of misunderstandings about the scope of the breach by Koreans and about Korean parliamentary and law enforcement practices by some in the United States, but staying here serves no one. By shifting the narrative from punitive targeting to a recognition of mutual benefit, both Coupang and the Korean government can – and should –seek to spur a new generation of transpacific success.

Coupang’s success story offers a blueprint for future ventures where U.S. capital provides the fuel and framework, while Korean talent and local knowledge execute the sophisticated operational strategies required to capture market share across diverse Asian economies. Further, the quick to adapt, densely populated, and digitally fluent population allow for companies to understand quickly if their endeavor could succeed.  The Korean market, though small, is dynamic and can serve as a testing ground for the companies and technologies of the future. To replicate the hybrid partnership model, the Coupang dispute should move from a politically charged fight pitting lawmakers and political leaders against the company and instead focus on negotiating a resolution.  Ultimately, a resolution should allow Korean legal processes to proceed and offer Coupang a chance to show to the Korean people that they have addressed the issues from the 2025 incident.

February 2026

https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20260218/133374005/1

As 2026 begins, the Republic of Korea stands at a definitive crossroads. In a few short decades, the nation has traversed the distance from an aid recipient rebuilding from the ruins of war to a powerhouse donor. As a long-time observer of the peninsula, I see this transformation not merely as economic history, but as a testament to a unique international conscience.

Yet, the true test of this commitment is leading when times are hard. Despite the economic buffeting of 2025—marked by new U.S. tariffs and global instability—Korea has chosen to hold the line. By maintaining its $100 million commitment to the Global Fund for the 2026-2028 cycle, Seoul has sent a quiet but powerful message: even amidst domestic pressures to prioritize defense, its role as a global guardian is non-negotiable.

This is not just charity; it is a strategic assumption of responsibility as traditional powers retreat. Crucially, this pledge has secured Korea a voting seat on the Global Fund Board, marking a critical evolution from a passive payer to an active architect.

The logic driving this is clear. Under the Lee Jae-myung administration, the imperative has shifted from simple generosity to ruthless effectiveness. The government’s focus is now strictly on "return on investment"—prioritizing funds that save the most lives per won spent. With its new seat at the table, Seoul can ensure that the billions of dollars managed by the Fund are deployed with the same efficiency that drove Korea’s own economic rise.

This focus on high-impact infrastructure brings us to a crown jewel of Korean leadership: the International Vaccine Institute (IVI). Headquartered in Seoul, the IVI is the only international organization dedicated to vaccines for the global poor—a powerful symbol of Korea’s capacity to host, not just fund, global institutions.

This synergy extends to Korea's deepening ties with Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, and the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI). These partnerships are not merely donations; they are investments in an ecosystem where Korea is a dominant player. As the fourth-largest supplier of vaccines to Gavi, Seoul’s aid creates markets for its own burgeoning biotech sector.

Similarly, CEPI has catalyzed SK Bioscience’s development of the world’s first AI-designed vaccine. By supporting CEPI’s "100 Days Mission," Korea leverages its status as a top-tier AI and bio-innovation hub to lead the race against future pandemics. This is "smart power": saving lives globally while fueling innovation domestically.

Looking forward, if Korea wishes to stamp its mark on a truly neglected global crisis, it should turn its gaze to lead poisoning. It is an issue that perfectly fits the administration’s "effectiveness" criteria: a solvable crisis causing $1 trillion in annual global losses. Korea successfully eliminated lead from its own systems years ago.

By joining the international Partnership for a Lead-Free Future and exporting this policy know-how to partners in South and Southeast Asia, Seoul could rapidly improve the IQ and life expectancy of millions of children. Taking the lead on an issue that has no other global champion would be a masterstroke of niche diplomacy.

Ultimately, Korea’s trajectory in global health is a microcosm of its rising stature in the wider world order. The logic that drives its leadership in the Global Fund—strategic commitment and technical expertise—is the same logic driving its growing influence in other critical domains.

From hosting the AI Safety Summit and passing the AI Basic Act to set the "rules of the road" for future technology, to its expanding role in global defense exports, Korea is proving it can be a provider of security in all its forms: biological, technological, and physical.

In 2026, the world is looking for steady hands. By anchoring its foreign policy in reliable contributions to global health, Seoul earns the trust required to lead on AI and security. Korea is no longer a "shrimp among whales," but a pivot state capable of steering the global current. The decision to maintain its course in global health is the right one—not just for the lives it saves, but for the future it secures for Korea itself.

February 2026

https://csds.vub.be/publication/allies-in-transition-recasting-the-united-states-south-korea-alliance-for-a-competitive-era/

Key issues

• The US-ROK alliance is transforming, with higher Korean defence spending and nuclear-submarine cooperation shifting it beyond Peninsula-centric deterrence;

• The alliance agenda is widening and regionalising, integrating China deterrence, defence industry ties, high-tech security, supply chains and energy;

• Political and economic frictions are the main risks, as Trump-Lee dynamics and disputes over trade, technology or China could strain alliance management.

Introduction

The future of the United States (US)-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance is bright. President Trump has redefined the meaning of the term “alliance” from that of past presidents, and while President Lee values the importance of the relationship, he is, first and foremost, a nationalist rather than a globalist. Despite the frictions and tensions that have emerged and been managed in recent months and that will continue to arise, South Korea does and will play an essential role in the US security approach to the Indo-Pacific. Notwithstanding potential political differences between the countries, South Korea has one ally, the United States, and Korea plays a key role as a robust, defence and industrial power miles from China and next to North Korea. As stated in the 23 January 2026 US National Defense Strategy (NDS), ‘South Korea is capable of taking primary responsibility for deterring North Korea with critical but more limited U.S. support‘. The US strategy highlights South Korea’s defence industrial base (DIB) and names Korea a partner capable of deterring an ever more provocative North Korea and a militarily growing China.

In the wake of the 25 August 2025 “Trump-Lee Summit” meeting in Washington and the State Visit of President Trump to Gyeongju, South Korea, on 29 October 2025, the two leaders put out a statement on 13 November 2025 that announced a “new chapter” in the US-ROK Alliance. While in many cases statements do not contain much that is new, in the wake of the two leaders’ meetings in 2025, 2026 will indeed see the alliance modernise, evolve and change significantly. 2026 will be a year of transformation for the alliance, with South Korea increasing its defence budget to 3.5% of GDP, with a rise of 8% year-on-year until reaching that goal. This budgetary change, along with the commitment to purchase US$25 billion in US military equipment, will dramatically alter the pace of integration of the two militaries and the modernisation of the South Korean military. The aim of this CSDS Policy Brief is to unpack and analyse the evolving alliance.

Deepening the alliance

Overall, the long-term future of the US-ROK alliance is regional, modernised, transnational and high-tech. The core focus of the alliance will move further away from deterrence against North Korea, and become more modern, regional and focused on overall deterrence from various threats, both national and transnational. It will also develop into a more functional and transnational alliance that seeks to support supply chain security, energy security and cyber security, just as much as to support the safety and security of the Peninsula from the North Korean military threat. The challenge for South Korea is to navigate this transformation while accommodating the strong traditionalist school of conservative (in an alliance sense, across all parties), pro-alliance Koreans who see the alliance as the foundation of defence against North Korea and believe that anything that detracts from that purpose could increase the Korean people’s insecurity.

For the US, the challenge under the current administration is to acknowledge value from the alliance, while continuing to demand more and continuing to develop the Trump doctrine vis-á-vis China and the region, and determining how South Korea fits into the China strategy. For South Korea to achieve this balance, moves like the decision to acquire (or co-build) a nuclear submarine from the US will be central. For the United States, as long as South Korea increases its defence budget as pledged, and continues to invest in the US through military purchases as part of the overall US$350 billion overall investment commitment, the conditions could remain in place for the two countries to find the terms of the alliance and alliance management vastly different at the end of the Trump and Lee administrations.

While the above frame lays out the potential policy trajectories for the alliance, the near-term success of the relationship hinges on the personal relationship between Presidents Trump and Lee Jae Myung. President Lee’s ability to stay in the “good” camp for President Trump will have a significant impact on how turbulent the inevitable ups and downs will play out between the two countries. The two of them present ideological flexibility and national, sovereigntist approaches to governance that mean they could step away from historical precedent in significant ways as it relates to the alliance, as well as how the two countries relate to China and the Indo-Pacific region. Korean government officials point out that President Lee’s first diplomatic objective is to maintain a stable relationship with President Trump and the US. His second goal is to improve relations with China in order to support economic growth, all while avoiding historical arguments with Japan. Thus far, President Lee has achieved all of his diplomatic objectives far better than most could have anticipated. To hit high marks with China and Japan at the same time has proven difficult for most of President Lee’s predecessors, so to follow up a successful visit to Beijing with a drum session with the Japanese Prime Minister days later is, if not unprecedented, certainly rare.

President Trump’s “America First” and Western Hemisphere-centric approach means that his focus on South Korea could be episodic and seen largely through either the China or the investment-in-America lens. There is even some concern in South Korea that President Trump could, if a “big deal” were possible with China, turn away from allies like South Korea and Japan. Although President Trump may not necessarily see the intrinsic value of the alliance with South Korea, most, if not all, of the administration’s key figures see Korea’s central role in the competition with China, both in terms of investment and economic supply chain security and defence and deterrence. Because of the overall administration view of the high value of Korea to the United States, it is unlikely that President Trump will trigger a wholesale rewriting of the US approach to the alliance or fundamentally alter the US commitment to Korea. However, it is reasonable to expect that President Trump could buffet the overall relationship with tariffs or other aggressive measures that, heretofore, had not been deployed against allies. Even if not in the military or security realm, such actions could affect how Koreans view the relationship and affect cooperation between our governments.

On the Korean side of the leadership equation, President Lee appears to have found a method to manage President Trump’s approach without triggering adverse reactions either in Korea or amongst the Trump team. That said, the conflict over the digital economy could prove challenging as President Lee is liable to stand up for local champions like Naver as the US puts pressure on the Korean government to treat its tech firms fairly. President Lee is currently poking the bear with attacks on the leading US investor in Korea, Coupang (known as the Amazon of Korea), and his approach and the approach of his government could make this issue not just a commercial issue, but a bilateral irritant. President Lee has proven that in his flattery and management of President Trump, and his management of tricky historical issues and his overall approach to Japan, his flexibility could lead him to buck the traditional, staunch pro-US approach past Korean presidents have taken if he perceives that the Korean people would support him standing up to President Trump and the US over digital or other policy.

We are currently seeing President Lee’s approach play out as he attacks Coupang and encourages the National Assembly, the Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) and the prosecutor’s office to target Coupang due to a data breach. President Lee’s actions appear driven in part by a long-standing desire to hold Coupang to a higher standard, given its success as a US firm in Korea, and the perceived notion that Coupang does not pay its share of taxes or profit in Korea. More likely, this is President Lee taking advantage of the data breach to chip away at Coupang’s dominant position in the e-commerce and delivery space. While this is an economic issue, if President Lee continues to target Coupang, there could be consequences for his ability to manage President Trump and, therefore, the alliance. It seems that President Lee is counting on his forward-leaning stance to support US shipbuilding, to purchase defence articles and Boeing jets, along with Korean businesses’ commitment to invest US$20 billion per year in the US, to give him room to take aggressive action against Coupang. This seems like the type of action that could harm the alliance and also deter US firms from investing in Korea.

Modernisation is the slogan of transformation of the alliance currently, and while discussions will continue to determine whether modernisation refers to capabilities, policies, force structures, OpCon transfer, all of the above, or none of the above, the US and Korea have agreed to embark on a nuclear submarine project. In one decision (that may or may not have followed extensive National Security Council or interagency deliberation) to offer South Korea the ability to reprocess nuclear material and to build nuclear submarines, the alliance has been modernised in its scope and approach. The nuclear submarine, in President Lee Jae Myung’s own words, is made for long-term and long-distance deployment and therefore could help support US regional efforts and deter China. Observers have sought to downplay President Lee’s remarks as a “mistake”, but the fact is, his remarks ring true as the nuclear submarine is most useful as a deterrent and in conflict away from the Peninsula. The capability automatically makes Korea a more regional and even global military actor.

As President Lee sought to downplay any proliferation concerns, he expanded the mission and ambition for the South Korean military, and this could lead to the most profound modernisation of how the two countries talk about China and the Indo-Pacific. While the first Korean nuclear submarine may not deploy for 10+ years, in the meantime, discussions could begin about how the submarine will transform how the US cooperates with the ROK. Surprisingly, China has not reacted to the nuclear submarine deal in a move that shows remarkable restraint by Beijing. Since there are many details to be ironed out to finalise the deal, let alone the time to determine where the subs will be manufactured, China appears to have decided not to upset warming relations with Korea. Perhaps Korea has benefited from China’s ongoing tensions with Japan.

China has, if not influence, an impact on any decision by South Korea (or the US, for that matter) and one can expect China to have a view on the breakthrough decision by Korea and the US to modernise their alliance through submarine cooperation. In 2015, after the United States deployed its THAAD air defence system, China reacted by imposing an unofficial boycott on certain companies, reducing the number of tourists who travelled to South Korea, and limiting Korean entertainment content in China. This had a ~US$10 billion impact on the South Korean economy and, perhaps even greater effect on souring how Koreans viewed China. China’s justification for its reaction to the deployment was that the THAAD battery threatened its strategic security. While China’s position was hardly defensible regarding the THAAD, which was first and foremost deployed to defend South Korea and to deter North Korean provocations, the nuclear submarine is clearly and explicitly for playing a greater regional role, deterring China, and cooperating with the US in the South China Sea. Military experts note that South Korea does not need a nuclear submarine to defend the Peninsula or even for a possible conflict with North Korea, but only to take a greater regional role, or participate in a possible conflict with China in the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea.

Regionalisation meets globalisation

In addition to the move toward nuclear submarine cooperation potentially causing friction with China, other trends for South Korea and the alliance require management and further oversight. Coordination with Japan on the defence front continues to advance, and President Lee’s bold decision to visit Japan before the US, and to visit again early in 2026, has set the Korea-Japan relationship on a surprisingly strong track, especially considering President Lee’s past negative statements about Japan. For a president who suggested in the past that Korea’s military buildup was to defend against a potential threat from Japan to transform into a liberal president who not only takes on Yoon’s conciliatory approach to Japan, but goes one step further with a charm offensive, is remarkable and augurs well for Korea’s expansion into more trilateral regional cooperation with Japan and the US.

While South Korea (and Japan) did not attend the 2025 NATO Summit, the Asia-Pacific 4 (AP4) (Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand) continues to expand and develop. Alliance conversations between the US and ROK generally focus on geographic deterrence and areas of operation (i.e. North Korea), but conversations at NATO rightly pull Korea into discussions about how to manage transnational threats and the growing global threat posed by China and Russia. As the US and ROK expand their coordination bilaterally through the nuclear submarine-related talks and further define the “modernisation of the alliance”, NATO AP4 discussions could offer a road map for how to expand and modernise. Russia and North Korea are boosting the trend toward a more global alliance perspective with their increased cooperation, including the deployment and death of North Korean troops in Russia. Even as the US-ROK alliance becomes more global and transnationally-focused, an expanded and more global, Russia-supported, North Korean threat will pull South Korea and the US-ROK alliance discussions naturally into a focus on European security matters.

Transnational deterrence

The US-ROK alliance will continue to become more of a high-tech alliance and less about deterring the military threat that North Korea poses. This high-tech alliance will evolve through greater defence industry cooperation as well as overall economic integration, investment and cooperation as the industries of the future – from drones, to AI, to pharmaceuticals, to quantum and the Internet of Things (IoT) – will become more and more dual-use as deterrence becomes more about protecting digital infrastructure and data than about automated artillery. Here, the alliance is poised to take off, boosted by the extensive investments Korean firms have made in the United States in a variety of sectors, most notably in semiconductors. SK Hynix and Samsung have pumped tens of billions of dollars into fabs that will produce chips for Nvidia and the next generation leaders of the AI sector in the US.

As the IoT becomes more present in the grocery store, in our homes, in cars, etc., our data becomes more and more valuable to companies and to our military foes. South Korean companies offer viable alternatives to Chinese competitors – for example, the two leading electronic shelf label companies are Chinese and Korean, and we can anticipate the leading Korean manufacturer, SoluM, could soon be ubiquitous thanks to its ability to safely handle our data and deliver a quality service. As our phones connect us to our stores and to our cars, it will become just as important to keep Chinese technology out of our refrigerators and our grocery stores as it is to keep Huawei out of our physical digital infrastructure or BYD cars off our highways. The US-ROK alliance and its future safety rely just as much on the relationship with Hanwha and Hyundai for military equipment as they do on the relationship with companies like SoluM that will support advanced connectivity in our cars and our cereal aisles.

Finally, in addition to high-tech cooperation, energy security is critical. South Korea is the top importer of US Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and will continue to rely on the US for power, and the energy relationship of the two countries will become more and more essential to the alliance and the national security of each nation. South Korea not only relies on the US, but South Korea also could power the United States future through cooperation in the civil nuclear space, shared efforts to build a critical minerals supply chain that does not rely wholly on China, and through investments in US infrastructure as well as energy-related manufacturing. The energy relationship will drive the economic and security alliance and help secure support for the alliance and the relationship more broadly, as the relationship and our security depend more on technology, AI and advanced manufacturing.

Conclusion

The prospects for the US-ROK alliance in 2026 are exceptionally strong, given the fact that the two leaders have successfully navigated a period of uncertainty related to trade, tariffs and investment and have concluded a significant agreement to change the nature of our alliance through investment, shipbuilding co-production and a greater level of trust in the nuclear sphere to allow for South Korea to build nuclear submarines. The investment agreement, increased defence budget in Korea, pledge to buy US equipment and agreement to allow nuclear submarines will catalyse the significant evolution and even transformation of the alliance in 2026 and beyond.

November 2025

https://www.khan.co.kr/article/202511182141005

Why give more overseas aid? This is a question that is on the minds of many in this country in the wake of the closure of USAID and in Korea as well. Adding to the challenge facing those advocating for Korea to take a leadership role internationally, both budgetarily and diplomatically, is the fact that the previous Yoon administration misused precious government aid dollars. The bottom line is that Korea should give more aid to help its bottom line. If Korea spends more on international aid focused on vaccine programs, Korean firms benefit and the Korean people benefit.

The most important and perhaps persuasive argument to policy makers and the Korean people about why to make an investment in overseas development aid is not charity. Korean people are very generous with their personal charitable giving and they should demand the same generosity from their government to reflect Korea’s global stature and economic wealth. However, I want to focus in this piece on the significant potential economic benefits as well that deliver a substantial Return on Investment (ROI) to Korea companies and the Korean people.

One of the most direct ways to increase benefits for Korea is to build on its already deep relationship with Gavi, the vaccine alliance.  The ROK is already deeply integrated into Gavi’s value chain, representing the fourth-largest vaccine supplier. Gavi currently procures 11% of total vaccine purchases from Korean manufacturers, supplying more than $100 million USD worth of vaccines annually. This procurement relationship stimulates demand for Korea’s burgeoning pharmaceutical and biotech industries, fueling innovation and opening new markets.

The industrial return for Korean manufacturers alone is estimated to be around five times the Korean government’s total contribution over Gavi’s next strategic period. Furthermore, the Korean company EuBiologics controls over 80% of the global oral cholera vaccine (OCV) market share, making Korea the sole OCV provider to Gavi, and giving Korea a critical role in global health security and rapid response to cholera outbreaks. This synergy between aid and industrial competitiveness represents smart economic diplomacy.

Looking solely at the moral case, investing in global vaccination efforts is fundamentally one of the most cost-effective interventions available. As a public-private partnership, Gavi helps vaccinate over half of the world’s children against the deadliest diseases. Between 2000 and 2022, Gavi supported the vaccination of over one billion children, leading to the prevention of more than 17 million deaths. Looking ahead, Gavi’s ambitious strategy for 2026–2030 aims to protect 500 million children and save an additional 8 to 9 million lives. Crucially, this immense humanitarian impact is coupled with massive economic benefits for recipient countries, estimated to exceed $250 billion USD.

In addition to Gavi, greater investment in the Global Fund and the International Vaccine Institute (IVI), also offer opportunity for Korea to assert global leadership while realising tangible domestic economic returns. With the Global Fund’s Eighth Replenishment in November 2025, Seoul has a timely opportunity to pair vaccine leadership with a strategic pledge that advances both Korea’s global standing and its innovation-led growth. The Global Fund, like Gavi, saves lives on an impressive scale.  It has saved over 70 million lives and, in 2024, backed HIV treatment for 25.6 million people while driving TB care and malaria prevention at scale.

Scaling up support for organisations like Gavi, the Global Fund and the Seoul-based IVI is the clearest path for Korea to translate its economic success into commensurate global influence and prosperity for its people while saving lives. An investment in global health security and vaccine equity is a win-win: it safeguards vulnerable populations worldwide while securing unparalleled commercial and diplomatic dividends for Korea.

October 2025

https://emma-assets.s3.amazonaws.com/0oueb/e8ce6f30af0aa0f8a665a659b60a618d/%E1%84%92%E1%85%A1%E1%86%AB%E1%84%86%E1%85%B5%E1%84%8C%E1%85%A5%E1%86%BC%E1%84%8E%E1%85%A2%E1%86%A8%E1%84%87%E1%85%B3%E1%84%85%E1%85%B5%E1%84%91%E1%85%B310%E1%84%8B%E1%85%AF%E1%86%AF_GW%E1%84%8B%E1%85%AD%E1%86%BC_.pdf

The U.S.-South Korea alliance and economic partnership has been built over the decades on immigration and investment as much as on military cooperation, troop presence, and joint efforts to deter North Korea.  The recent tightening of immigration enforcement by the United States that resulted in the arrest of 318 Korean citizens at a Hyundai-LG battery plant in Georgia on September 4, along with the ongoing negotiations to reduce tariffs on Korean goods and requests for Korea to hand over 80 percent of its currency reserves ($350 billion) in an investment agreement, have put intense pressure on the bilateral relationship. Collectively, these actions suggest that current U.S. policy decisions are testing the foundational economic and social pillars of the longstanding U.S.-South Korea partnership.

Immigration

The history of Korean immigration into the United States is an American success story and built on legal immigration. Consequently, the immigration policies of the Trump administration targeting illegal immigration did not appear aimed at South Korea. In the wake of the lifting of quotas in the 1965 Immigration Act, and followed by a loosening of the Korean government’s restrictions on travel and access to passports in the 1970s, Koreans, largely educated and oftentimes with enough capital to start small businesses on arrival in the United States, started immigrating at over 100,000 per year.  Twenty years of such legal, high volume, and successful immigration produced the current population of 3.5 million Korean Americans.  While immigration has slowed in recent years, Korea sends the highest per capita number of students to study in the United States each year (average over 50,000 each year for the last twenty years) and almost two million tourists each year, amounting to a significant amount of money for tourism and education (over $10 billion/year).  Additionally, Korean companies have turned away from China for high tech manufacturing, and have invested over $100 billion in the United States in the last three years to establish chip, battery and other manufacturing plants.  As such, the longstanding pattern of South Korean immigrants contributing to the United States as law-abiding citizens continues.

Despite this pattern and the related ongoing benefits that Koreans and Korean companies offer to the U.S. economy, the highest profile and largest mass arrest in the second Trump administration occurred at the Hyundai-LG plant on September 4 in Georgia when ICE detained 475 workers, including over 300 Koreans, at the battery plant.  While diplomatic coordination since September 4 has sought to assuage Korean concerns and avoid any further incident that could affect Korean investments into the United States, there have been no changes to either the relevant immigration rules or the directives from DHS and top Trump officials regarding ICE agents’ practices.  The chance that further arrests of skilled Korean workers at one of the many factories Korean companies are building throughout the country could occur again is not insignificant.  In addition to the eagerness of local ICE officials to fulfill their deportation quotas, this risk stems from the fact that the visa rules and regulations are intentionally (or seemingly so) vague to allow for a wide variety of legal business activities to include installation of equipment and factory set up. Moreover, many of the Korean workers in the United States setting up Korean factories are sub-contractors or even sub-sub-contractors and may or may not have the clearest understanding of the visa mandates or the distinction between a B1 business visa and the more limited ESTA visa waiver program.

While the United States and South Korea have agreed diplomatically that the type of work conducted in Georgia does fit within the parameters of the B1 visa, there are several challenges.  Korean companies under more and more pressure to complete construction quickly in order to sell their products, tariff-free in the U.S. market. They might therefore have incentives to send workers on ESTA or via the visa waiver program because some of the workers, lacking the stamp of approval from a known employer such as Hyundai, Samsung, or SK, could fail to receive a B1 visa during the interview process.  This decision might stem from a lack of understanding of the distinction between sending workers to the United States via ESTA or via the B1 visa.  Companies might also pursue the more stable and long-term work visa related to their investments (e.g., applying for a longer-term work visa rather than a short-term business B1 visa), generally to secure the right managers or skilled engineers to work in the United States long-term.  However, the lack of skilled workers in the United States and even non-skilled labor could lead companies to continue to send Koreans to do short-term contracted or sub-contracted work to get their highly automated factories up and running as quickly as possible.  (Note: one source has reported that over half of the U.S. applicants for non-skilled labor positions failed drug tests.)

Investment

Under the Biden administration, the U.S. government incentivized massive Korean investment in U.S. manufacturing through the IRA and the CHIPs Act that offered significant rebates to Korean companies.  Additionally, U.S. states competed (and still do compete) to lure Korean investment and the thousands of jobs that accompany such multi-billion-dollar investments with tax and regulatory incentives. The “carrot” strategy helped push Korean companies, which were already moving out of China because of retaliations against Korea over the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system, to move production to the United States and Southeast Asia, in order to accelerate and increase investments. Trump has decided to sunset the Biden-era incentives and use sticks rather than carrots to boost investment by imposing tariffs and demanding additional investment in order to reduce the tariffs to lower levels.

The risk of the Trump approach is that South Koreans could start souring on the relationship economically, decelerating their investment decisions and implementation.  Korean students could start to decide to study in other countries such as Australia and Canada and take their $2 billion dollars a year spent on education in the United States each year with them.  Worse still, his policies could slow the deepening cultural connections between our two countries that have led to more and more collaboration in movie, television, and music.  However, the most potential significant impact of the Trump approach is that the Korean government could drag their feet and start making security coordination more complicated or difficult.  Advisors such as Laura Loomer and Steve Bannon near Trump have painted the current Korean president as a “communist” and friendly to China.  The policies of the Trump team will not transform Lee Jae Myung into a communist, but may encourage Lee to adopt more China-friendly policies or at least seek to balance the relationship with China with the relationship with the United States, especially in economic terms.  However, because the vast majority of the Korean people are strongly pro-American and understand that the United States is the most important country for them in both security and economic terms, there is not much room for Lee to move away from the United States without losing support from a vast majority of Koreans across the political spectrum.

Alliance

If in fact Lee is unable to change policy, what can he do?  How can he respond to the Korean people who do not understand why, with a free trade agreement in place, the United States has slapped tariffs on Korean goods?  The answer lies in how the Korean government frames the alliance.  Korea will remain a strong partner in building the trilateral relationship with Japan because it is in Korea’s interest to do so.  However, if the United States asks Korea to participate more in NATO or South China Sea-related exercises, Korea may become more reluctant, not because of a turn toward China, but because in the past, Korea participated in international exercises or even to deploy to Iraq or Afghanistan primarily in response to requests from the United States.

Cooperation and coordination at the UN and other international organizations could suffer given the tariff and immigration policies of the Trump team.  How that plays out may not have short-term visible consequences and for this administration, which does not value multilateral institutions.  However, over time, Korea could take a more European-friendly approach to AI-related regulations, or try to balance Chinese or even Russian demands absent pressure from the United States to vote one way or another.  Without U.S. pressure, Korea could start to vote on personnel-related issues at the UN in a way that is more favorable to China or at least in a way that does not take into account U.S. preferences.

Overall, the Trump approach to tariffs and immigration enforcement may not fundamentally alter the trajectory of the bilateral relationship.  Koreans will likely remain pro-U.S. even as they become more anti-Trump and continue to be anti-China and skeptical of Russia.  Therefore, the alliance should withstand Trump’s attempts to extract more from Korean companies. But management of alliance-related issues could become more contentious and frustrating as Korean government officials seek ways to stand up to Trump without turning their back on the alliance.

Yet, if there is another Georgia-esque crackdown on legal or mostly legal Korean workers, or if Trump supporters continue to paint Lee as anti-American, significant friction could emerge that could have a more fundamental effect on the relationship.  Add to this attempts by Trump to reach out to North Korea without coordinating with South Korea, and the potential for a 2008-esque popular movement when millions of Koreans protested the opening of the Korean market to U.S. beef in Korea is non-zero.  I would expect such protests not to be anti-U.S. per se. Rather, they would underscore the Korean viewpoint that, despite support for investment in the United States and the importance of the U.S.-ROK alliance, there is only so much the United States can ask before the Korean people say “enough.”

October 2025

https://issuu.com/mh183/docs/energy_insights_2025/123

Japan and South Korea play central roles in the energy ecosystem despite not having any significant domestic energy supplies. They do this by driving technological advances and energy-related innovations out of necessity. In addition to individually remaining central to the global energy market, experts anticipate that the two countries will expand trilateral cooperation on energy with the United States.

Currently, the two countries import significant amounts of LNG — roughly 113 million metric tons combined in 2024 or 14% of U.S. LNG exports — and are intimately connected with the U.S. energy market given significant imports. Japan and South Korea combined imported 12% of U.S. oil and refined product exports in 2024. This has been boosted by the recent new trade deals signed between the United States and each country: July 23, 2025, for Japan and July 30, 2025, for South Korea. Another contributor is the significant Inflation Reduction Act of 2022-facilitated investments during the 2022–24 period in energy-related manufacturing, including semiconductors, electric vehicles (EVs), and EV batteries. Thanks to the new trade deals, investment in the United States will continue to grow.

Economic Size Matters

Japan’s and South Korea’s economies remain significant, with Japan the fifth largest economy with a GDP of over four trillion and South Korea the twelfth with a GDP of almost two trillion. While neither country will likely experience significant growth given demographic and economic trends — projected growth for Japan is under 1% in 2025 and 2026; projected growth for Korea is 1% in 2025 and 2.2% in 2026 — the two economies will remain significant drivers of the energy economy for decades to come given their significant manufacturing capacity, focused research, continued reliance on fossil fuels to power their advanced economies, and per capita GDP.

Driving Demand: AI, Energy Evolution, and Beyond

Japan and South Korea have placed great emphasis on research and investment in the energy field, both for economic growth and for the need to innovate due to a lack of natural resources. Coupled with the drive to innovate, there will likely be significant electricity demand increases: Japan predicted at 40% and South Korea at 113% by 2050. Both countries are investing heavily in AI and related fields and rapidly moving toward the cloud to support their AI industries in addition to working with the major U.S. cloud companies such as AWS, Azure, and, now, in South Korea, Coupang. One of the stipulations for more extensive cloud adoption is server and data center expansion. The number of data centers in Japan is expected to double over the next 3–5 years and quadruple in South Korea by 2029 which will further contribute to the increase in energy demand.

Energy Diplomacy: Key to Future Cooperation

To ensure that the evolution of energy access will meet increasing demand (in addition to these two countries’ climate change and emission goals), active energy diplomacy will continue to play a central role. For both Japan and South Korea, their relationship with the United States is paramount to both energy security and geopolitics. Given the shared energy needs and technical capabilities of Japan and South Korea, the two countries would be well served to increase trilateral energy cooperation.

Similarly, bilateral energy diplomacy has a role despite challenges related to Japan’s 1910–45 colonization of Korea. While there are no current bilateral flashpoints, odds are high that inevitable conflicts will arise over history, especially given the low expectations in Japan about South Korean President Lee Jae-myung, given his past statements.

That said, sending South Korea’s foreign minister Cho Hyun to Tokyo as his first overseas visit on July 29, 2025, relieved tension and could extend the current honeymoon phase between Lee, who entered office on June 4, 2025, and his counterpart, Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba. If the two countries can put differences aside and focus on cooperation and partnership regarding energy, there is great potential and opportunity.

While the trilateral diplomatic construct has the most potential overall regarding energy policy, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — the U.S., Australia, India, and Japan —could also play an important role. The Quad just established a Quad Critical Minerals Initiative to boost their supply chains and reduce reliance on China. South Korea could also participate in this initiative as an observer and the grouping could serve as a useful diplomatic vehicle. The U.S. could encourage and invite South Korea to play such a role, a logical move given South Korea’s current role as chair of the Minerals Security Partnership.

Energy Sources

Civil Nuclear: Both Japan and South Korea are already global leaders in the civil nuclear sector, given their production capacity and reliance on nuclear power for energy production. Going forward, the two countries have bet big on small modular reactors (SMRs); have invested heavily in U.S. and U.K. SMR companies, such as between several South Korean companies and NuScale in the U.S., and between the U.K.’s National Nuclear Laboratory (NNL) and the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA); and look to play a central role in the production of the SMRs globally. Japanese and South Korean companies are set to play a key role in the supply chain to produce the SMRs as well, with Doosan Enerbility and GS Energy working closely with NuScale.

Nuclear power will contribute significantly to the increase in electricity demand and the two countries could benefit from collaboration in the commercial space and/or with the research and development community. Perhaps a trilateral summit, focusing on energy diplomacy or nuclear power specifically, could unlock commitments from the two countries and their leading energy companies to invest in or sign long-term LNG commitments, in potential Lower 48 states and/or the Alaska LNG projects. This could also lead to commitments to coordinate critical minerals supply chain efforts and coordinate on civil nuclear production, research and exports, and shipbuilding.

Hydrogen: Japan and South Korea both have roadmaps to develop significant hydrogen markets and infrastructure. While progress remains slow, any strides the two countries make in the next 10 years could provide an example for other countries seeking to increase hydrogen production. The two markets are dense enough that infrastructure development to support a hydrogen market could make sense, if prices come down for the fuel and if technology improves so that related infrastructure is less unwieldy and expensive. While the United States remains a global leader in gray hydrogen and a potential leader in clean hydrogen (given low-cost U.S. natural gas), growing trade in clean hydrogen could be another area for cooperation.

Solar: South Korean company Hanwha Q Cells invested $2.5 billion dollars in the United States to produce solar panels and offer a non-Chinese option for panels in the United States. Japan has invested in perovskite and titanium technology as well as rooftop solar in order to offer a new tech alternative now that China has captured 80% of global solar panel production.

Wind Industry: Wind is another energy sector where South Korea and Japan are industry leaders. Japan has a vast amount of potential wind power capacity. According to experts, if harnessed, the offshore wind in Japan could produce enough electricity to power Japan. However, there remain significant challenges to harness economically the offshore wind power, transmit it, and resolve the intermittency concerns through battery storage or otherwise. With Japan’s and South Korea’s production capacity, shipping innovation, and vibrant manufacturing sectors, the two countries will likely play a central role in providing a non-China option for countries looking to expand their wind power.

Electricity Storage Batteries: For both solar and wind power, if battery technology continues to improve, the storage challenges related to these options could become more manageable. On batteries, there are innovative new companies like Standard Energy in South Korea that have developed advanced technologies to improve energy efficiency in data centers, manage the volatility of AI workloads, and better address the intermittency of renewable energy.

The vanadium ion battery (VIB) developed by Standard Energy is fundamentally different from traditional vanadium redox flow batteries and lithium-ion batteries. The VIB has already solved the flammability issues associated with lithium-ion batteries while achieving high efficiency, high power, fast response, and ultra-long cycle life. These characteristics could drive significant battery adoption across data centers, indoor energy storage systems (ESSs), urban infrastructure, and public transportation, and Standard Energy is exploring investment and co-investment with U.S. companies.

Minerals: The U.S., Japan, and South Korea play central roles in the Minerals Supply Partnership, with Korea chairing the group that seeks to develop more coherent and non-China-based minerals supply chains. Japan spearheads the recycling group while both of the countries, with their mining and processing capabilities through their industries as well as their state-sponsored entities, are key players in the critical minerals space. The two countries launched more formal bilateral cooperation in February 2025 to cooperate on mining projects in third party countries.

They both rely on inputs from China, like the United States and most other countries, but to become less reliant on China for rare earths along with processed lithium, cobalt, and other key minerals, Japan and South Korea should play a central role. Both Japan and South Korea have interests in Southeast Asia, Australia, Africa, and South America for mining and processing.

There are numerous examples of Japanese and South Korean companies working to develop alternatives to China and to Chinese processing methods. South Korean company POSCO aims to develop an alternative cobalt processing method in the Philippines that would be less environmentally harmful. If the United States opens some of its mining in order to increase domestic production and build a non-China supply chain for critical minerals, Japanese and South Korean companies would likely be involved in the process. One existing example of this is U.S. company Energy Fuels, which is cooperating with POSCO to process minerals from its Utah mine.

CCUS and Gas Reserves: One area for potential bilateral cooperation is an exploration of the Sea of Japan. While there could be some gas, a more likely benefit would come from carbon capture opportunities rather than gas production. But given the overlapping economic zones and the billions of investment required to develop such an opportunity, it would behoove the two countries to collaborate on a plan if either country sees real potential in this area.

Similar to the possible Alaska LNG pipeline project that could offer increased energy security to Japan and South Korea if realized — even if the project is not a moneymaker — it may still make sense to explore or even to develop. To advance in the Sea of Japan and develop a viable carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS) capacity, it would require extensive diplomatic efforts, cooperation, and shared investment. Additionally, partnering with an industry leader such as Chevron or Exxon could provide needed experience and expertise as well as capital.

Conclusion: Japan and South Korea Are Key Energy Partners for the US

All of these energy trends in Northeast Asia point in one direction — Japan and South Korea will continue to play an outsized role in the energy economy, in the world of energy diplomacy, and in research and innovation as well as in production and manufacturing. The more that U.S. firms and the U.S. government focus on Japan and South Korea as partners in research, investment, and commercial advocacy, the more effectively the three countries could compete with Chinese alternatives and spur significant economic growth over the coming decades as well as cooperating on regional security in Asia.

October 2025

President Donald Trump's "America First" policies, which include tariffs and domestic production incentives, have significantly disrupted global supply chains. In response, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) can strengthen their collective supply chain resilience by leveraging and expanding existing partnerships. This report analyzes how current ROK-EU bilateral agreements in key sectors—civil nuclear, critical minerals, car manufacturing, defense, and emerging technologies— offer opportunities and can be used to counteract these protectionist measures. It also proposes policy initiatives for the ROK government to promote the diversification of strategic investments and enhance ROK-EU collaboration.

The Impact of Trump's Policies
In order to protect domestic jobs and national security, the Trump administration has implemented tariffs on key imports and encouraged reshoring. Recent trade agreements with South Korea and the European Union have placed tariffs on products such as steel, aluminum, autos, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. These measures, while intended to promote local sourcing, have created uncertainty in US-ROK and US-EU relationships incentivizing the acceleration of nascent Korea-EU efforts to expand economic activity.

Tariff Agreements & Trade Relations (US-ROK, US-EU): President Trump's administration has actively pursued new trade agreements and tariff regimes. In July 2025, the United States and the EU announced a trade agreement stipulating that the EU would pay a 15% tariff rate on various products, including autos, auto parts, pharmaceuticals, and semiconductors. However, existing 50% sectoral tariffs on steel, aluminum, and copper remain unchanged, with discussions planned for securing supply chains for these materials. Similarly, a July 30 trade agreement with South Korea outlined a path via investment to avoid higher tariffs, with South Korea agreeing to a 15% International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariff rate and a 15% tariff on automobiles and auto parts, down from a potential 25%. However, the tariffs currently remain at 25% until the details of the agreement are ironed out.  Reaching a final agreement has been complicated by the recent immigration raid at the Hyundai-LG factory in Georgia and H1-B policy changes. The 50% tariff rate on aluminum, steel, and copper products for Korea, as with Japan, remain in place. These tariff actions aim to rebalance economic relationships and encourage local sourcing and reshoring production. Earlier suggestions to repeal U.S. 232 steel tariffs and quotas on South Korea were proposed as a way to stimulate economic gains and revitalize the U.S. steel industry through partnerships, rather than tariffs.  With the 232 tariffs expanded, Korea should consider how to enter the EU market.

Framework for Shared Resilience
The ROK-EU relationship is built on a series of foundational agreements and offers a strong framework for enhancing supply chain resilience against global disruptions. The Framework Agreement (2010) and the Free Trade Agreement (2011) form the bedrock of this partnership, significantly boosting bilateral trade and including crucial commitments on fair competition, which are especially important for sectors like semiconductors.

A key development that expands on this foundation comes in the Digital Partnership (2022), a forward-looking initiative that fosters cooperation on cutting-edge technologies. This partnership, governed by a ministerial-level council, promotes joint work on semiconductors, next-generation networks (5G/6G), AI, and cybersecurity. Within this framework, ongoing economic security dialogues have been established to create early warning systems and coordinate on industrial policies and export controls for critical technologies. The ROKG could propose an expanded scope and investment into this partnership.

In contrast to a U.S. emphasis on fossil fuels, the Green Partnership (2023) demonstrates a shared commitment to a clean energy transition. This collaboration aligns with the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and South Korea's "Carbon Free Alliance," supporting the diversification of mineral sources for EV batteries and promoting sustainable energy solutions.  While Korean companies have invested heavily in wind turbines, EV charging stations and other green tech supply chain opportunities in the United States, Korean companies could find additional or even complementary or linked investment opportunities in the EU’s green tech supply chain. It should be noted that with all opportunities, Korea and Korean companies should seek accommodations—both regulatory and tax-related—from Brussels to incentivize investment.  The more comprehensively the ROKG bundles proposed investment, the more likely the EU could relax some of its exceedingly complex administrative and regulatory hurdles to facilitate such investment.

ROK's association with Horizon Europe (2025), the EU's key research and innovation program, allows Korean researchers and organizations a structured framework for joint R&D projects in areas critical to supply chains, such as semiconductors, AI, and sustainable technologies. Now that Korea can participate as an associate member (first Asian country to do so), Korea should focus on applying for funding and leading collaborative research projects.

In addition, the incorporation of educational and cultural exchange programs such as Erasmus+, the EU's flagship student mobility program, will support the expansion of ROK-EU cooperation. Erasmus+ facilitates student and staff exchanges between European and South Korean universities, allowing participants to study, conduct research, and intern abroad. Expanding Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe and perhaps the formation of a Korean equivalent to these two excellent programs could encourage more targeted research cooperation in high tech fields and lay the groundwork for next generation industries such as batteries, SMR, AI, quantum and green tech.  Korea would be well served to fund an expansion of Erasmus+ from sponsoring hundreds of scholars a year to thousands.

The Security and Defense Partnership (2024) further deepens cooperation in the defense industry, addressing hybrid threats and critical infrastructure. By fostering collaboration on defense technology and production, this agreement enhances the resilience of military supply chains.  Korean companies have made great strides in recent years selling billions of defense equipment to Poland, Romania and other EU states. As the EU looks to bolster its defense capabilities and reinforce Ukraine’s deterrent capability, there is opportunity for Korea and Korean companies to fit more systematically into EU defense procurement by focusing efforts on outreach to policymakers in Brussels to complement the current member state focus.

Key Sectors for Cooperation
The ROK-EU partnership can significantly increase shared resilience in critical sectors by leveraging existing agreements and coordinating strategies to counter the disruptive potential of Trump's "America First" policies.  The policies of the U.S. government should serve as a catalyst to allow Korea to seek more concessions and cooperation from EU institutions.

Civil nuclear: South Korea, a global leader in nuclear plant construction and advanced reactors such as Small Modular Reactors (SMRs), is an ideal partner for the European Union (EU). Expanding their "Green Partnership" would allow them to jointly promote secure nuclear energy. This initiative is further supported by the proposed multilateral "JUKE" grouping (Japan, U.S., Korea, EU), which prioritizes nuclear power and the energy transition. JUKE met once at a Commerce-led meeting during the Biden administration and could be revived to focus solely on civil nuclear.  With the global market for nuclear energy projected to double to a $1 trillion industry over the next 25 years, South Korea's expertise in producing key supply chain components on schedule and budget presents a significant opportunity for collaboration with the EU.  However, this sector requires U.S. support and even participation, so while expansion of ROK-EU cooperation on production of components for the industry could reap benefits, a broader JUKE (or similar) association that includes the United States is critical for comprehensive sector development.

Minerals Security: The EU and the Republic of Korea (ROK) are deepening their cooperation on securing critical minerals, a partnership that aligns with their mutual goal of diversifying supply chains away from China. This collaboration is largely facilitated through the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), which the ROK chairs. The EU's Critical Raw Materials Act and Batteries Regulation complement South Korea's strategy, providing a framework for joint policy and investment coordination.  Korea could seek to sponsor and lead mining projects with EU Member States drawing on EU connections to the Middle East and Africa to facilitate expanded joint projects for mining and processing, through MSP or bilaterally.

Car Manufacturing: South Korean companies like Hyundai and KIA, along with battery manufacturers, have established some EV plants in Europe. Korean companies should immediately expand this effort with a comprehensive proposal to Brussels to offer significant investment and in return, seek remedies to visa issues (with the EU helping Korea work with the immigration authorities in target countries) as well as regulatory barriers that could impede quick action.  

Industrial Defense: The ROK-EU Security and Defense Partnership promotes joint R&D and co-production and should be just the first step toward increased co-production as well as sales.  Korea could expand its after sales efforts, mirroring U.S. defense sales practices that would not only secure a longer profit timeline, but integrate Korea more fully into the EU defense industrial supply chain.  To facilitate such integration, Korea should focus more on securing accommodations for such projects at the EU institution level as much as seeking to secure ad hoc sales.

Semiconductors, AI, and Emerging Technologies: the ROK-EU Digital Partnership seeks to address supply chain vulnerabilities. Both sides are working together on semiconductors to strengthen supply chain transparency and advance research. This includes initiatives like the ROK-EU Forum for Semiconductor Researchers and shared export control coordination.    

Security Dialogues and Cooperation Mechanisms
Beyond specific agreements, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) have strengthened their shared resilience through various dialogues and mechanisms. The ROK-EU Joint Committee has consistently advocated for closer cooperation on economic security and supply chain resilience. The Supply Chain and Industrial Policy Dialogue, launched in December 2023, specifically focuses on monitoring and responding to disruptions. Additionally, the EU's Economic Security Strategy (June 2023) promotes diversifying critical dependencies ("de-risking") and partnering with like-minded countries, including the ROK, on initiatives like foreign investment screening and export control coordination. The proposed "JUKE" grouping (Japan, U.S., Korea, EU) could further serve as a diplomatic forum for coordinating policy on critical areas, such as supply chain security, nuclear, AI, and cybersecurity. 

Conclusion and Recommendations
Under the unpredictable and protectionist policies of President Donald Trump, South Korea and the European Union have a significant opportunity to expand their partnership. By leveraging existing bilateral agreements—including the Framework Agreement, Free Trade Agreement, and partnerships in digital, green, and security sectors—they can collaborate to diversify critical supply chains and strengthen a rules-based international order. The South Korean government should offer the EU a substantial investment package in exchange for regulatory support, visa accommodation, and expanded governmental, academic, and institutional exchanges.

To further enhance shared resilience, specific recommendations include:

1. Elevate and Formalize Supply Chain Coordination: Transform the ROK-EU Supply Chain and Industrial Policy Dialogue into a more frequent and structured mechanism. By creating joint early warning systems and coordinated response protocols, we can address disruptions in critical sectors like semiconductors, critical minerals, and advanced manufacturing. This could be a binding annex to the Digital Partnership or Free Trade Agreement (FTA).

2. Strategic Co-investment and Joint Ventures: Actively promote and co-finance ROK-EU joint ventures and direct investments in key industries like civil nuclear, EV batteries, and semiconductors within both regions and in third countries. Maximizing and expanding the use of Horizon Europe for large-scale industrial R&D projects will be crucial for these initiatives.

3. Harmonize Export Controls and Investment Screening: Establish formal mechanisms, possibly within the Digital Partnership and aligned with the EU's Economic Security Strategy, for coordinating export control policies and inbound/outbound investment screening related to critical and emerging technologies (semiconductors, AI, quantum). 

4. Enhance Talent Mobility and Skill Development: Fully implement and expand the initiatives on skills and mobility outlined in the Digital Partnership. This includes creating more robust research and exchange programs, joint training initiatives in ICT, AI, and quantum technologies, and developing pathways for skilled workers in critical sectors across both regions. A temporary, non-immigrant E-4 visa category, as proposed for Koreans in the U.S., could serve as a model for ROK-EU (or at ROK-Member State level) visa facilitation to address labor shortages in critical industries. Promote Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe to encourage expanded education and research cooperation in high tech fields.

5. Strengthen Multilateral Advocacy for Open Trade: Jointly advocate for multilateralism and rules-based trade within international fora such as the WTO, G20, and the Minerals Security Partnership. Expanding cooperation within the MSP should focus on securing diversified supply chains for critical raw materials.

6. Integrate defense Industrial Bases: Strengthen the Security and defense Partnership to boost joint R&D, co-production, and integrated supply chains. This will provide Korean companies with greater access to the EU market, and it will also streamline the acquisition and delivery of defense materials, particularly for shared security goals like supporting Ukraine.

7. Develop Shared Standards and Governance Frameworks: Deepen cooperation on digital standardization, AI governance, and cybersecurity under the Digital Partnership to align norms and values. 

By taking these concrete actions, the ROK-EU relationship can navigate the challenges presented by President Trump's policies and emerge as a more resilient and influential force in shaping a stable and prosperous global economy.

August 2025

https://www.csis.org/analysis/analysis-first-trump-lee-summit

South Korean President Lee Jae Myung achieved his top goal: a productive and cordial meeting with President Trump. He did so and more, hitting all the right notes. From his speech at CSIS to his interactions with Trump, Lee consistently emphasized the importance of the alliance, underscored the need for continued cooperation with the United States against China, and highlighted the shared goal of denuclearizing North Korea. His use of the U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) slogan, “We go together,” resonated with Washington’s South Korea watchers, who were looking for signs that Lee would seek to weaken the alliance in favor of “balancing” the relationship with a more conciliatory China policy.

Some liberal South Korean (ROK) presidents have sought a new path with the United States—because of such attempts, both Roh Moo-hyun and Moon Jae-in had challenging starts to their relationship with Presidents Bush and Trump as they channeled the desire of some of their core liberal supporters to stand up to “big brother” and shed any sense of dependency on the United States. Despite this, by the end of their respective terms, on alliance issues, China policy, economic cooperation, cultural and educational exchange, the two presidents had the U.S. relationship on stable ground and at the nexus of South Korea’s foreign policy and, arguably, the U.S.-ROK relationship at the center point of their presidencies.

While many critics expected Lee to stumble out of the gate on the world stage after a career laser-focused on domestic ROK policy and politics, he clearly learned two important lessons before arriving in Washington and did not miss a step. First, the relationship with the U.S. president and the United States is pivotal; therefore, he should seek to get off on the right foot with Trump and with the U.S. government. Second, he realized that, however appealing standing up to the United States might be to some in the Democratic Party of Korea, South Korea ultimately wants its president to get it right with the United States. If, while maintaining a good relationship with the United States, there are moves toward “sovereignty” or “independence,” all the better, but first, the goal is not to harm South Korea’s only ally and most important economic partner.

Lee shared he learned from The Art of the Deal that though Trump might use threats during negotiations, ultimately, he would not “cause a wound” or damage relationships that matter. He got this right as Trump seemed ready to send Lee down the Zelensky/Ramaphosa route with his early August 25 (just hours before the Oval Office meeting) salvo via Truth Social about the “purge and revolution” going on in South Korea, but ultimately smoothed things over publicly and privately to focus on the alliance, trade, investment, shipbuilding, security, and North Korea.

Lee struck the only note he could—South Korea has one ally, one relationship that represents the future, and that is the relationship with the United States. Therefore, the South Korean people will judge Lee, like they have every South Korean president before him, by his ability to manage the relationship with the United States. Lee did what he needed to do—artfully flatter Trump, not fall into the trap of contradicting Trump, and pivot from controversial (for example on comfort women) to less thorny issues (such as Japan-ROK ties are important or golf in North Korea) and avoided the bizarre (let’s fly to Beijing together) while focusing on reassuring topics (South Korea is ready to work with the United States to manage and compete with China).

On North Korea policy, there has occasionally been daylight between the United States and South Korea. In many instances, at the heart of the matter is a desire by both the United States and South Korea to engage in bilateral talks with the North, sharing more or less what they are attempting. Even when the Six-Party Talks were the main negotiating vehicle (2003–2009), keeping all parties aligned and keeping track of the various bilateral initiatives featured as main diplomatic tasks. 

The Trump-Lee summit featured extensive discussions on North Korea, with both leaders signaling their eagerness to reengage with Pyongyang. Lee praised Trump’s past diplomatic overtures, while Trump himself expressed his willingness to meet with Kim Jong-un again, describing their relationship as “very good.” Lee’s framing of himself as a “pacemaker” to Trump’s “peacemaker” role could position South Korea as a partner in any future talks. However, the path to a breakthrough remains uncertain, as Kim Jong-un has not yet shown interest in dialogue, and his comprehensive strategic partnership with Moscow likely limits his ability to engage.

On the security front, Lee affirmed South Korea’s commitment to the alliance by announcing a planned increase in the defense budget. This move, which was well-received by the United States, aims to modernize the South Korean military and bolster its capabilities. While some questions remain about the details of defense cost-sharing and how to interpret “strategic flexibility,” along with Trump’s public comments that the United States could take ownership of military base land, the overall tone of the summit on security matters was positive and forward-looking.

In the wake of the July 30 trade agreement and commitment by South Korea to invest $350 billion and purchase up to $150 billion in fossil fuels, focus on economic and industrial collaboration featured prominently at the summit. While the investment commitments were substantial, shipbuilding emerged as the strategic centerpiece for Lee’s visit. Discussions at the industry roundtable, attended by executives from major South Korean and U.S. companies, suggested a deal is in the works that could see greater South Korean participation in the U.S. shipbuilding sector. HD Hyundai, Cerberus Capital, and the Korea Development Bank agreed to form an investment strategy to attract and focus tens of billions into revamping the U.S. shipbuilding industry. This builds upon the $150 billion South Korean “Make America Shipbuilding Great Again” proposal. The initiative, which could potentially involve a modification or modernization of the Jones Act, aligns with President Trump's “Restoring America’s Maritime Dominance” agenda. To further highlight this partnership and the potential for such a partnership, Lee visited the Philly Shipyard in Philadelphia on August 26, which Hanwha Ocean purchased for $100 million and reportedly will invest an additional $70 million to expand the facility.

Lee’s visit to Washington exceeded all expectations and was a success. The next opportunity to build on this success is a possible Trump visit to South Korea for the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit at the end of October. If Trump does travel to Gyeongju, and possibly Seoul as well, it could help to catalyze real progress on Korea’s investment commitments, to refine the trade agreement, and to define what modernizing the alliance will mean for the two countries. The possibility of North Korea engagement could boost chances for Trump to invest further in the relationship with Lee and the relationship with South Korea.

June 2025

https://issuu.com/mh183/docs/energy_and_resilience_policy_briefs_2025/34?fr=sY2YzZTg2MzM0MjQ

Energy and Resilience: Policy Briefs 2025

Trilateral Recommendations for Pacific Energy and National Security Focuses on the relationship between the U.S. and two of its critical allies in the Pacific, recommending trilateral U.S.-Japan–South Korea energy cooperation. 

Goal: Incorporate trilateral energy cooperation as a central pillar if Camp David trilateral engagement continues and/or start a separate, trilateral energy coordination mechanism for the United States, Japan, and South Korea.

Option 1: Camp David Summit Agenda picked up by Trump Administration.

Method: Build a government-led trilateral energy pillar separate from and in support of the Camp David Agenda based on a Baker Institute-led study and in collaboration with Stanford’s Hoover Institute to develop the most effective areas to focus on based on Japan’s recently released energy strategy and the approach of the new U.S. administration.2 

• Hold a series of joint webinars and meetings with Japanese, Korean, and U.S. officials and energy policy experts to build a trilateral energy agenda. 

• Convene a track 1.5 trilateral energy security dialogue based on the agendas and preparatory work done between January and March. 

• July 2025 onward: Trilateral Energy Security Dialogue held in Korea, Japan, and the U.S., alternating and on a quarterly or biannual basis. 

Option 2: Camp David Summit Agenda not adopted by Trump Administration 

Method: Focus efforts on Track 2 work to build trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Host a webinar to discuss the potential for trilateral energy cooperation. 

• Kick off in-person meeting with think tanks and energy industry officials. 

• Invite ROKG, GOJ and USG participants or observers. 

• Launch a biannual series of in-person meetings, alternating between the United States, Korea and Japan to encourage greater trilateral coordination. In 2026, present findings and progress along with recommendations to the three governments, offering a specific way forward should the governments choose to adopt trilateral energy cooperation as a key area of focus. 

Areas of Focus: Three Potential Sample Policy Areas for Trilateral Coordination 

1. Minerals Security Partnership (MSP):

• The MSP continues as a core multilateral organization since it works to Trump 1.0 goals to secure critical minerals and develop a secure supply chain not dependent on China.3 That trilateral coordination within the MSP would serve as a key driver, for policy, projects, and investment. 

• Ultimately, the USG would consult with the ROKG and the GOJ before any MSP meeting, much as the USG does now with the P3 (France, UK and the United States) before any UN meeting or as the USG does now with the quad (UK, France, Germany) before any NATO meeting to coordinate approach and ensure cohesion among the leading countries. 

• To develop such an approach, all three governments should develop a greater awareness and understanding of their current leadership role (Japan served as the chair of the MSP until June 2024, Korea currently serves as chair) as well as the potential for this type of coordination. 

  • Engage with Trump administration State and DOE teams to highlight the potential and lay out how to institute and institutionalize such an approach. 

  • Approach Seoul and Tokyo with the same pitch through in-person meetings with their top diplomatic and energy officials. 

• Agree on several key initiatives and targets that the three countries could advocate for within the MSP. 

• Highlight the wins of a more effective MSP, energized by the three countries that have most at stake and have most capacity to invest capital, mineral extraction, and processing ability to help boost non-China dependent mineral supply chains. 

• Potential areas for cooperation: 

  • Japan and the United States could join the ROK-led MSP working group on the Mahenge Mine project.4 

  • Japan (JOGMEC, JBIC) could offer a virtual briefing to Korea and the United States to describe Japanese private sector investments in upstream and midstream minerals (e.g., Sumitomo, Mitsui). 

2. Methane Abatement 

• Japan, the ROK, the United States, and other countries issued a Joint Statement in July 2023 to collaborate on reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, particularly methane from LNG imports and exports. JERA and KOGAS also launched the CLEAN Initiative, a voluntary effort where gas buyers would seek methane emissions data from producers to prioritize procurement of lower-methane gas. 

• Establish regular meetings in which the United States, Japan, and Korea discuss policy and industry steps to mitigate methane and CO2 emissions from internationally traded fossil fuels, including through implementation of the CLEAN initiative. We recommend inviting technical experts (governmental, academia, industry, NGOs, etc.) to brief the United States, Japan, and the ROK on tools that can be used to measure and mitigate greenhouse gases (methane and CO2) from imported fossil fuels, including assessing existing policy levers, examining price and market impacts, and assessing internationally aligned approaches to cut emissions from traded fuels. 

• Assemble a team of experts, working with other institutions, to brief USG, ROKG, and GOJ officials, planting the seed for regular track 1.5 and track 2 trilateral meetings to advance methane abatement coordination. 

• Brief industry representatives based on the findings assembled during the meetings in order to encourage them to take efforts to reduce methane emissions. 

3. Technical Assistance Coordination in the Pacific Islands Counties (PICs) 

• USTDA has funded a mini-grid feasibility study evaluating site configurations for 75 priority sites in Fiji. USTDA is also conducting a site selection study supporting renewable energy in Tonga. USTDA is actively considering several other activities in the region from rooftop solar and BESS to utility-level smart grid roadmaps. 

• The three governments share information on projects through regularly scheduled calls to minimize overlap and interference in other countries’ efforts. 

The Center for Energy Studies at the Baker Institute at Rice University has served to enhance collaboration between industry, think tanks and governments of ROK, Japan and US over the past year and would be willing to be a convener and policy advisor for Trilateral Energy Cooperation going forward.

Notes

1. The White House. “Fact Sheet: The Trilateral Leaders Summit at Camp David.” The American Presidency Project (U.S. National Archives), August 18, 2023. https://bidenwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefing room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/fact-sheet-the-trilateral-leaders-summit-at-camp david/#:~:text=The%20United%20States%2C%20Japan%2C%20and%20the%20ROK%E2%80%A6 

2. METI Agency for Natural Resources and Energy. “Basic Plan on Energy and the Environment.” Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, March 19, 2025. https://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/en/category/others/basic_plan/. 

3. U.S. Department of State. “Minerals Security Partnership.” U.S. Department of State. https://www.state.gov/minerals-security-partnership. 

4. U.S. Department of State. “Joint Statement on Establishment of the Minerals Security Partnership Finance Network.” Media Note, Office of the Spokesperson, September 23, 2024. https://2021-2025.state.gov/joint statement-on-establishment-of-the-minerals-security-partnership-finance-network/. 

5. European Commission. “EU and Global Partners Reaffirm Their Commitment to Tackling Methane Emissions in the Natural Gas Value Chain.” European Commission, DG Energy, July 18, 2023. https://energy.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-and-global-partners-reaffirm-their-commitment-tackling-methane emissions-natural-gas-value-chain-2023-07-18_en. 

6. Čučuk, Aida. “KOGAS, JERA to Reduce Methane Emissions in the LNG Value Chain.” Offshore Energy, July 19, 2023. https://www.offshore-energy.biz/kogas-jera-to-reduce-methane-emissions-in-lng-value-chain/

7. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Advances Rural Electrification in Fiji.” May 18, 2023. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-advances-rural-electrification-in-fiji/. 

8. U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA). “USTDA Signs Infrastructure Deal in Tonga, Expands Pacific Island Commitments.” April 22, 2022. https://www.ustda.gov/ustda-signs-infrastructure-deal-in tonga-expands-pacific-island-commitments/.

https://www.hankyung.com/article/202507301146i

July 31, 2025

Facing ongoing trade frictions along with tariffs and negotiations about non tariff barriers, Korea could win diplomatic points globally by continuing to step up its overseas development aid donations.  If Korea does so, it could highlight global leadership and win plaudits from U.S. allies - and eventually from the United States itself.  While the United States has decided to shutter its overseas aid agency USAID, and curtail much of its development aid, Secretary of State Rubio highlighted that “It’s important to understand we are not walking away from foreign aid,” and highlighted South Korea’s graduation from recipient to donor.  Some may think that highlighting Korea’s impressive and growing global role in development might seem to be counterintuitive.  However, mirroring the painful adjustments Trump’s NATO allies are making to defence budgets in Europe, it could instead serve as a key talking point for Korea to show how it is heeding Trump’s call for U.S. allies to bear more of the burdens the U.S. has traditionally taken on in world affairs, and take up the mantle in supporting and sustaining global health and prosperity at a critical time.  While right now, managing the turbulent relationship with the United States is paramount, by showing greater global leadership, Korea would boost its standing with other countries in ASEAN, Africa, and South America as well as among OECD countries, that are all central to Korea’s growth and continued economic expansion.

Beyond the near-term pitch that Korea could make to get credit for its efforts in global development, Korea has a compelling success story to tell as the only nation to successfully transition from a major aid recipient to a significant donor nation.  This message is objectively impressive, but could be further tailored for a USG audience by highlighting the fact that Korea is now giving back in recognition of the generous support it received from the U.S. and others during its own development journey: taking a greater share of the burden to support U.S. priorities such as vaccine development, pandemic preparedness, and limiting the outflow of migrants fleeing the poverty and instability that often go hand in hand with development failures.  At the same time as Korea builds that narrative for the Washington audience, it could advance its own leadership with other partners as among the only OECD countries in recent times to increase, year-on-year, its development budget.  

Korea could further enhance its image and prestige by modelling best practice and international solidarity in adopting more effective, evidence-based aid strategies: for example, pledging more monies through effective institutions like GAVI and the Global Fund as well as the Korea-headquartered IVI, and partnering with cutting edge foundations such as the Gates Foundation and Open Philanthropy rather than trying to build up its domestic aid agency that is already overmatched following the commendable increase in funds Presidents from both sides of the political divide put in place over the past several years.  With the Global Fund and Gavi both conducting major replenishments this year, significant early Korean contributions to each would be a powerful statement of intent. Additionally, demonstrating initiative in fighting new, neglected challenges such as lead poisoning, that other countries have not to date focused on, could offer Korea another chance to lead on the global stage.  One unique asset Korea can bring to bear on these problems is the popularity of K-culture. We have seen how powerful this can be in raising popular awareness and assent for major global issues, through their adoption by a major Korean cultural icon. What this could look like is a popular band such as BTS or BlackPink, or an up-and-coming band like Stray Kids taking on a particular cause such as lead or malaria as a comprehensive, sustained campaign rather than just on an ad hoc basis.  

In addition to boosting Korea’s international stature, development investment also offers substantial benefits to Korea’s pharmaceutical and biotech sectors as well as offering new opportunities for Korean research and development collaboration and leadership with other countries.  Finally, to connect back to how this would support the bilateral relationship with the United States, President Lee Jae Myung and his team could highlight how Korean bio-pharmaceutical companies are engaged in joint ventures with U.S. companies, investing in the United States, and sharing research and development facilities.  At a time of heightened economic tensions and concerns about burdensharing and strategic flexibility, Korea could utilize its untapped potential to give more and to lead in the philanthropic space in order to help manage relations with the United States while also garnering greater global support and further economic opportunity.

June 2025

https://www.mk.co.kr/en/economy/11340043

사진 확대

President Lee Jae-myung has been inaugurated as the 21st president of the Republic of Korea. The direction of bilateral relations now depends on whether President Lee will be able to overcome a number of major challenges at home and abroad in the short term, and develop a comprehensive strategy for Korea to build and develop a successful relationship with the United States. President Lee should adopt a multi-faceted and active strategy for successful Korea-U.S. relations. It is necessary to prioritize personal diplomacy to strengthen ties with U.S. President Donald Trump. It should also change President Trump's perception of South Korea through his intended message.

In particular, Korea's contribution to large-scale investment and job creation in the United States should be highlighted, and bilateral cooperation in key industries such as shipbuilding and nuclear power plants should be actively promoted. Such a comprehensive approach will help ensure Korea's national interest by defining the Korea-U.S. alliance as a source of Korea's national power and global influence and enhance Korea's national wealth and international status on international stages such as the G7 summit.

President Lee faces two major challenges. First, the deadline for trade negotiations is approaching. If Seoul and Washington fail to reach an agreement, the destructive tariffs will be reimposed from July 8. Second, the Trump administration will try to renegotiate the South Korea-U.S. defense cost sharing. The two issues are actually much more burdensome because Seoul's foreign officials have fewer people to communicate with in Washington since the U.S. government reshuffle, and Lee's work to form a new government will take several more weeks. For example, direct dialogue and coordination between the White House and the presidential office may be difficult because the director-general for South Korea is currently vacant at the U.S. National Security Council. In addition, South Korea is one of the major importers of U.S.-made liquefied natural gas (LNG), and although energy cooperation plays a key role in bilateral relations, the U.S. team, which was in charge of energy diplomacy and policy, has been disbanded.

President Lee should come up with an approach to maintain Seoul-Washington relations under such unfavorable conditions. The United States is South Korea's most important ally, friend, economic partner, and also a major exporter of K content, culture, and tourism. For a successful strategy, Lee needs to focus on two different approaches.

First of all, it's on a personal level. This president should be able to build a personal bond with President Trump. For example, they share their experiences of "legal persecution" that they both experienced. In fact, President Lee got off to a good start by sharing his opinions on the political difficulties they each experienced in their first phone call with President Trump and proposing a golf round. If the two leaders form a personal link, President Lee will help change President Trump's perception of South Korea and himself to a "precious partner who makes a key contribution to the U.S. reshoring and friend-shoring in global competition with China," rather than a "country that does not properly pay for defense costs."

In addition to President Lee's personal diplomacy, CEOs of major Korean conglomerates, including Samsung, SK, Hyundai and Hanwha, will also help strengthen ties between Seoul and Washington. They already have direct contacts with the Trump family in Washington and Mar-a-Lago. This is helping President Trump and his staff to understand how much Korean companies are contributing to the U.S. economy.

Such an approach certainly helps to develop the bond between South Korea and the U.S. There is also an aspect that pay-to-play diplomacy seems to have become more important in forming relations with President Trump. If so, Korean conglomerates may play a key role by investing or cooperating in virtual currency and other businesses involving the Trump family.

Lee should direct a comprehensive and consistent strategy for strategic messaging and a shift in U.S. perception. Whenever there is any mention of trade or trade deficit with Korea in terms of messages, Lee and Seoul should highlight the case of Seoul's investment in the United States, either publicly or privately. This should shift the existing perception that makes Korea appear to be at the top of the list of countries that "use" the U.S. to a story that focuses on creating jobs in the U.S. through Korean investment.

Rather than highlighting only Korea's requirements in the negotiations or responding defensively to criticism of Korea's economic practices, it should also highlight what key role Korea plays in its competition with China. It should be explained in the framework that all investments made by Korea in the United States play a role in preventing Chinese companies from taking control of key industries. It is also worth highlighting that many Korean investments are with U.S. partners, whether investors or joint ventures. Emphasizing such a bilateral approach to joint ventures and partnerships should be at the heart of President Lee's message.

Lee and his aides should give Trump the recognition that South Korea is a key U.S. partner and the most important partner in the competition with China. President Trump now sees South Korea as a country trying to strike a "balance" between the U.S. and China. Some in South Korea are concerned that such an approach could lead to a backlash from China, but it is impossible to fully satisfy China as long as South Korea is an ally of the United States.

Balancing the U.S.-China balance is different from pursuing a less confrontational bilateral relationship with China. I don't think China will recognize South Korea as a true partner. It is also near impossible for any South Korean government to find a balance between Washington and Beijing as long as they have a firm alliance with the United States. Building a less confrontational relationship with China may also seem impossible, but it is not without possibility if it can improve awareness of Korea's approach to China from a U.S. perspective.

There are many things Lee can do without direct clashes with China. Development of the Pacific Islands, increased support for global infrastructure projects, and cooperation with U.S.-led organizations such as the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and the Blue Dot Network will enable Korea to join the U.S. global strategy without provoking China.

The Alaska LNG pipeline project is a good opportunity for South Korea to "all-in" on the Trump administration's core business and promise to take a leading role from the research and exploration stage. This can give Washington's key policymakers the impression that South Korea is actively participating in the U.S. policy to strengthen its energy advantage.

Whether this project actually materializes is a secondary issue. Most importantly, Korea can change its position in the United States by investing tens of millions of dollars to support the project and actively supporting it ahead of other countries such as Japan. Korean conglomerates can also sign long-term purchase contracts when the pipeline is operational. In the end, if the project becomes a reality, Korea will benefit from it. Whether this plan is economical will be assessed for years.

South Korea has invested tens of billions of dollars annually in the United States over the past few years. Repeating this in the future seems difficult both in terms of finance and in terms of investment demand in Korea required for infrastructure and R&D. In order for Korea to maintain a leading position in key industries such as steel, shipbuilding, and semiconductors, it is inevitable to expand investment in the country.

Lee promised to focus on promoting the dynamism and growth of the Korean economy. For this reason, even if companies continue to consider overseas investment, it will be politically burdensome for them to announce expensive overseas investment plans in the early days of the new government.

However, Korean companies are already actually creating a lot of jobs in the U.S. In particular, not only large companies but also medium-sized and small- and medium-sized companies are actively investing in the United States. SPC, for example, plans to open hundreds of Paris Baguette stores in the U.S. and set up factories in Texas to produce products to supply stores. Solum, which was spun off from Samsung Electro-Mechanics, has acquired stakes in U.S. tech companies and is expanding its electronic price tag (ESL) business.

President Lee and the Korean government should be able to work with Korean businessmen to explain how much Korean companies invest in the U.S. every year and how their influence goes beyond simple investments. This may differ from the usual cross-border dialogue on trade, but it will serve as a strong narrative that will not only fully appeal South Korea's contribution to President Trump and his staff, but also justify South Korea's political and economic participation in the United States.

There are areas where President Lee can promote bilateral cooperation so that South Korea and the United States can build global leadership together. Typical examples are shipbuilding and nuclear power generation. South Korea is the world's leading shipbuilding, maintenance, and maintenance (MRO) powerhouse and an ally of the United States, and can contribute to strengthening U.S. merchant ships and U.S. military fleets. The aging U.S. warship MRO market is the most obvious opportunity, and Korean companies have already begun to enter the field.

Although direct shipbuilding in Korea is blocked by the Jones Act, there is also a possibility that the two countries will pursue an "Ikea-style" partnership. This means that Korean companies make "ship kits" and send them to the United States, and assemble them in the United States. Such cooperation goes beyond simple investments, and even provides an opportunity for President Trump to claim that he has worked with allies to revive key U.S. industries and enhance U.S. military power.

In the case of nuclear power plants, Korea is the only country except Russia and China that has the capacity to build nuclear power plants on a large scale in line with the budget and schedule. This is a great opportunity for Korean companies that can power and profit from the U.S.

In particular, the small module nuclear power plant (SMR) market is an area that can generate billions of dollars in profits through bilateral cooperation. Currently, TerraPower and NewScale Power, SMR leaders, are both U.S. companies, but cooperation with Korea is actively underway.

All of these cases are things that President Lee can highlight when he meets with President Trump. Capital and technology will come from the United States and significant profits will go back to the United States, but Korea's manufacturing capabilities have tremendous potential for both countries in that they can play a key role in making the U.S. SMR industry an expandable and exportable industry.

June 2025

https://csds.vub.be/publication/president-lee-jae-myung-the-united-states-perspective/

The most important result of the 3 June 2025 election from the United States’ (US) perspective is that South Korea can now fully engage with Washington on the full range of national security and economic issues. After six months of an acting president after Yoon Suk-yeol’s failed 3 December 2024 declaration of martial law and subsequent impeachment, South Korea-US relations can get back on track. Additionally, democratic rule is assured in a key ally and President Lee Jae-myung has established as one of his top priorities to limit the ability of the president to declare martial law. With authoritarianism making advances, this election will strengthen South Korea’s democratic path and could banish both the nostalgia for military rule and the ability of a president to backslide to authoritarianism. A more stable, solidly democratic South Korea is in the United States’ national interest.

What are the views of the US regarding Lee Jae-myung?

With the election of Lee Jae-myung, South Korea has chosen a president who has pledged, as a top priority, to continue to strengthen the relationship with the United States and focus his security and diplomatic policy on an “ironclad” relationship with the US. This focus, along with his pledge to continue to emphasise trilateral cooperation with the US and Japan, should help to build up a positive view in the US of the new president.

Lee has visited the US two times, very briefly, and remains relatively unknown to most policymakers in the United States. In past interviews, Lee has suggested that South Korea should “balance” its relationship with the US and its relationship with China and this, along with his limited international experience or exposure to foreign leaders, leaves some in Washington unconvinced Lee will partner well with the US. Lee has emphasised that while he will follow his predecessor Yoon Suk-yeol’s blueprint to foster good relations with the US and Japan, he will also seek better relations with China and attempt to engage with North Korea. It is unlikely his policy regarding China or North Korea will diverge significantly from past Korean presidents, but some in Washington believe Lee is willing to attempt to improve relations with China because Lee touts himself as willing to chart new policy directions if in the interest of South Korea.  North-South engagement seems unlikely in the aftermath of the 2024 signing of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between North Korea and Russia. The fact that Lee has named Ambassador Wi Sung-lac as his National Security Advisor will almost certainly improve the views of Lee in Washington. Wi is well known in Washington as a very strategic, reasonable policymaker. Wi is respected by many based on close cooperation over the years with many US diplomats and officials based on his time at the Korean Embassy in Washington, and as Assistant Secretary in charge of US policy at the Foreign Ministry, in addition to his time as North Korea negotiator.

Given few formal connections between Lee and his close aides in the Democratic Party and policymakers in Washington, there will be great attention paid to Lee’s first moves, starting with his personnel choices, his first call with President Trump, his initial speeches and his first entree on to the international stage, likely at the NATO Summit in late June. Beyond his introductory moves, visits to the UN General Assembly in September 2025 and hosting the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in October 2025 in Korea, along with an eventual invite to Washington, could serve as opportunities for US counterparts to develop a more nuanced understanding of Lee while also offering Lee chances to articulate his approach to key foreign, security and trade policies.

What are the key short-term priorities for the South Korea-US relationship?

The month of June would challenge any Korean president – with possible G7 and NATO summit attendances, along with trade and burdensharing negotiations with the United States, the weeks ahead are fraught. They are even more consequential and formidable because Lee takes over the presidency with no transition period, and an extremely short campaign period; therefore, less policy preparation and coordination among his team and fewer personnel decisions are in place. To top it off, there will be National Assembly hearings for his cabinet. While the hearings will be relatively straightforward with a strong majority supporting Lee, the domestic calendar will take significant time and attention in his first weeks.

Therefore, the key priority for the Lee government will be to avoid missteps on the international stage, to establish a good working relationship with President Trump and the US administration and manage relations with South Korea’s sole Ally, while also getting his domestic team up and running. The priority for the relationship is to establish enough trust in the early days such that the Trump administration allows Lee time to get his officials in place who can serve as counterparts for the Trump team and negotiate effectively. Beyond the priority to build governmental ties and trust in order to manage the ongoing negotiations between the two allies, developing a personal connection with Trump could help Lee, South Korea and the relationship.  There is potential for a strong personal tie developing based perhaps on the fact that the two leaders have both faced numerous legal challenges and criminal trials they perceive as politically motivated.

The biggest policy challenge for Lee will be to convince Trump and his administration that South Korea is not seeking to find any “balance” between the US and China but that South Korea remains fully committed to the primacy of the relationship with the United States. He could do this by highlighting areas of alignment and opportunities for shared leadership in sectors such as nuclear power and shipbuilding.

May 2025

https://www.hani.co.kr/arti/PRINT/1198274.html

Past and Present

South Korea occupies a singular position in the history of international development, as the only nation to successfully transition from a major aid recipient to a significant donor nation. Reflecting this evolving responsibility, Seoul's official development assistance reached a record ₩6.3 trillion in 2024, equivalent to 0.21 per cent of Gross National Income (GNI), the highest share since Korea joined the OECD Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2010.

Successive administrations have demonstrated a growing commitment to this cause. Building on gains under the Moon Jae-in government (2017-22), President Yoon Suk-yeol's administration (2022-24) set out its intention to see ODA reach 0.30 per cent of GNI by 2030. While still below the DAC member average, this goal better reflects Korea's economic stature as the fourth-largest economy in Asia and the twelfth-largest globally. Significant strides have been made, but the coming year is critical. With a new president taking office on June 4 and the government set to fix its five-year aid budget  (2026-30) this autumn, 2025 will be a litmus test for Korea’s global vision.

The Capacity Gap

Korea’s laudable expansion of  ODA has come with growing pains. The Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA) has faced challenges managing its expanding portfolio, underscoring the need for broader,  stronger delivery channels to ensure each taxpayer won achieves maximum impact.

Leveraging the expertise and evidence-based approach of established international organisations is an important first step in narrowing this gap. Partnerships with the top research-driven institutions - such as the Gates Foundation and Open Philanthropy, which rigorously identify the most cost-effective interventions - can supply invaluable evidence and methods. By collaborating with such partners, Korea can ensure its contributions are optimised for lives saved per won spent, thereby setting a powerful example for other donor nations.

Maximising Impact

To deliver on this impact-focussed approach, Korea should in turn prioritise support to the most impactful organisations. Countless studies demonstrate that a won spent in support of the best multilateral global-health initiatives is far more impactful than the same won spent bilaterally. COVAX - to which Korea provided generous support - is a clear recent example of the power of multilateralism. 

Indeed, the global-health mechanisms consistently rated the most effective are Gavi and the Global Fund.  Their  transparency, accountability and rigorous monitoring and evaluation, coupled with a focus on support to the world’s most vulnerable communities, means they offer world-beating value in delivering impact: saving lives and strengthening health systems.Gavi is responsible for vaccinating half of the world’s children. Its  role expanding routine immunisation in the world’s poorest settings is transformative in improving  child survival and global health security. The Global Fund plays a critical role in fighting HIV, tuberculosis and malaria, each a scourge on human progress that disproportionately affects the world’s most vulnerable citizens. 

Gavi and the Global Fund are both seeking fresh international funding this year, in a very difficult climate for global health work. Substantial Korean contributions to each would demonstrate Seoul’s leadership and compassion, and place it at the centre of a historic effort to end preventable disease.  Fundamentally, such backing is among the most cost effective and transparent way to  control epidemics, save millions of lives, and reinforce health systems worldwide.

Leadership Opportunities

Beyond lifting ODA volumes, Korea can showcase distinctive leadership by harnessing its scientific and technological edge to apply data-driven approaches to its aid allocation. While in part that should involve channelling resources to high-impact multilateral organisations like Gavi and the Global Fund, there are also opportunities that Korea is uniquely well placed to lead.  .

Today’s geopolitical fault-lines have left critical gaps in development finance. Korea’s expanded ODA can help stabilise fragile regions, shore up democratic partners and rebalance influence across Asia and beyond.

Korea’s COVID-era digital-health platforms -now globally admired for remote diagnostics and contact tracing - could be piloted across ASEAN to revolutionise disease surveillance and telemedicine.

Perhaps most promisingly, Korea can also champion solutions to health challenges that remain badly underfunded. Lead poisoning - often described as a silent pandemic - kills an estimated one million people each year and blunts the potential of some 800 million children. Yet proven, affordable remedies exist. By directing a slice of its expanded ODA to initiatives like the Lead Exposure Action Fund (LEAF) and Pure Earth, Korea could become a pivotal national actor in addressing this neglected crisis, drawing on lessons from its own path from heavy industry to clean technology. The gains - in human health and Korean prestige -would be immense.

Benefits and Prospects

A well-designed, scaled-up ODA programme can bring Korea tangible economic and political dividends. Supporting global procurers such as Gavi and the Global Fund would stimulate demand for Korea’s fast-growing pharmaceutical and biotech industries, opening new markets and fuelling innovation. This synergy of development aid and industrial competitiveness is economic diplomacy at its smartest.

Crucially, a substantial and effective ODA contribution is a hallmark of advanced global powers and a key criterion for deeper engagement in forums like the G7. By showing it can meet global challenges with impactful aid, Korea would burnish its credentials as a responsible stakeholder and strengthen its claim to a seat among the world’s leading democracies. The direction of Korean ODA over the next few years will reveal how fully Seoul intends to translate economic success into commensurate global influence.

Conclusion

I hope both ruling and opposition parties in the National Assembly will unite behind a vision for Korean global ODA leadership, making Korea’s leading role and contribution an area of bipartisan unity and national pride. 

The Republic of Korea stands at a pivotal juncture. With the economic strength and moral authority born of its own development miracle, Seoul can claim greater global leadership through an enhanced, sharply focused ODA programme. By prioritising effectiveness, funnelling resources through proven multilateral partners and championing neglected high-impact areas, Korea will save lives, spur sustainable development and strengthen its own economy - all while cementing its place among the world’s foremost nations. This commitment would crown Korea’s journey from aid recipient to benefactor, a transformation the world has witnessed with deep respect.

April 2025

https://keia.org/the-peninsula/how-the-u-s-and-south-korea-can-power-the-globe-with-nuclear-energy/

On January 9, 2025, the United States and South Korea signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on principles of nuclear export and cooperation that could unlock new dimensions of the partnership and tens of billions of dollars in profit for construction and nuclear industries in both countries. In addition to its clear economic implications, the deal allows for a credible path toward delivering an alternative to Chinese and Russian nuclear offerings and, therefore, has significant geopolitical implications. The deal sets a precedent for an expanded bilateral partnership based on common understandings about nonproliferation, emerging technology, export controls, and the increased demand for nuclear power generation due to the burgeoning AI ecosystem.

In the next decade, nuclear power will play a significant role in satisfying the growing demand for electricity, which will continue to increase well beyond the capacity that fossil fuels can provide. Even if the peak demand for oil does not occur in 2030, and even if the move to decarbonize the global economy does not hit the climate targets outlined in the Paris Agreement, electricity production from nuclear energy will likely increase given the growing demand and the amount of ongoing investment and research. Electricity consumption is expected to rise 4 percent annually from energy-intensive sectors, including transportation and AI data centers. That translates to a doubling in demand over the next twenty years. As a “plug and play” technology, nuclear power from small modular or traditionally large nuclear plants can connect seamlessly to existing electrical grids. Some experts suggest that companies could install small modular reactors (SMRs) on the sites of coal plants and connect them immediately to the existing coal-generation grid. Utilizing molten salt reactors could ease retrofits of coal plants to nuclear plants and provide more stability than light-water reactors.

Conservative estimates suggest that the amount of energy produced from nuclear plants could double in the next twenty-five years, and the high-case scenario from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) suggests a 250 percent increase in nuclear power by 2050 from 416 GWe to over 1000 GWe and provide 25 percent of global electricity production from its current 9 percent. The conservative market value for nuclear power contracts over the next twenty-five years is valued at USD 500–740 billion, representing a substantial economic opportunity for countries such as South Korea with advanced nuclear technology and strong production, research, and construction capacity. Not only does South Korea have capable government-backed research, construction, and operation organizations in Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) and Korea Electric Power Corporation (KEPCO), but it also has companies like Hyundai and Samsung that are capable of building and operating plants domestically and overseas.

South Korea is dependent on imported coal (33 percent of its energy mix in 2023) and LNG (26.8 percent of its energy mix in 2023) to fuel the manufacturing production of semiconductors, batteries, chips, and electric vehicles (EVs). While fossil fuels will continue to power much of South Korea in the near term, sustainable and alternative energy sources are needed to meet the country’s carbon neutrality commitments by 2050. During his presidency, Yoon Suk Yeol renewed South Korea’s commitment to nuclear power as a domestic energy source and outlined plans to build three new nuclear reactors, increasing nuclear-generated power to 35 percent of the country’s energy supply by 2038. Lee Jae-myung, the leading presidential candidate for the Democratic Party ahead of the presidential election in June, has stated his support for nuclear power domestically and as an export. Meanwhile, any potential conservative candidate would likely continue Yoon’s policy approach.

South Korea has invested heavily in developing advanced reactors, and its standardized designs reduce construction time by minimizing changes and ensuring smooth project execution. On average, South Korea is able to construct nuclear power plants in fifty-six months, more than three times faster than the global average. In addition to developing traditional and next-generation reactors, including SMRs and high-temperature gas-cooled reactors (HTGRs), South Korean companies are investing in U.S. companies like NuScale Power and TerraPower and will likely provide engineering know-how to U.S. SMR companies. The recent settlement agreement between Westinghouse, KEPCO, and KHNP positions South Korea to more effectively operate in the global market and fulfill contractual obligations for building plants in the Czech Republic and the United Arab Emirates and compete for contracts in Egypt, Finland, Ghana, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey. In the best-case scenario, the United States would support South Korea’s bids and even engage in commercial advocacy to boost its bid over China or Russia. This could look similar to U.S. efforts to support Nokia and other non-U.S. telecommunication organizations globally to counter China’s Huawei due to the lack of a practical U.S. alternative. While this could sound counterintuitive in the current Donald Trump administration, the preferred path for the United States—due to the lack of competitive U.S. alternatives and the economic benefits that would accrue from South Korea-led projects to Westinghouse and other U.S. companies—would be to support South Korea’s bids on traditional reactor projects and invest heavily in SMR technology.

The United States is the world’s largest producer of nuclear power, accounting for about 30 percent of global nuclear electricity generation. Nuclear power has contributed almost 20 percent of electrical generation in the United States and remains the single-largest contributor to non-greenhouse-gas-emitting electric power in the United States. Despite past success building in the United States and abroad, the export of nuclear reactors has declined in recent years, and U.S. companies now fail in speed and expense to match state-owned enterprises, especially those from China and Russia. Reports indicate that of the ninety reactors expected to be completed worldwide by 2030, only three will be supplied by U.S. companies and ten from South Korea—compared to forty-three from China and twenty-nine from Russia. China and Russia prioritize rapid deployment and cost-effectiveness over stringent safety and security measures. This contrasts with the United States’ projects, which emphasize robust nuclear security protocols but also come with cost overruns and delays. Emerging markets that choose Chinese or Russian reactors due to the lack of alternative options may face a heightened risk of accidents or security breaches and, with the forty- to fifty-year production life of a typical reactor, become locked in a decades-long relationship of economic dependency on China and Russia.

South Korea’s capabilities, coupled with U.S. research and capital, could answer many of the world’s energy demand questions now that the path forward is clear for close cooperation and collaboration. In addition to offering clean energy and energy access to the billions who currently lack such resources, the United States and South Korea could do so while also providing a safer and more geopolitically aligned alternative to China and Russia’s offerings.

March 2025

https://podcasts.apple.com/be/podcast/energy-security-is-national-security-the-case-of/id1752856119?i=1000697371009

February 2025

https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/profit-and-power-opportunities-us-south-korea-energy-sector

Expanding US-South Korea Energy Collaboration

South Korea is one of the United States’ most industrially-capable international partners, but due to its lack of energy resources, it relies on U.S. liquefied natural gas (LNG), among other sources, to fuel its industrial output. Increased U.S.-South Korea energy cooperation would strengthen an already robust treaty alliance and economic partnership. Over the last five years, South Korea has expanded its trade and investment relationship with the U.S., becoming its largest foreign investor, while the U.S. has overtaken China as South Korea’s top export market. In 2024, South Korea was the largest importer of U.S. LNG, receiving 5.7 million metric tons.

South Korea’s already strong participation in the U.S. energy sector was supercharged by the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (IRA). Its incentives significantly boosted South Korea’s investment and engagement in the green economy, accelerating growth in electric vehicles (EVs), charging stations, small modular reactors (SMRs), wind turbines, solar panels, and more. In the coming years, given the potential for profit, energy sector cooperation is likely to continue to increase.

Fueling the Energy Transition

The IRA and CHIPs and Science acts have attracted billions of South Korean energy-related investment, funding projects and plants in Texas, Georgia, Alabama, Ohio, Indiana, Tennessee and Michigan to produce EV batteries, solar panels, wind turbines and related supply chain components that support the U.S. and global effort to catalyze the energy transition. South Korean investment has added manufacturing capacity throughout the supply chain for EVs and EV batteries and supported expansion of related infrastructure.

In addition to this existing cooperation in the EV space, South Korea and the U.S. are starting to expand their cooperation in clean hydrogen and ammonia. For example, U.S. company AirProducts invested $500 million to establish a clean hydrogen production facility in Gyeonggi Province that could be used to import U.S. production as well as the associated “crackers” that are used to break down heavier fuels. Cracking is an energy intensive process and development of an efficient and affordable hydrogen-driven cracking process would result in a significant reduction of greenhouse gases. Syzygy Plasmonics, a startup based on Rice University-developed technology, set up a test ammonia cracker in Ulsan, South Korea in November 2024 and is working with South Korean companies to expand cooperation in the hydrogen sector.

Key to US-South Korea Energy Ties

The most significant U.S.-South Korea energy partnership remains in LNG, with the U.S. as South Korea’s top supplier. LNG makes up 26.8% of South Korea’s energy mix and Korea is the third largest LNG importer globally after China and Japan. Less well known is Chevron’s decades-old joint venture with South Korean conglomerate GS (known as GS Caltex) that operates the fourth largest refinery in the world in Yeosu, South Korea.

As South Korea works to hit its net zero commitments and transition away from coal, U.S.-South Korea LNG trade should continue to increase. With the second Trump administration’s expected focus on reducing the trade deficit (over $50 billion in 2024), the pressure to further increase LNG, and perhaps crude oil, imports from the U.S. is likely to rise.

Renewed Focus on Nuclear Power and Exports

While fossil fuels will continue to power much of South Korea in the near term, the future is bright for nuclear power, both domestically and as a source for overseas manufacturing and operating. After former President Moon Jae-in (2017–22) pledged to abandon nuclear power for environmental reasons in the wake of the 2011 Fukushima disaster, President Yoon Seok-yeol (2022–TBD) renewed South Korea’s commitment to nuclear power as a domestic energy source and a source for jobs and overseas sales.

Ahead of likely spring presidential elections in South Korea, all major candidates support increased focus on nuclear power, both domestically and as an export opportunity. Following the signing of a civil nuclear memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the U.S. and South Korea on Jan. 9, 2025, civil nuclear cooperation is expected to accelerate, with the U.S. likely supporting the previously-disputed deal for Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power (KHNP) to build nuclear reactors in Czechia.

South Korean companies are investing in U.S. companies like NuScale and TerraPower, while also developing their own reactor models and continuing to export traditional South Korean reactors. The new MOU unlocks great potential for U.S.-South Korea civil nuclear cooperation. Leveraging U.S. research expertise alongside South Korea’s construction capacity and experience, the coming decades could position this sector at the core of a shared energy future and broader economic cooperation.

Energy Cooperation Spans Conglomerates, Tech, and Startups

South Korea is at the cutting edge of technological development in the energy sector. The following examples highlight this progress:

• Korea Zinc, a 50-year old leader in recycling and smelting, operates extensively in the U.S., Australia, and elsewhere.

• MajorSouth Korean conglomerates like Samsung, SK, Lotte, LG, and Hanwha are investing heavily in U.S. companies across the supply chain. South Korea’s second-largest conglomerate, SK, plans to invest over $50 billion in batteries, chips, and energy-related factories over the next 10 years.

• South Korean startups like Gaoncell are forging partnerships in the U.S., Poland, and Saudi Arabia to expand energy cooperation. Gaoncell is developing cutting-edge hydrogen fuel cell technology to create portable energy solutions for a variety of uses ranging from defense to data centers and drones.

• South Korean company CS Wind owns and operates the largest wind turbine manufacturing facility in the world in Pueblo, Colorado.

Fueling US Energy Innovation

Gaoncell exemplifies the type of cooperation expected going forward — research and production capabilities developed in South Korea, combined with global capital, sales and production. Similarly, the CS Wind investment and partnership illustrates how South Korean companies bring three key benefits to the U.S.:

1. Investing in the U.S. and creating jobs.

2. Leading research and development to create advanced technologies for the energy sector.

3. Providing manufacturing capacity and ability to meet deadlines and cost targets.

Although political challenges remain in aligning the bilateral relationship — and with Japan in trilateral arrangements — energy sector partnerships are expected to grow. Looking forward, established South Korean companies and conglomerates will likely continue to find investment and cooperation opportunities in the U.S. To strengthen this cooperation, research institutions and governments should expedite existing initiatives that support smaller companies and startups, driving further profitability in the U.S.-South Korea energy partnership.

South Korea’s Role in Shaping the Future of Minerals

South Korea also plays a leading role in the mineral sector, which is expected to grow in importance as the global energy economy shifts away from fossil fuels. As the current chair of the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP), a U.S.-led collaboration of 14 countries and the EU, South Korea is spearheading efforts to secure a steady supply of critical minerals. With major conglomerates like POSCO at the forefront, South Korea is a key player in the global effort to diversify mineral sources, even as China maintains a dominant position in mineral production and processing. While a true mineral decoupling from China is unlikely to occur in the next decade, South Korean investments are contributing to a more balanced and resilient global supply chain.

Key Dialogues and Future Opportunities

When representatives of the U.S. and South Korea met at Rice University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy in Houston on April 29–30, 2024, for their tenth annual energy security dialogue, it marked a significant shift. For the first time, business and academic experts joined what had previously been a government-to-government policy dialogue. Building on the success of that event, the Baker Institute sponsored a follow-up U.S.-Korea Business Energy Dialogue on Nov. 21, 2024, which served as a half year check-in on this critical bilateral energy relationship.

Guided by a government-drafted agenda and led by energy experts from academia and business, participants discussed not only continued cooperation in traditional sectors like LNG, but also ways to accelerate industrial collaboration in support of the energy transition. In both dialogues, experts and officials discussed coordinating policies to enhance collaboration and identified areas for growth, shared research, and cross-investment in sectors such as carbon capture, wind and solar power, geothermal, and hydrogen. During the November session, participants agreed that, as the second Trump administration begins, all should seek to frame cooperation as an opportunity to support U.S. efforts to compete with and counter China.

South Korea and the U.S. already cooperate extensively across government and private sectors, and this collaboration is expected to intensify as both nations seek to compete with and offer an alternative to China’s influence. The 2024 discussions at the Baker Institute underscored that the most promising areas for U.S.-South Korea cooperation lie in carbon capture, utilization and storage, nuclear energy, minerals supply chain coordination, and LNG exports — sectors that hold the potential to shape a more secure and sustainable global energy future.

January 2025

https://csds.vub.be/publication/south-korea-impeachments-and-next-steps/

President Yoon impeached

Since President Yoon Suk-Yeol’s hours-long declaration of martial law 3 December 2024, the opposition Democratic Party of Korea (DPK) brought two impeachment motions against Yoon, with the second one successful on 14 December securing twelve votes (204 total) from the ruling Peoples Power Party (PPP), enough to secure the necessary two thirds of votes. All 192 of the DPK legislators voted to impeach Yoon. Following the vote, Yoon was relieved of his duties and then-Prime Minister Han Duk-soo took over as acting president.

Acting President Han impeached

The Constitutional Court is charged with certifying (or not) the National Assembly’s impeachment vote. The opposition believed that only a full court of nine judges could produce a fair outcome. Six Constitutional Court judges must certify a presidential impeachment to validate the ruling and there were just six judges on the Court on 14 December when the National Assembly voted to impeach Yoon. Since then-acting President Han refused to appoint judges to fill the three empty seats on the Constitutional Court – Han said he would only appoint consensus candidates, impossible given the political cleavage –, the opposition DPK party brought forth and approved an impeachment motion against Han by a majority vote on 27 December 2024. A two thirds majority (200 votes) in the National Assembly is necessary to impeach a President in South Korea, but the Assembly can impeach any other official with a simple majority (151 votes). Therefore, the opposition DPK and its coalition partners, with 192 of 300 seats, could impeach Han despite the absence of the 108 ruling party lawmakers at the vote.

Acting President Choi takes over

After Han’s impeachment, then-Finance Minister Choi Sang-mok became acting President and on 31 December appointed two judges to the Constitutional Court. On 3 January 2025, investigators from the Corruption Investigation Office (COI) attempted to execute a warrant for Yoon’s arrest and interrogation related to the various charges levied against him, including a charge for insurrection as a result of his failed self-coup. The Presidential Security Service (PSS) formed a human wall, blocking police and investigators to prevent Yoon’s arrest as Yoon remains holed up in his hilltop villa in central Seoul. After the warrant expired, government authorities extended the warrant on 7 January.

Yoon arrested

On 15 January 2025, the CIO investigators executed the warrant and brought Yoon in for questioning. Before he left his residence, Yoon issued a video stating that the arrest was illegal. He will be questioned by the CIO, the police and then the prosecutors and held at the Seoul Detention Center until the trial at the Constitutional Court concludes.

Constitutional Court hearings begin

Hearings in the Constitutional Court began 14 January and five sessions are scheduled between 14 January and 4 February 2025. The 14 January session lasted just minutes as Yoon did not appear. Yoon’s lawyers attempted unsuccessfully to exclude one of the justices and requested that former Prime Minister Han’s impeachment hearings proceed before the Constitutional Court considers Yoon’s case. Regarding the two previous impeachments, then-President Roh Moo-hyun regained office in March 2004, two months after his impeachment when the Court dismissed the motion. And in March 2017, the Constitutional Court upheld then-President Park Geun-hye’s impeachment and presidential elections were held in May 2017, six months after the 9 December 2016 impeachment vote related to charges that Park abused her power.

Next steps

If the Constitutional Court does not certify Yoon’s impeachment, Yoon would resume office as President of South Korea. Since then-President Yoon publicly declared martial law, most experts presume that the Constitutional Court will uphold the impeachment motion and South Korea will hold presidential elections in the April-June timeframe depending on how the court case proceeds. The Constitutional Court must rule within 180 days of the impeachment vote, and, once the Court rules, an election must take place within 60 days of the ruling.

Consequences

Many Koreans have expressed concern that the domestic political turmoil that is ongoing in the wake of the impeachments and now arrest and detention of deposed President Yoon will damage South Korea’s ability to work effectively with the United States and the incoming Trump administration, and affect Korea’s reputation as a leading democracy. With Trump’s inauguration on 20 January 2025, there is concern that an acting President in South Korea is not well positioned for a strong start with Trump and his team. Some foreign observers have concerns that instability in South Korea could lead to a loss in momentum on several key issues such as trilateral relations with Japan and the US, coordination on supply chain and economic security, and overall coordination vis-a-vis China. The US Secretary of State and the Japanese Foreign Minister visited Seoul in January, seeking to ensure coordination, especially regarding North Korea, remains solid. Most anticipate that Trump and his team will look to South Korea to take a strong position with the US to counter China and an acting President in Korea could face considerable domestic opposition to new initiatives if they could cause increased friction with China.

Conclusion

The end of the stand-off between Yoon and the CIO led to a boost in Korean markets as some semblance of political “normalcy” has returned, the Constitutional Court hearings can proceed, and expectations are that the process will now lead to a presidential election in the Spring. Polling suggests that DPK party leader Lee Jae Myung is the odds-on favourite to win the presidency while a number of conservative candidates are now seeking to unite the anti-Lee, anti-impeachment sentiment and preparing to challenge Lee.

November 2024

https://csds.vub.be/publication/south-korea-impeachments-and-next-steps/

Korean companies have invested 114 billion dollars in the United States in the last three years, creating tens of thousands of American jobs and helping to rebuild our manufacturing base in the United States. Korea, Korean companies, and the Korean people have put “all their chips” on the United States and the benefits for our country are many.  To encourage Korea to continue to place its bet on us and to chart its future with us, and not with Europe, Southeast Asia, or even China, in a way that is most beneficial to the American people, and the U.S. economy, the next U.S. president and Congress, could make long-discussed changes that would boost the relationship with Korea to new heights, make our country safer, the alliance more robust, and create more new jobs in the United States.

First, the United States could repeal its 232 steel tariffs and quota on South Korea. The Peterson Institute for International Economics estimated that each job saved in the steel industry due to the tariffs came at a cost of nearly $650,000 to consumers. Repealing the tariffs would likely reverse many of these economic distortions and lead to overall economic gains for the United States. Partnerships, not tariffs, offer a way to revitalize our steel industry. The stalled Nippon Steel acquisition of U.S. Steel means that not only are U.S. customers paying more for steel, if something is not done to facilitate this type of partnership, it seems likely that the U.S. steel industry will not survive Chinese competition.  If the Nippon-U.S. Steel acquisition remains politically impossible, or even if it succeeds, the U.S. steel industry could and should explore forming a joint venture with South Korean companies or re-imagine a partnership with Nippon Steel in order to preserve not only jobs but the industry. Such a partnership could serve both Korean and U.S. industry and reestablish a viable steel industry for the future, powered by partnerships and American jobs, in the United States.  

Second, another industry that a revitalized relationship with Korea could resuscitate is shipbuilding.  South Korean companies have dipped their toes into the U.S. market with the $100 million purchase of U.S. shipbuilder Philly Shipyard. However, in order to save the shipbuilding industry and preserve U.S. capability to supply ships for the future—to our military as well as for cargo—we should take a far more sweeping approach and modify the Jones Act to allow production of needed vessels outside the United States such as LNG vessels that have not been built here since the 1970s. To encourage more shipbuilding in the United States, a joint ownership structure for a new, modern, and automated shipyard(s) in the United States could allow innovative South Korean companies to make significant investment in the United States that could not only preserve U.S. shipbuilding capacity and introduce thousands of new jobs into the United States, but could also help us retake a global leadership role in building the most advanced ships for our military and our industry.

Lastly, to facilitate even more Korean investment in batteries, semiconductors, and other industries of and for the future, and to ensure support for U.S. jobs and key industries as well as a viable future for industries like steel and shipbuilding, Congress should fast-track and promulgate the Partner with Korea Act introduced on October 8 to create a temporary, non-immigrant E-4 visa category for Koreans.  Previously, when the United States concluded a free trade agreement (FTA) with a country, the deal came with special visa categories to help facilitate the increase in trade and investment that logically accompanies an FTA.  Congress decided with the Korea-U.S. (KORUS) FTA in 2010 that such visa provisions did not belong in an FTA.  That does not change the fact that such visa provisions are helpful to the United States and support the increased FDI that comes with an FTA. Therefore, Congress could rectify this and add in the jobs provisions to allow Koreans to more easily manage their significant investments in our industrial base, to support efforts to invest even more, and to create even more jobs in the United States. The KORUS FTA is, outside of NAFTA/MSCA, the largest trade deal for the United States, and the lack of more specialized visas means there are billions of Korean investment that are taking longer to materialize or, worse for the American people, are being redirected to Southeast Asia or elsewhere.  If the E-4 visa bill goes through, it would catalyze even more Korean investment with more Korean companies launching new investments in the United States. Currently, the bulk of Korean investment comes from South Korean conglomerates (chaebols), but expanding the visa program could lead to smaller, new high-tech Korean companies to expand their investment approach in the United States.

The U.S.-Korea relationship is strong and built for the future, but a few political tweaks could launch the next decades of cooperation and investment, boosting prosperity in both countries.

October 2024

https://www.csis.org/analysis/korean-support-kyiv-would-transform-ukraine-and-koreas-global-role

North Korea sends ammunition to Russia for use in Ukraine, Putin travels to Pyongyang and concludes a comprehensive strategic partnership, and North Korean special forces deploy to support Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine. Is there any doubt what Pyongyang and Moscow are up to? It is now abundantly clear that Russia has chosen its partner on the peninsula, and it is not South Korea. Now is the time for South Korea to acknowledge this fact and stand with the Ukrainian people, the United States, and Europe. If Seoul chooses to throw its full-throated support behind Ukraine, South Korean support could turn the tide on the entire conflict and even lead directly to a peace deal. While European and U.S. allies have limited capacity for armament production critically needed in a protracted ground battle such as in Ukraine, South Korea’s world-class companies have continued to develop, perfect, and produce exactly the weaponry needed in an ongoing industrial war. Now, South Korean companies are world leaders in producing military vehicles, ammunition, automated artillery, and other defense equipment that Ukraine desperately needs.

While this seems like a compelling argument for the South Korean government to step up and authorize Korean companies to engage directly with Kyiv, some balk, claiming donation or sales of lethal weapons could ratchet tension up with Pyongyang and Moscow. There is an equally strong case to make for supporting Ukraine that has nothing to do with responding to what North Korea has done or will do. Rather than calling out red lines (not something the United States would recommend as a diplomatic gambit—see Syria, 2013) and hinting that Korea may consider changing its policy and support Ukraine based on what North Korea and Russia do, Korea should make its case based on two other key factors: South Korea’s global role and responsibility, and the potential economic benefits to Korean companies and workers.

Korean politicians on both sides of the aisle, along with many pundits and scholars, have long advocated for and sought G7+ membership for South Korea. There is strong logic in favor of offering Korea a greater global role to correspond with its economic and military power and its global reach. The G7 weighs in regularly on the war in Ukraine and has sided clearly and repeatedly with Ukraine against Russia because Russia has chosen to wage a war of aggression, illegally redraw borders, and engage in genocide. Ukraine deserves more from Korean leaders than dithering about what actions might upset possible future trade with Russia or harm Moscow’s role in future peninsula talks. This is not a global approach. South Korea should take a position that is consistent with the universal values it supports and espouses. Global leadership entails making trade-offs and difficult decisions. And it does not seem that any Korean politician could say with a straight face that not supporting Ukraine is the right choice based on global values. The surest way for global powers to accept Korea in the G7+ is for Korea to make the right choice and go all-in and support Ukraine. 

Second, if Korea does make the choice to stand with the Ukrainian people, much as Colombia, Greece, Ethiopia, the United States, and others helped South Korea during the Korean War, there would be certain gain for Korea, directly and indirectly. Indirectly, if Korea marshaled its technical know-how and led efforts to shore up and protect Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and keep the Ukrainian people warm this winter, and if Korea sold its world-class weaponry to Ukraine permitting the Ukrainians to push back against Russian aggression and therefore trigger an end to the conflict, Korea’s global brand would skyrocket in value as leaders in Brussels and Washington, but also in Delhi and Bogota. Foreign leaders would acknowledge Korea’s geopolitical arrival and, if Korean support proves as decisive as I anticipate it could be, Korea would logically receive diplomatic accolades that would redound in other fora and result in a more effective voice for Korea to advance its interests across the globe. More directly, there is much at stake and much to gain. The European Union is poised to lead reconstruction efforts in Ukraine as soon as peace or an armistice is achieved. If Korea and Korean companies play a pivotal role in catalyzing such a peace, the future participation of Korean companies in the half-trillion-dollar task of rebuilding Ukraine would not only be assured, it could smooth the path for Korean companies to establish a significant presence in Ukraine, a country linked to the European Union, the largest market in the world. What could this mean? This wouldn’t just mean car, artillery, and battery factories in Ukraine, but Korean construction companies could find themselves at the top of the list to build airports, highways, and apartment buildings, and set to play a leading role in reconstructing Ukraine’s energy grid. 

Now is the time for Korea to help the Ukrainian people. If Seoul makes this difficult decision, it will benefit the Ukrainian and Korean people and could transform Korea’s global stature and global role.

October 2024

https://csds.vub.be/publication/linking-europe-and-asia-for-the-future-time-for-the-juke-grouping-of-japan-united-states-korea-and-the-eu/

Key issues

There is untapped potential to boost policy alignment and implement capital-intensive initiatives through a diplomatic grouping between Japan, the United States (US), the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the European Union (EU) (“JUKE”). The group will build on common elements from the trilateral Camp David statement, the US-EU China Dialogue and the JUKE commerce-led dialogue on supply chain security to coordinate policy.

Nuclear power and the energy transition require immense investment that JUKE economies would support to marshal the research and capital needed to power the energy transition and achieve NetZero goals.

Track 2 dialogue in a JUKE grouping could identify the areas with most potential, and should be followed by Track 1.5 and Track 1 meetings. A few areas for potential focus are Ukraine support and reconstruction and deterring and engaging the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Introduction

Globalisation has been achieved for all practical purposes – not only are executives in Papua New Guinea tracking the New York Stock exchange in real time and investors in Europe forecasting Indonesian nickel supplies and prices, but kids from Paris, France to Columbus, Ohio exchange Pokémon cards and anticipate BTS concert dates. Global citizens think about issues that impact the world such as climate change and the next pandemic. Countries are increasingly interconnected and interdependent, however, diplomatic groupings tend to be regionally focused based on decades-old relationships. While these groupings are well intended and effective, it is necessary to review the diplomatic approach to transnational issues and adjust to galvanise an effective response to crises. Regionalisation of diplomacy is particularly acute in Europe and Asia. For good reasons, these two large continents have focused on their own regions. To spur action in response to global issues, it is important to consider minilateral groupings between Europe and Asia that are both more extensive than ASEAN, NATO or the Quad, and more cohesive with significant areas of alignment to facilitate diplomatic initiatives. NATO has done extensive outreach to the Indo-Pacific Four (IP4) but remains limited given the sensitivities of focusing too much on hard security in such proximity to China. Beijing stalemates action in any grouping it holds membership and therefore it is impossible to achieve a useful consensus or meaningful outcome.

Minilateral and ad hoc diplomatic groupings are most focused and effective when they attempt to respond to current and future threats and challenges, especially those emanating from China. While Europe-Asia dialogues need not focus exclusively on China, the groups could indeed discuss ways to constrain China while also looking at ways to respond together to transnational threats and challenges such as climate change and the energy transition, cyber security, etc. And, ultimately, when countries can discuss “China without China” there is more room to manoeuvre. For example, discussions of mineral security or supply chain security can rightly focus on potential actions from allies and partners. However, such discussions would be discussions of “China without China” since allies and partners would seek to achieve a collective response to protect from China’s malign intentions and/or predatory practices.

The US since 2017 has attained clarity on its approach to China and secured not only executive branch continuity between the Trump and Biden administrations, but also bipartisan agreement that China is a threat and a challenge to international order. While this is arguably the right starting point to compete and constrain China’s more hegemonic and malevolent goals, this does not offer a prescription for how to uphold the Biden administration’s strategy to “invest, align, compete”. Groups such as JUKE could do exactly that, working in concert with regional groupings, allies and partners.

In addition to revitalising NATO (thanks Vladimir Putin) and energising our bilateral alliances through outreach and friction reduction, the Biden administration brought new life to minilaterals such as the Quad and created new formats such as AUKUS and the Camp David Trilateral with Japan and the ROK. However, each of these formats has limitations and not one of them present options for significant impact on global policy coordination and implementation or provide an answer for how a non-China grouping could contribute to advancing prosperity and security. Furthermore, none of these groups specifically addresses the issue that I will seek to highlight – how to build more Europe-Asia connections, diplomatically and geopolitically.

The US has worked hard to expand its coordination with the largest economic bloc, the EU, and had great success in building trilateral cooperation with Japan and the ROK. This work could serve as a jumping off point for the JUKE. If the US, along with the second and fourth largest economies (the EU and Japan), and the sixth most “powerful” country economically and militarily (the ROK), combine efforts, there is unlimited potential for what the JUKE grouping could accomplish globally. The EU could piggyback on trilateral work being done in ASEAN countries as outlined in the Camp David statement. Both the US-EU dialogue and the Camp David Trilateral suggest greater cooperation on the Pacific Islands. A JUKE grouping would combine and expand that conversation to develop and enhance cooperation and investment. The investment needed over the coming years to stay ahead of China, let alone continue to offer opportunity and prosperity to the world, will require vast amounts of wealth and R&D from the US and its allies and partners. In addition, establishment of this partnership will provide a platform for current and future areas of mutual interest and global impact.

This CSDS Policy Brief will highlight potential areas where a JUKE grouping will contribute to increased policy alignment and support collective efforts by allies and partners in other multilateral fora. Additionally, the brief will outline a path forward to initiate a JUKE partnership.

Ukraine

Japan and the ROK have provided billions in humanitarian aid for Ukraine and the Ukrainian people as it continues to suffer an ongoing conflict with Russia. JUKE could serve as a useful vehicle to not only find ways to increase current support to ensure Ukraine can continue to hold off the Russian attack, but also to organise reconstruction once peace or an armistice is achieved. The group could discuss how to provide much-needed energy infrastructure to help bolster the grid that Russia targeted throughout the spring and summer of 2024. Reconstruction of Ukraine will require upwards of 500 billion dollars and not only will that money need to come from somewhere, Ukraine and its people will need support from companies and countries that can build and build quickly. Japan and the ROK are particularly well positioned to contribute, and coordination of these future efforts should start now.

Innovation and technology

The ROK, Japan, Taiwan, the US and the Netherlands have collectively managed to keep a five-year lead on China in commercial manufacturing of advanced logic chips and this serves as a prime example of how we can, collectively, keep our lead in critical industries of today and the future. Building on existing government support such as the US’ CHIPS act funding, the JUKE grouping could augment and complement the work of the Chip 4 Alliance. In addition to semiconductors, a building block for future development across all industries, the JUKE grouping is well positioned to discuss space, artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum-related research, investment and regulatory policy. The grouping could look to the December 2023 US-ROK meeting of the Critical and Emerging Technologies (CET) Dialogue and increase cooperation in biotechnology and other technologies of the future. The Commerce Department-led meeting on supply chain security serves as a prime example of how this group could seek to develop answers to our most pressing questions and prescribe a response to China.

Energy transition and civil nuclear power

Currently, China is up to 15 years ahead of the US and its allies on the construction of advanced nuclear power technologies thanks in no small part to massive governmental investment and favourable loans that will result in the construction of up to 150 new reactors before 2035 in China. This is a particularly important technology where we should not fall further behind for two important reasons. First, the International Energy Agency suggests that to meet our NetZero goals, we should build dozens of new reactors each year to generate 550 gigawatts of new nuclear power by 2050. Second, a 1-gigawatt plant costs about $5 billion, which means almost three trillion dollars are both needed and up for grabs over the next 25 years. Despite lagging China currently, if the JUKE countries made nuclear power generation a key priority, it could catalyse rapid growth in large and Small Modular Reactor (SMR) plants since this grouping, if it cooperates rather than competes, has both the research and construction capability to lead this important field and retake leadership in the industry globally from China. There are currently 80 different SMR reactors in the design stage and numerous countries are signing 123 agreements to further civil nuclear cooperation with the US and partnering through the FIRST programme. Construction of SMRs and traditional plants globally will expand rapidly in the next 20 years and now is the time for us to work together to support this effort.

Cybersecurity and counterterrorism

Japan and the ROK could join efforts ongoing between the US and the EU to share information concerning identifying and responding to foreign information manipulation and interference. The work on this topic as well as exchanges on human rights could be enhanced and amplified if Japan and Korea joined their voices to the ongoing conversation and, using the September 2024 US-EU dialogue on China and the Indo-Pacific as a framework, pick up on themes of concern such as the DPRK’s continued arms transfers to Russia and Russia’s use of DPRK ballistic missiles in Ukraine. Additionally, the grouping could serve as an effective forum to discuss ways to collectively respond to transnational threats such as cyber-attacks and terrorism. While cyber-attacks could come from China, they also could emanate from Russia, DPRK, terrorist groups and other malign actors so such discussions could offer the grouping more latitude to discuss ways to deter China as well as other actors without specifically calling out China, something that is problematic especially for the ROK. Another potential positive outcome from such discussions could be an increase in information and intelligence exchange between the countries and help the countries react more effectively and collectively in the case of a new threat in the future.

G7

The ROK, along with Australia and several other candidates, hopes to join a “G10” that expands the G7’s mandate beyond the current exclusive group and offers a greater voice to the Indo-Pacific. A JUKE grouping would offer the ROK a chance to showcase how aligned it already is with the G7 while also highlighting to the group the fact that the ROK brings capability, especially in construction and manufacturing both batteries and semiconductors but also tanks, artillery and other defence articles, that the other G7 countries lack. Shipbuilding, chips, batteries, nuclear power and arms production are a few areas where the ROK shines, but overall, the South Koreans retain a capability to produce goods and complete large scale, complex construction projects in a timely manner. This could be a critical piece of the puzzle as the JUKE (and future G10) seek to implement policies and produce results.

Cultural exchange and global health

The impact of soft power to address all global challenges should not be underestimated. The collective cultural influence of the US, EU, ROK and Japan can shape global narratives, counteract authoritarianism, promote human rights and sustain a rules-based international order. The JUKE grouping could develop both new ways to build cooperation and also augment current programmes such as Fulbright and Erasmus+ that have lasting impact. Research coordination amongst institutions and governments could boost ongoing efforts such as the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI) to fight infectious diseases and prepare for or prevent the next pandemic.

DPRK

Japan and the ROK face an existential threat from the DPRK. While perhaps some in Europe can see the North Koreans as more of a regional threat, given the DPRK’s possession of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction as well as its cyber attacking capabilities, and its “strategic partnership” with Russia, it is a nation that poses a global threat. The JUKE grouping could offer the EU a chance to engage on the DPRK more actively. To more effectively deter the isolated nation, more information sharing and cooperation could make cyber defence against the DPRK more effective. On the engagement front, if the EU or some of its member countries participated in a new dialogue on and with North Korea, this could create a more balanced approach to talks and, ultimately, more buy-in for support for aid and ultimately the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the DPRK.

Action plan

Think tanks, experts and government officials could work together and develop JUKE along the lines below:

• Start a Track 2 JUKE grouping with a leading think tank and/or academic representative(s) meeting to suggest pillars for JUKE’s activities;

• Follow this with track 1.5 meetings based on the pillars with the most promise – supply chain resilience and Ukraine support and reconstruction are two that appear to have the most potential; and,

• In Seoul, Tokyo, Brussels and Washington, embassy representatives could meet to discuss informally, the way many capitals host Quad-format meetings, the merit of the JUKE grouping. Other capitals could also lead meetings on the topic with embassy representatives, thus sending back messages about potential areas for cooperation among the JUKE members.

Conclusion

The world is increasingly more interconnected and it requires a diplomatic forum to coordinate a global effort to ensure peace, security and prosperity across regions. Whether JUKE becomes as effective as the next Quad or AUKUS or not, Asia and Europe could and should engage in more formal and informal diplomatic coordination. The US, as an Atlantic and Pacific power, should continue to take on the role of pulling Europe to engage more in Asia and pushing Asia to invest more in its relationships with Europe. This trend is ongoing, but groupings like JUKE could accelerate and focus the evolution. Additionally, it could facilitate industry-government cooperation that will be needed to tackle the big challenges and marshal the necessary investments required to maintain economic security, counter China and tackle global challenges such as finding ways to satisfy Asia’s need for an additional ten terawatts of power by 2050, doubling the current demand.

December 2024

https://www.bakerinstitute.org/research/us-korea-ties-hinge-counter-china-efforts-energy-and-shipbuilding-sector-cooperation

For Korea to successfully navigate relations with the second Trump administration, South Korea and South Korean companies should highlight how they can help the United States compete with China, especially in the shipbuilding and energy sectors and through support of Ukraine. Serving in the last months of Trump’s first administration’s NSC, a singular focus on China directed every action. Even serving in the Europe directorate, I spent 90% of my day coordinating with key allies like the UK and Turkey on China-related issues. The Biden administration continued largely with Trump’s China approach but without the same singular focus, due in large part to Russia’s further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To best manage its relationship with the United States, South Korea should promote its companies in key sectors that offset U.S. deficiencies and help the United States compete with China, taking into account the significant relationship with China. However, if the Trump team sees Korea making an effort to “balance” its relationship with the United States with its approach to China, it could result in bilateral friction, economically and diplomatically.

Shipbuilding — Korean Companies Key to U.S. Building Renaissance

During my recent trip to Seoul following the U.S. election, contacts expressed concern about Trump’s approach to the Korean peninsula, but focused less on how to address Trump’s China concerns. President-elect Trump offered an indication of how he might approach the alliance when he spoke with President Yoon on November 6 and highlighted his hope for “close cooperation with Korea in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of ships” to support naval shipbuilding and repair. Trump likely focused on this topic given the extreme imbalance in the Chinese and U.S. shipbuilding industries that many, including NSA-nominee Mike Waltz, have pointed out publicly as a threat to U.S. national security. Korea and Korean business should take this as an invitation to work closely with the incoming team to find a way to contribute — to the U.S. economy, to U.S. national security, and to the struggle to compete with China both in terms of naval capacity as well as in our ability to move cargo and energy. To respond to such an invitation means Korean industry and the ROKG should offer specific proposals for how Korea could help the United States catch up with China, offering one approach that requires Jones Act reform and allows foreign companies to build ships in the United States with fewer impediments, and one less ambitious plan that focuses on coordination within the framework of the act. Ideally, competing Korean firms could work together to present the strongest offer, with the most expansive scale of ambition and investment, at the earliest date. 

Energy — Investment and Supply Chain Cooperation 

To secure and enhance strong overall bilateral ties throughout the next four years, South Korea could also cooperate with the United States to satisfy U.S. demand for electric power and to secure a global supply chain for the energy transition. Korea is uniquely positioned with its capability to build nuclear power plants and, when the Westinghouse and KEPCO negotiation concludes, Korean and U.S. firms could successfully compete for the trillions of dollars at stake as the world turns to nuclear power — with both traditional and small modular (SMR) reactors — to offer energy access to the billions of people who are currently without, power the continuing electrification of the transportation sector, and respond to the increased demand for electricity to support AI and quantum computing. In addition, China poses a threat to the United States and South Korea as it seeks monopolies by flooding the market with solar panels, inverters, electrolyzers, as well as the mineral building blocks for batteries, displays, and semiconductors. If there are not non-Chinese options for these materials and products, key to expanding the energy grid, boosting energy access and assuring the energy transition, China could weaponize its stranglehold on the modern energy sector much as Russia has weaponized its fossil fuel resources. 

Ukraine — Countering China Industrially and in Ukraine

South Korea offers an alternative to China as a world leader in many industries, from batteries to steel to semiconductors, and plays a critical role in bolstering the western supply chain and manufacturing capacity. South Korea could offer to arm Ukraine during the ongoing conflict if the U.S. sought to reduce its support, and then to rearm Ukraine after an armistice, hopefully in 2025. Korean companies are uniquely well-equipped to rebuild Ukraine’s critical infrastructure, from roads to buildings, airports to nuclear plants, and critical energy infrastructure. After spending years working on Ukraine-related issues, attending numerous one-on-one meetings with top Ukrainian business leaders as well as the current and former President, and attending President Zelensky’s inauguration in 2019 as part of our official delegation, I am convinced that Ukraine has all the ingredients to serve as an engine for European growth once Russia and Ukraine conclude an armistice. Korea’s engagement would not only benefit Ukraine, spurring growth and energizing the European market, it would result in significant profit for Korean companies, and it would allow the United States to focus more energy on its counter-China approach and to address urgent domestic concerns. 

If South Korea can effectively continue its cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and trilaterally, through efforts like the Fab 4 to secure semiconductor supply chains and through leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership that helps ensure the west has access to minerals needed for batteries, semiconductors and other key industries, Korea could offer a roadmap for how minilateral efforts can offer clear alternatives to China. Korea is currently the chair of the MSP and Korean companies like Posco play leading roles in securing critical minerals through projects like the Mehenge Project in Tanzania that offers a non-Chinese source for graphite.

Next Steps — Opportunities to Compete With China and Strengthen the Alliance 

Korean businesses could secure long-term growth and bolster our alliance with initial focus on investing in the U.S. shipbuilding and energy sectors. Such investment would serve to counter China while creating jobs and preserving manufacturing in the United States. Korea and Korean companies should, when they engage with the Trump team, frame their contribution, investment and potential cooperation with the United States first and foremost as part of the struggle to counter China. Korea will have good relations with the United States over the next four years if the Trump team sees Korea and Korean businesses not as competitors but as key players to help them implement their vision to compete with China.

December 2024

https://www.lawtimes.co.kr/LawFirm-NewsLetter/203421

For Korea to successfully navigate relations with the second Trump administration, South Korea and South Korean companies should highlight how they can help the United States compete with China, especially in the shipbuilding and energy sectors and through increased support of Ukraine. Serving in the last months of Trump's first administration's NSC, a singular focus on China directed every action. Even serving in the Europe directorate, I spent 90 percent of my day coordinating with key allies like the UK and Turkey on China-related issues. The Biden administration continued largely with Trump's China approach but without the same singular focus, due in large part to Russia's further invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. To best manage its relationship with the United States, South Korea should promote its companies in key sectors that offset US deficiencies and help the United States compete with China, taking into account its significant relationship with China. However, if the Trump team sees Korea making an effort to “balance” its relationship with the United States with its approach to China, it could result in friction bilaterally, economically and diplomatically.

Shipbuilding - Korean Companies Key to US Building Renaissance
During my recent trip to Seoul following the US election, contacts expressed concern about Trump's approach to the Korean peninsula, but less focused on how to address Trump's China concerns. President-elect Trump offered an indication of how he might approach the alliance when he spoke with President Yoon on November 6 and highlighted his hope for “close cooperation with Korea in the maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) of ships” to support naval shipbuilding and repair. Trump likely focused on this topic given the extreme imbalance in the Chinese and US shipbuilding industries that many, including NSA-nominee Mike Waltz, have pointed out publicly as a threat to US national security. Korea and Korean business should take this as an invitation to work closely with the incoming team to find a way to contribute - to the US economy, to US national security, and to the struggle to compete with China both in terms of naval capacity as well as in our ability to move cargo and energy. To respond to such an invitation means Korean industry and the ROKG should offer specific proposals for how Korea could help the United States catch up with China, offering one approach that requires Jones Act reform and allows foreign companies to build ships in the United States with fewer impediments, and one less ambitious plan that focuses on coordination within the framework of the act. Ideally, competing Korean firms could work together to present the strongest offer, with the most expansive scale of ambition and investment, at the earliest date.

Energy - Investment and Supply Chain Cooperation
To secure and enhance strong overall bilateral ties throughout the next four years, South Korea could also cooperate with the United States to satisfy US demand for electric power and to secure a global supply chain for the energy transition. Korea is uniquely positioned with its capability to build nuclear power plants and, when the Westinghouse and KEPCO negotiation concludes, Korean and US firms could successfully compete for the trillions of dollars at stake as the world turns to nuclear power - with both traditional and small modular (SMR) reactors - to offer energy access to the billions of people who are currently without, power the continuing electrification of the transportation sector, and respond to the increased demand for electricity to support AI and quantum computing. In addition, China poses a threat to the United States and South Korea as it seeks monopolies by flooding the market with solar panels, inverters, electrolyzers, as well as the mineral building blocks for batteries, displays, and semiconductors. If there are not non-Chinese options for these materials and products, key to expanding the energy grid, boosting energy access and assuring the energy transition, China could weaponize its stranglehold on the modern energy sector much as Russia has weaponized its fossil fuel resources.

Ukraine - Countering China Industrially and in Ukraine
South Korea offers an alternative to China as a world leader in many industries, from batteries to steel to semiconductors, and plays a critical role in bolstering the western supply chain and manufacturing capacity. South Korea could offer to arm Ukraine during the ongoing conflict if the US sought to reduce its support, and then to rearm Ukraine after an armistice, hopefully in 2025. Korean companies are uniquely well-equipped to rebuild Ukraine's critical infrastructure, from roads to buildings, airports to nuclear plants, and critical energy infrastructure. After spending years working on Ukraine-related issues, attending numerous one-on-one meetings with top Ukrainian business leaders as well as the current and former Ukrainian President, and attending President Zelensky's inauguration in 2019 as part of our official US presidential delegation, I am convinced that Ukraine has all the ingredients to serve as an engine for European growth once Russia and Ukraine conclude an armistice. Korea's engagement would not only benefit Ukraine, spurring growth and energizing the European market, it would result in significant profit for Korean companies, and it would allow the United States to focus more energy on its counter-China approach and to address urgent domestic concerns.

If South Korea can effectively continue its cooperation with Japan, bilaterally and trilaterally, through efforts like the Fab 4 to secure semiconductor supply chains and through leadership in the Minerals Security Partnership that helps ensure the west has access to minerals needed for batteries, semiconductors and other key industries, Korea could offer a roadmap for how minilateral efforts can offer clear alternatives to China. Korea is currently the chair of the MSP and Korean companies like Posco play leading roles in securing critical minerals through projects like the Mehenge Project in Tanzania that offers a non-Chinese source for graphite.

Next Steps - Opportunities to Compete with China and Strengthen the Alliance
Korean businesses could secure long-term growth and bolster our alliance with initial focus on investing in the US shipbuilding and energy sectors. Such investment would serve to counter China while creating jobs and preserving manufacturing in the United States. Korea and Korean companies should, when they engage with the Trump team, frame their contribution, investment and potential cooperation with the United States first and foremost as part of the struggle to counter China. Korea will have good relations with the United States over the next four years if the Trump team sees Korea and Korean businesses not as competitors but as key players to help them implement their vision to compete with China.